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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1986, the Washington Legislature adopted a broad
reform of the principles governing tort liability law. The Tort
Reform Act of 19861 was the most far-reaching legislative revi-
sion of tort law in Washington state history, and perhaps in the
nation.2 The legislation established dramatic changes in the
rules governing civil actions for tort recovery, ranging from
such basic concepts of liability law as the doctrine of joint and
1. Tort Reform Act of 1986, ch. 305, §§ 100-912, 1986 Wash. Laws 1354-67 (codified
in scattered sections of WASH. REV. CODE (1991)).
2. See Cornelius J. Peck, Washington's Partial Rejection and Modification of the
Common Law Rule of Joint and Several Liability, 62 WASH. L. REV. 233, 233 (1987)
(stating that the forces of tort reform in Washington "probably accomplished more of




several liability among tortfeasors 3 and the maximum amount
of damages recoverable,4 to matters concerning the waiver of
the physician-patient privilege in personal injury cases5 and
limited immunity for directors and officers of certain charita-
ble organizations.6 In sum, the compendium of modern tort
law principles adopted in the 1986 Act "cast a heavy shadow on
the common law"7 of liability in Washington.
The Tort Reform Act was enacted by overwhelming
majorities of both houses of the state legislature," and the tort
reform movement has received strong support from the pub-
lic.9 However, within the legal community, reform of the rules
governing civil liability has remained sharply controversial.
Following the enactment of the legislation, the field of battle
over tort reform has shifted from the political to the legal,
from the legislature to the courts. In 1989, the Washington
Supreme Court struck down a provision in the Act1° that
placed a ceiling on the amount of non-economic damages that
could be awarded." A divided court declared the cap on dam-
ages to be an improper infringement upon the jury's role of
determining an appropriate award of damages. The court
therefore invalidated the provision as a violation of the state
constitutional right to a jury trial. 2 Many other significant
reforms in the legislation have also been the subject of consti-
3. Tort Reform Act of 1986, ch. 305, § 401, 1986 Wash. Laws 1357-58 (codified at
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070 (1991)).
4. Id, § 301, 1986 Wash. Laws 1357 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 4.56.250 (1991)).
This provision was invalidated as unconstitutional by the Washington Supreme Court.
Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 112 Wash. 2d 636, 771 P.2d 711, modified, 780 P.2d 260 (1989).
5. Tort Reform Act of 1986, ch. 305, § 101, 1986 Wash. Laws 1355-56 (codified at
WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060(4) (1991)).
6. Id. § 903, 1986 Wash. Laws 1365 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.264 (1991)).
7. See Roger J. Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common-law Orbits, 17 CATH. U.
L. REV. 401, 402 (1968) (a statute "may cast a heavy shadow on the common law or a
light one").
8. See H. Journal, 49th Reg. Sess. & Spec. Sess. 1068-69 (1986) (adoption of Tort
Reform Act by vote of 65-32); S. Journal, 49th Reg. Sess. & 1st Spec. Sess. 498 (1986)
(final passage by vote of 31-16).
9. For example, a poll taken in 1987 revealed that 70 percent of the national
population supported elimination of joint and several liability among defendants to
tort actions. Karyn T. Hicks, The Case for Reform: An Economic Analysis of Joint and
Several Liability After Comparative Negligence, 17 CAP. U. L. REV. 187, 197 (1988)
(citing Harris poll).
10. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.56.250 (1991).
11. Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 112 Wash. 2d 636, 771 P.2d 711, modified, 780 P.2d
260 (1989).
12. WASH. CONST., art. I, § 21.
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tutional dispute, first in the law review literature 3  and
increasingly in the courts.14
The centerpiece of the Tort Reform Act of 1986, and the
provision with the greatest effect upon liability law, is Revised
Code of Washington (RCW) 4.22.070.' In this single section of
the Act, the Washington Legislature established a new founda-
tion for tort liability--one of individual responsibility in direct
proportion to individual fault. RCW 4.22.070 significantly mod-
ifies the application of joint and several liability against joint
tortfeasors, particularly (but not only) in circumstances where
the plaintiff is also at fault. Not surprisingly, opponents of the
path taken by the Washington State Legislature have focused
their greatest energies against this provision. The region's law
reviews, as well as other legal periodicals, have published
numerous articles discussing the provision, its merits, its weak-
nesses, and its validity.'" The various and sundry constitu-
tional objections raised-and the strength of those objections-
to the modification of joint and several liability have been
addressed elsewhere.' 7
Opponents of the legislative changes to joint and several
liability have recently opened a new front in the war on tort
reform, emphasizing their struggle against the modification of
joint and several liability. In addition to the frontal constitu-
13. Bryan P. Harnetiaux, RCW 4.22.070, Joint and Several Liability, and the
Indivisibility of Harm, 27 GONZ. L. REV. 193 (1991/92); Cornelius J. Peck,
Constitutional Challenges to the Partial Rejection and Modifwcation of the Common
Law Rule of Joint and Several Liability Made by the 1986 Washington Tort Reform
Act 62 WASH. L. REV. 681 (1986/1987) [hereinafter Peck, Constitutional Challenges];
Charles K. Wiggins et al., Washington's 1986 Tort Legislation and the State
Constitution: Testing the Limits, 22 GONZ. L. REV. 193 (1987). But see Gregory C. Sisk,
The Constitutional Validity of the Modification of Joint and Several Liability in the
Washington Tort Reform Act of 1986, 13 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 433 (1990)
(concluding that the statutory modification of joint and several liability passes
constitutional muster); Thomas J. McLaughlin & Bradley L. Fisher, Apportioning the
"Indivisible" Comparative Liability, 27 GONZ. L. REV. 207 (1991/92) (same); John J.
McFadden, Comment, Development in the Law, The 1986 Washington Tort Reform
Act: Elimination of Joint and Several Liability (RCW 4.22.070), 23 WILLAMETrE L.
REV. 211, 235 (1987) (same).
14. As of the date of this writing, the Washington appellate courts have not yet
addressed the constitutionality of other provisions in the Tort Reform Act of 1986. I
am aware of at least one superior court decision upholding the constitutionality of
RCW 4.22.070, the provision modifying joint and several liability. Werner v. R & H
Construction, Inc., No. 88-2-06577-8 (Pierce County Super. Ct. June 29, 1990).
15. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070 (1991).
16. See, e.g., Peck, Washington's Partial Rejection, supra note 2; Wiggins et al.,
supra note 13.
17. See authors cited supra note 13.
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tional challenge to the validity of RCW 4.22.070, the opponents
of tort reform in the plaintiff's bar initiated a flanking maneu-
ver to destroy the statute through suggested interpretive mod-
els that would drain the provision of its reforming energy.1 8
Although commentators from all points of view were originally
in general agreement on the meaning of the statute's basic pro-
visions,19 creative tort law advocates have now begun formulat-
ing alternative theories of statutory interpretation designed to
dismantle the reforms. From this new deconstructionist per-
spective, RCW 4.22.070 is portrayed as either a modest and
insignificant provision with limited application, or as a hope-
lessly ambiguous statute that should be narrowly construed to
preserve the basic concepts of full joint and several liability in
Washington. In addition to the statutory "disinterpretation"
strategy, members of the plaintiffs' bar within the state bar
association have campaigned for changes in the court rules of
civil procedure. Specifically, those changes seek to impose
upon defendants an early burden of raising by pleading the
issue of fault allocation among all potentially responsible
tortfeasors.
This Article is offered in defense of RCW 4.22.070 and in
opposition to the deconstruction of legislative tort reform. My
premise is that the legislature did indeed intend to accomplish
a significant reform of the liability system and to take a long,
purposeful stride toward the implementation of comparative
fault as applied to all parties in tort litigation. Moreover, I con-
clude that the legislature adopted language that adequately, if
sometimes imperfectly, achieves that purpose.
My thesis is this: Proposed interpretations of the statute
18. See, e.g., David Heller, Statutory Construction and the "Empty Chair," TRIAL
NEWS (Washington St. Trial Lawyers Ass'n), Apr. 1991, at 2 (stating that while
constitutional invalidation of joint and several liability modification statute would
solve all problems, plaintiffs' lawyers can overcome some obstacles through statutory
interpretation); Richard B. Kilpatrick, Joint and Several Liability Under Tort Reform
Act of 1986, TRIAL NEWS (Washington St. Trial Lawyers Ass'n), Dec. 1990, at 13
(urging "vigilance, imagination, and sharing of idea" to challenge RCW 4.22.070 on
constitutional, statutory, and procedural grounds). In addition to its longstanding
amicus curiae committee, which works to develop constitutional and statutory
challenges to legislative provisions limiting tort liability, the Washington State Trial
Lawyers Association has created a network for sharing briefs and other materials
directed toward attacking the joint and several liability provision on both
constitutional and statutory grounds. See, e.g., TRIAL NEWS (Washington St. Trial
Lawyers Ass'n), Sept. 1991, at 2, col. 3.
19. Peck, Washington's Partial Rejection, supra note 2, at 242-56; Sisk, supra note
13; Wiggins et al., supra note 13, at 236-39.
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that serve to undermine the guiding principle of comparative
fault in liability are not in accord with either the plain lan-
guage of the provision or the history of its enactment.20 That is
not to say that there are no gaps left to be filled. On occasion,
the courts must apply the 1986 modification of joint and sev-
eral liability in contexts that are also regulated by other legis-
lative enactments. The workers' compensation statutory
scheme 21 and the section of the earlier 1981 product liability
act providing relief to retailers from liability for defective
products are examples of other statutory provisions22 that must
be coordinated with the 1986 adoption of comparative fault.
Nevertheless, the essential framework of RCW 4.22.070 can
readily be discerned from the language of the statute, and it
does not plausibly lend itself to the unusual interpretations
offered to preserve the broader liability rules that previously
prevailed in Washington common law.
The subject of this Article is statutory interpretation. In
particular, I discuss the following: the meaning of "fault" as
applicable through RCW 4.22.070;23 the nature of the entities to
whom fault must be allocated;24 the responsibility for raising
the culpability of an unjoined entity and the burden of proof
on allocation of fault;25 the manner in which damages are to be
apportioned among the culpable parties;26 the separate rule for
20. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1) (1991) (commanding trier of fact to
"determine the percentage of the total fault which is attributable to every entity which
caused" the injury or harm, and providing that the "liability of each defendant shall be
several only and shall not be joint" unless the case falls within certain narrow
limitations and exceptions) (emphasis added); S. Journal, 49th Reg. Sess. & 1st Spec.
Sess. 466 (1986) (legislation promotes "good public policy to have those persons who
have contributed to the problem pay proportionate to their contribution") (remarks of
Sen. Thompson); id. at 1486 (changes in joint and several liability were adopted to deal
with unfairness of situation in which someone is found "fifty percent negligent in the
accident" and yet is left "paying the total cost") (remarks of Sen. Hayner); H. Journal,
49th Reg. Sess. & Spec. Sess. 1067-68 (1986) (explaining that joint and several liability
concept needed to be corrected because "it allows one person to be held liable for
another person's fault to some extent") (remarks of Rep. Barnes). See also Huber v.
Henley, 656 F. Supp. 508, 511 (S.D. Ind. 1987) (the provisions of Indiana's comparative
fault statute "signal a legislative policy favoring the principle of fair allocation among
all tortfeasors," and "[a]ny interpretation of legislative intent must therefore be made
with a cognizance of this policy").
21. See infra part IV.B; see also Clark v. Pacificorp, 118 Wash. 2d 167, 822 P.2d 162
(1991).
22. See infra part IV.C.
23. See infra part III.B.
24. See infra part III.C.1.
25. See infra part III.C.2.
26. See infra part III.D.
Tort Reform
parties acting in concert or as agents;27 the limited form of
joint and several liability that applies when the plaintiff is
without fault;28 the provisions for settlement and contribution
under the statute;29 and the three exceptions to the statute.30
In addition, I examine two areas in which RCW 4.22.070
must be read in conjunction with other statutes so as to give
the fullest possible effect to both legislative enactments. First,
I outline a recent Washington Supreme Court decision con-
cerning the application of comparative responsibility principles
to the workers' compensation program.3 ' In Clark v.
Pacificorp, the court held that the state government's right to
reimbursement of industrial insurance benefits from an
injured employee who recovers from a third person must be
proportionately reduced.32 Such a reduction occurs when fault
is allocated under the Tort Reform Act to the employer who is
immunized from liability under the workers' compensation
system. Second, I look at the application of the comparative
fault principles of the 1986 modification of joint and several lia-
bility in the context of the 1981 retailer relief provision, which
granted broad relief to retailers but left them exposed to liabil-
ity in certain circumstances, such as when the manufacturer of
a product was insolvent.3 Lastly, I offer some ruminations on
the future course of the common law as it develops with
respect to joint and several liability in those few areas that fall
outside the express mandate of the 1986 statute. 4
Other than as it bears on interpretation of the statute, the
constitutional validity of RCW 4.22.070 is not addressed in this
Article. That subject has been thoroughly examined in previ-
ous publications, including one that I authored.35 The legisla-
ture has adopted the statute. I believe the supreme court will
uphold it. In my view, and for good or for ill, RCW 4.22.070
will remain the law of the State of Washington for the foresee-
able future.
27. See infra part III.E.
28. See infra part III.F.
29. See infra part III.G.
30. See inrfra part III.H.
31. Clark v. Pacificorp, 118 Wash. 2d 167, 822 P.2d 162 (1992); see infra part IV.B.
32. 118 Wash. 2d at 181, 822 P.2d at 169-70.
33. See infra part IV.C.
34. See infra part V.
35. See authors cited supra note 13.
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II. RCW 4.22.070: BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY
A. The Road to Tort Reform: Joint and Several Liability
and the Expansion of Tort Liability
Under the common law doctrine of joint and several liabil-
ity, a plaintiff asserting a cause of action in tort was entitled to
pursue any or all responsible tortfeasors and thereafter collect
any part or all of the judgment against any one or more of the
defendants found to have contributed to the personal injury or
property damage.3 6 In other words, each individual defend-
ant-however slightly at fault in comparison to other defend-
ants-was liable for the entire amount of the damages awarded
to the plaintiff.3 7 At the same time, a plaintiff who was found
also to have been at fault, and thus to have contributed to the
event that led to the injury or damage, was barred from any
recovery, no matter how slight the plaintiff's contributory neg-
ligence.3 8 Both doctrines-the rule of joint and several liability
and the bar of contributory negligence- "grew out of the com-
mon law concept of the unity of the cause of action; the jury
could not be permitted to apportion the damages, since there
was but one wrong."39
However, two recent developments in tort law combined
to provide a sharper edge to the doctrine of joint and several
liability. The ever deepening channel dug by these two forces
into the tort liability system, and the consequent expansion of
liability, led to a rather sudden realization that an unlimited
rule of joint and several liability was no longer appropriate.
First, most states, including Washington, rejected the abso-
lute bar of contributory negligence to recovery by negligent
plaintiffs. Tort law was modified to permit plaintiffs, even
when they bear some culpability for the accident, to neverthe-
less recover against tortfeasors for a proportionate share of the
36. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 47, at
327-28 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS]; 1
STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 3.6, at 391-92 (1983);
Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co., 91 Wash. 2d 230, 235, 588 P.2d 1308,
1312 (1978).
37. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 36, § 47, at 327-28; 2
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 13.80(3], at 13-109 (1992); DaFonte v. UpRight, Inc., 828
P.2d 140, 142 (Cal. 1992).
38. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 36, § 65, at 451-52; 2
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 13.80[3], at 13-109 (1992); DaFonte, 828 P.2d at 142.




damages. In 1973, Washington adopted a pure system of com-
parative negligence under which the trier of fact allocates fault
between the plaintiff and the defendant and reduces the
amount of recovery by only the plaintiff's share of the total
fault for the accident. 40 The "premise that wrongs were inher-
ently indivisible or that responsibility could not rationally be
apportioned among multiple parties fell into disfavor."'" With
the removal of the bar of contributory negligence, the circum-
stances under which a defendant could be held liable in tort
dramatically increased, thereby also extending the reach of
joint and several liability.'
Second, during the last twenty to thirty years, the scope of
tort liability expanded exponentially.43 New causes of action
were invented; new duties of care were created. Strict liability,
or liability irrespective of negligence, was expanded to new
activities and subjects. The doctrine that a plaintiff could not
recover when he or she had assumed the risk by engaging in a
dangerous activity was merged into comparative negligence.
The immunity of governments and charitable institutions from
liability largely collapsed. The requirement of a direct link of
proximate causation was weakened. The expansion of substan-
tive liability law, and the removal of the contributory negli-
gence bar, combined so that the doctrine of joint and several
liability packed an extra wallop against defendants. As Peter
W. Huber puts it so colorfully, "fj]oint and several liability pro-
vided the brass knuckle at the end of the law's ever longer
swing."'44
To take a common example, the simple automobile acci-
40. 1973 Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess. 949, ch. 138, § 1 (codified as amended at WASH.
REV. CODE § 4.22.005-.015 (1991)).
41. Sisk, supra note 13, at 437.
42. Hicks, supra note 9, at 192 (adopting comparative negligence (and thereby
removing the bar to recovery of contributory negligence) in the 1970's exacerbated the
effects of joint and several liability because "an enormous new and distinct class of
injured parties was suddenly in the picture").
43. See generally George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort
Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1534-36 (1987) (outlining expansion of liability since the 1960's,
including limiting effect of contributory negligence and assumption of risk, expanding
strict liability, and relaxing rules of causation and statutes of limitations); George L.
Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual
Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 461 (1985) ("Since 1960, our
modern civil liability regime has experienced a conceptual revolution that is among
the most dramatic ever witnessed in the Anglo-American legal system.").
44. PETER W. HUBER, LAirLrrY-THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
79 (1988).
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dent case increasingly included an allegation against the state,
county, or city government.45 Although the primary cause of
the accident may have been the negligent or reckless driving of
another driver combined with the contributory negligence of
the plaintiff driver himself, economic realities encouraged the
creative plaintiff lawyer to look well beyond those primary
actors. The defendant driver might not have either sufficient
wealth or insurance coverage to pay a full recovery to the
plaintiff. The plaintiff's own insurance coverage might not be
sufficient to pay all expenses for a serious injury. The govern-
ment, however, was the quintessential "deep pocket," plainly
able to cash out to the plaintiff. Hence, a lawsuit would often
be filed against the government for negligent road design or
inadequate posting of highway signs, despite the negligent driv-
ers' primary responsibility.
During the common law period, but prior to the last
couple of decades, such a lawsuit was unlikely to succeed in
most jurisdictions. The court might have found the govern-
ment exempt from liability under the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. Or, alternatively, the court might have concluded
that the government owed no specific duty to individual driv-
ers, as opposed to the public in general, upon which a tort
cause of action could hang. Or the court might have barred
recovery from any defendant upon a finding that the plaintiff
driver was contributorily negligent. In any event, the court
was likely to find that any errors by the government in devel-
oping the roadway or posting signs were too removed from an
accident between two automobiles to fall within the realm of
proximate causation.46
45. See generally Peck, Washington's Partial Rejection, supra note 2, at 238; 2
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 13.80[3], at 13-109 (1992).
46. Even in recent years, Washington courts have continued to cut short the chain
of causation to a city's minor fault when the primary actor's behavior in an automobile
accident case is sufficiently egregious. For example, in Klein v. City of Seattle, 41
Wash. App. 636, 639, 705 P.2d 806, 808 (1985), the court refused to hold that negligent
road design was the legal proximate cause of an accident in which a speeding driver
had crossed the center line and collided with the plaintiff's car. See also Braegelmann
v. Snohomish County, 53 Wash. App. 381, 385-86, 766 P.2d 1137, 1140 (1989) (similar
facts to Klein with addition that at-fault driver was highly intoxicated). However,
when a motorist has acted merely with negligent carelessness, the link of causation
between government fault in road design or maintenance and a motor vehicle accident
will not be severed as a matter of law and public policy. See Stephens v. City of
Seattle, 62 Wash. App. 140, 144, 813 P.2d 608, 610 (1991) (fact that motorcyclist may
have been drinking and was speeding when he hit curb did not justify holding, as a
matter of law, that the sole proximate cause of accident was motorcyclist's own
[Vol. 16:1
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Not so any longer. Before tort reform in 1986, the state,
county, or city government stood a high chance of being held
fully responsible. Even if the government was found only
slightly at fault-perhaps far less culpable than either the
defendant or plaintiff drivers-the doctrine of joint and several
liability ensured that the government was left on the hook for
the entire judgment.47 For example, if the plaintiff was found
to be 40 percent at fault, the other driver 55 percent at fault,
and the government only 5 percent at fault, the government
was left holding the bag for 60 percent of the damages (assum-
ing the other driver was insolvent). The impact on taxpayer
dollars or liability insurance premiums paid by municipalities
was not difficult to imagine. Other similar examples of the
ever larger sweep of joint and several liability across the tort
law landscape abounded.4 Accordingly, "a consensus devel-
oped that a crisis existed in the administration of tort law and
in the operation of insurance enterprises. 49
B. Washington's Statutory Modification of Joint and Several
Liability in the Tort Reform Act of 1986
In Washington, the legislative response to this state of
negligence, rather than city's design of intersection). See also infra part V.C
(discussing Klein, Braegelmann, and Stephens).
47. See Zakshersky v. City of New York, 562 N.Y.S. 2d 371, 373 (1990) (stating that
among the flaws of the "old rule" of joint and several liability was that "[t]he
defendant with the 'deep pocket' need only be held in for a small percentage and yet
be liable for the full amount of the judgment").
48. See, e.g., HUBER, supra note 44, at 79 (citing as examples a case in which the
City of Los Angeles was held jointly and severally liable for a multimillion dollar
judgment based on inadequate trimming of bushes at an intersection, although the
accident's primary cause was that one driver ran the stop sign while high on drugs, and
another case in which the City of San Diego was held jointly and severally liable for a
$1.6 million judgment based on a theory of faulty road design when a drunk driver
crossed the center line and collided with a car in which the plaintiff was a passenger);
Peck, Washington's Partial Rejection, supra note 2, at 238 & n.18 (noting that "it has
become quite common" in automobile accident litigation for plaintiffs to charge the
governmental entity responsible for the roadway with fault in the design or
maintenance of the roadway) (citing Vasey v. Snohomish County, 44 Wash. App. 83,
721 P.2d 524 (1986), in which a county was held jointly and severally liable based upon
20 percent negligence in road design compared with 80 negilgence on the part of the
plaintiff's spouse who had been the driver of the car)).
49. 2 COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 13.80[1], at 13-99 (1992); see also STATE OF
WASHINGTON, A REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE FROM THE JOINT STUDY COMMITTEE ON
INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY 3 (1985) (concluding that the growth of
tort litigation compounded problems caused by insurance industry practices, leading to
a crisis in the availability and affordability of liability insurance).
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affairs was the Tort Reform Act of 1986.1 In that Act,
the legislature largely abandoned the archaic common law
doctrine of joint and several liability in cases where the
plaintiff is also at fault. Consistent with the adoption of
comparative negligence several years before, the legislature
mandated that recovery of tort damages generally be limited
to that portion of damages for which each individual defend-
ant is found to have been responsible.51
Under this new approach, codified in RCW 4.22.070, a
defendant's liability is several only, unless: (1) the plaintiff
was not at fault; (2) the defendant was acting in concert with
another person; (3) the person at fault was acting as an agent
of the defendant; or (4) the case falls within one of the three
exceptions to the statute.53 RCW 4.22.070 calls for allocation of
fault by the trier of fact to every entity, whether a party or
not, that played any part in causing the plaintiff's damages.
Each defendant is responsible to pay only its own share of the
loss, unless one of the limitations or exceptions permitting
application of joint and several liability applies, such as a find-
ing that the plaintiff lacks any culpability for his or her own
50. The legislature stated that the purpose of the reforms enacted were "to create
a more equitable distribution of the cost and risk of injury and increase the availability
and affordability of insurance." Tort Reform Act of 1986, ch. 305, § 100, 1986 Wash.
Laws 1354. Individual members of the legislature further explained the need for the
legislation to correct the unfairness of the joint and several liability doctrine in holding
defendants, who may be only partially at fault, liable for the entire amount of
damages. See, e.g., S. Journal, 49th Reg. Sess. & 1st Spec. Sess. 466 (1986) (legislation
adopts "good public policy to have those persons who have contributed to the problem
pay proportionate to their contribution") (remarks of Sen. Thompson); H. Journal,
49th Reg. Sess. & Spec. Sess. 1065 (1986) (describing the economic harm to society of
holding a defendant that is only ten percent responsible for an injury liable for the
entire amount of the damages simply because another tortfeasor is insolvent) (remarks
of Rep. Ballard). See also supra note 20 (additional comments by legislators).
51. Sisk, supra note 13, at 435. See also S. Journal, 49th Reg. Sess. & 1st Spec.
Sess. 1486 (1986) (explaining that, since contributory negligence had earlier been
eliminated in 1973, the modification of joint and several liability proposed in the 1986
Tort Reform Act "is just bringing it a little back toward where it was-a little bit of
equalization") (remarks of Sen. Newhouse); H. Journal, 49th Reg. Sess. & Spec. Sess.
1049 (1986) (saying change in joint and several liability means return to an "equal"
situation given the 1973 legislative changes) (remarks of Rep. Ballard).
52. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070 (1991).
53. Thomas V. Harris, Washington's 1986 Tort Reform Act: Partial Tort
Settlements After the Demise of Joint and Several Liability, 22 GoNz. L. REV. 67, 73-74




injury.54 By the terms of the statute, it is effective as to "all
actions" filed after August 1, 1986."
Because this is an Article about statutory interpretation,
our touchstone should be the actual words of the statute.
Thus, it is appropriate to set out the full text of RCW 4.22.070:
(1) In all actions involving fault of more than one entity,
the trier of fact shall determine the percentage of the total
fault which is attributable to every entity which caused the
claimant's damages, including the claimant or person suffer-
ing personal injury or incurring property damage, defend-
ants, third-party defendants, entities released by the
claimant, entities immune from liability to the claimant and
entities with any other individual defense against the claim-
ant. Judgment shall be entered against each defendant
except those who have been released by the claimant or are
immune from liability to the claimant or have prevailed on
any other individual defense which represents that party's
proportionate share of the claimant's total damages. The lia-
bility of each defendant shall be several only and shall not
be joint except:
(a) A party shall be responsible for the fault of
another person or for payment of the proportionate share of
another party where both were acting in concert or when a
person was acting as an agent or servant of the party.
(b) If the trier of fact determines that the claimant or
party suffering bodily injury or incurring property damages
was not at fault, the defendants against whom judgment is
54. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1)(b) (1991); see generally Sisk, supra note 13, at
469-71 (1991).
55. Tort Reform Act of 1986, ch. 305, § 910, 1986 Wash. Laws 1367. Accordingly,
the statutory adoption of comparative fault applies to all suits commenced after
August 1, 1986, including a plaintiff's addition of a new defendant by amendment of a
complaint, or an action for contribution by one tortfeasor against another tortfeasor
who was not a party to the original action by the plaintifff. Erickson v. Wright
Welding Supply, Inc., 485 N.W.2d 82, 84-85 (Iowa 1992) (new defendant who was added
to lawsuit by amended complaint after effective date of tort reform statute was
entitled to benefit of new statute; addition of new defendant did not relate back to date
of filing of original action before effective date of statute); Bisaillon v. Casares, 798
P.2d 1368 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (absent a mistake as to the identity of the parties
permitting an amendment of the complaint to relate back to the date of the original
complaint, the plaintiff's amendment of the complaint to add a new defendant
constituted the commencement of a new suit after the effective date of the Arizona
statute abolishing joint and several liability); Fraser v. Beutel, 56 Wash. App. 725, 739,
785 P.2d 470, 478 (1990) (although the plaintiff brought action against the defendant
before August 1, 1986, when the defendant filed a third party action for contribution
against another tortfeasor after the effective date of the statute, the contribution suit
was a new cause of action subject to the provisions of the Tort Reform Act of 1986).
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entered shall be jointly and severally liable for the sum of
their proportionate shares of the claimants [sic] damages.
(2) If a defendant is jointly and severally liable under one
of the exceptions listed in subsections (1)(a) or (1)(b) of this
section, such defendant's rights to contribution against
another jointly and severally liable defendant, and the effect
of settlement by either such defendant, shall be determined
under RCW 4.22.040, 4.22.050, and 4.22.060.
(3) (a) Nothing in this section affects any cause of action
relating to hazardous wastes or substances or solid waste dis-
posal sites.
(b) Nothing in this section shall affect a cause of action
arising from the tortious interference with contracts or busi-
ness relations.
(c) Nothing in this section shall affect any cause of
action arising from the manufacture or marketing of a fungi-
ble product in a generic form which contains no clearly iden-
tifiable shape, color, or marking.5
III. INTERPRETATION OF RCW 4.22.070
A. The Rules of the Game
1. Sustaining the Plain Meaning of the Statute
When I was first prompted to explore the subject of the
interpretation of RCW 4.22.070, my impression was that this
would be a rather barren area for legal analysis. In its basic
operation, I did not (and do not) think the statute is truly in
much need of interpretation. Its purpose is clear. Its language
is direct. There are no apparent ambiguities in the provisions
as written. The ordinary reader, even one educated in the
skills of lawyerly disputation, would likely conclude that how-
ever controversial the adoption of the statute, its application
would raise few significant issues of statutory interpretation.
This impression is further confirmed by the fact that, until
quite recently, virtually every commentator who has looked at
the statute-including those who are critical or advocate con-
stitutional invalidation of it-have reached the same, simple
conclusions about its basic operation. For example, three
respected members of the state plaintiff's bar57 and I" have
56. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070 (1991).
57. Wiggins et al., supra note 13 (Charles K. Wiggins, Bryan P. Harnetiaux and
Robert H. Whaley).
58. Sisk, supra note 13.
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authored articles that, while focusing on constitutional chal-
lenges to the statute, have also provided an overview of the
structure and meaning of the statute. There were no real dis-
agreements on these basic underlying points. Professor Corne-
lius J. Peck of the University of Washington School of Law has
also studied the statute and, while criticizing the drafting of
the statute and suggesting a few interesting issues of interpre-
tation, had little difficulty perceiving the fundamental format
and effect of the statute.5 9 Finally, the Washington Supreme
Court Committee on Jury Instructions, which includes noted
plaintiffs' attorneys among its membership, has published pat-
tern instructions implementing the 1986 reforms. Again, this
committee of lawyers reached the same conclusions about the
fundamental purpose and effect of RCW 4.22.070.0
Notwithstanding, members of the Washington plaintiffs'
bar have recently suggested very different understandings of
RCW 4.22.070 and have further urged the aggressive advocacy
of such variant interpretations before the courts.61 These
interpretations depart significantly from the common under-
standing of the statute that has prevailed heretofore; more-
over, the transparent intent of these advocates, and the obvious
effect of the proposed interpretations, are to nullify or under-
mine the statutory retreat from broad rules of joint and sev-
eral liability. Accordingly, the receptivity of the courts to
these deconstructionist interpretations will determine whether
the 1986 Act has truly given birth to a new era of tort liability
founded upon the principle of comparative fault, or whether
tort reform instead will die aborning in the courts.
Fortunately, despite the superficial appeal and creativity
of some of the proffered arguments, the language of the statute
and the legislative history, together with a healthy dose of
common sense, provide the rejoinder to these proposals. I
think it may safely be predicted that the Washington appellate
courts will not accept such interpretations of RCW 4.22.070 for
the simple reason that these arguments fail to adhere to the
59. Peck, Washington's Partial Rejection, supra note 2; Peck, Constitutional
Challenge, supra note 13.
60. Washington Pattern Jury Instruction-Civil, §§ 41.00-50.24, 6 WASHINGTON
PRACTICE (1989 & Supp. 1990).
61. See, e.g., Heler, supra note 18; Kilpatrick, supra note 18; Charles K. Wiggins,
Living Without Joint and Several Liability, in 1ST ANNUAL TORT LAW UPDATE:
WHAT You DON'T KNOW CAN HURT You AND YOUR CLIENT 204, 208-10 (sponsored by
Washington St. Trial Lawyers Ass'n Oct. 5, 1990).
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plain language and obvious import of the statute. Several of
these newly-minted interpretations of RCW 4.22.070 invite the
courts to excise certain phrases and commands from the stat-
ute. For example, these tort law advocates would reduce the
requirement that the trier of fact determine the percentage of
fault to be assigned to each entity to a useless formality by con-
struing the statute to allow the trier of fact to ignore that fault
allocation when apportioning the damages to be assessed
against each defendant.62 In yet another imaginative approach,
and notwithstanding the statute's direct command that fault be
allocated to "every entity," a canon of statutory interpretation
would be misapplied to severely restrict the field of responsible
entities that would be considered by the trier of fact in allocat-
ing fault.6 3
In sum, the alternative interpretations addressed below
are not true alternative understandings of the statute at all.
Rather, they employ a deconstructionist approach manifestly
designed to destroy the law, rather than faithfully seeking to
divine the statute's true meaning. As further discussed below,
and as is apparent from even a cursory reading of the statute,
RCW 4.22.070 has two underlying themes. First, where the
plaintiff is also at fault for the ensuing harm, no defendant
should be held liable for more than its own share of the dam-
ages as determined by its proportionate fault. Second, when a
potential defendant has not been added to the lawsuit because
of a legal immunity or impediment, or simply by reason of the
plaintiff's voluntary choice or neglect, no other defendant may
be forced to assume that share of the liability. Any interpreta-
tion of RCW 4.22.070 that ignores these basic premises is not
true to the letter, spirit, or intent of the legislative act.
2. Giving Full Effect to the Intent and Spirit of the Statute
In applying RCW 4.22.070 through interpretation, the
flame of tort reform must not be smothered beneath the blan-
ket of that "legal cliche"64 which states that statutes in deroga-
tion of the common law should be given a narrow
62. See infra part III.D.2.b (discussing proposed alternative interpretation of
statute whereby trier of fault could assess damages on an equitable share basis rather
than awarding judgment proportionately based upon the percentage share of fault).
63. See infra part III.C.1.f (discussing allocation of fault to all entities, including
nonparties).
64. Sheppard v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 83 N.W.2d 614, 618 (Mich. 1957).
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construction65 Even assuming that the movement toward
comparative fault fails to advance the precepts of the common
law, this nevertheless provides no basis for evading or muting
the legislative command.
The antagonistic rule calling for narrow construction of
statutes reforming the common law reflected an unseemly hos-
tility by the judiciary toward legislative incursions upon what
the judiciary regarded as its sacred province. In an earlier day,
the judiciary revered the common law as a perfect construct of
law formed from abstract and disinterested reason, above and
unstained by the flawed compromises distilled through the leg-
islative process. Accordingly, the courts adopted a doctrine of
strict construction of statutes in furtherance of its "zealous
guardianship against legislative encroachment" upon the ven-
erated common law." In the age of statutes, it is time to dis-
card this "pious canon[] of an early age."67
Dean Roscoe Pound powerfully challenged the legitimacy
of a rigid approach to legislation:
The proposition that statutes in derogation of the common
law are to be construed strictly has no analytical or philo-
sophical justification. It assumes that legislation is some-
thing to be deprecated. As no statute of any consequence
dealing with any relation of private law, unless declaratory,
can be anything but in derogation of the common law, under
this doctrine the social worker and legal reformer must
always face the situation that the legislative act which repre-
sents the fruits of their labors will find no sympathy in those
who apply it, will be construed narrowly, and will be made
to achieve as little as possible.68
Beginning in 1899,69 Washington courts frequently,7" but
65. Id.; see generally Jefferson B. Fordham & J. Russell Leach, Interpretation of
Statutes in Derogation of the Common Law, 3 VAND. L. REV. 438 (1950) (criticizing
presumption that statutes derogating from common law should be strictly construed);
Barbara Page, Statutes in Derogation of the Common Law. The Canon as an
Analytical Tool, 1956 Wis. L. REV. 78 (criticizing doctrine as applied in Wisconsin).
66. Fordham & Leach, supra note 65, at 440-41.
67. John M. Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS
213, 213 (1934); see also id. at 217, 235 n.11 (discussing the origin of the doctrine of
strict construction of statutes in derogation of common law as "a product of late
eighteenth century thought").
68. 3 ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE, § 111, at 664 (1959).
69. State v. Binnard, 21 Wash. 349, 58 P. 210 (1899).
70. See, e.g., Burms v. Miller, 107 Wash. 2d 778, 733 P.2d 522 (1987); Coburn v. Seda,
101 Wash. 2d 270, 276, 677 P.2d 173, 77 (1984); McNeal v. Allen, 95 Wash. 2d 265, 269,
621 P.2d 1285, 1288 (1980).
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uncritically, applied the "time-honored rule"' 1 of strict con-
struction to rigidly confine legislative innovations upon com-
mon law subjects to the express terms of the statute. To its
credit, however, the Washington Supreme Court, in a very
recent decision, has joined a handful of other jurisdictions72 in
questioning whether the courts should "cling to the concept
that a statute in derogation of the common law must be inter-
preted strictly. 7 3  In Wichert v. Cardwell,4 a defendant
argued that the statute permitting constructive or substituted
service of process 75 should be strictly construed as in deroga-
tion of a purported common law rule requiring personal ser-
vice of process. In upholding the validity of service upon the
defendant's adult child who was an overnight resident in the
defendant's house, the court acknowledged that "the purpose
and rationale" underlying this rule of strict construction had
not been "explored" in prior decisions applying the doctrine.7 6
The court further recognized that the principle has been heav-
ily criticized and was denounced by Dean Pound as without
"analytical or philosophical justification.'7 7 The court even
suggested7 8 that the doctrine may be irreconcilable with RCW
1.12.010, which provides that "[t]he provisions of this code shall
be liberally construed, and shall not be limited by any rule of
strict construction. 79
Despite these strong expressions of dissatisfaction with the
doctrine, the Wichert court somewhat surprisingly declared
that it would await more thorough briefing and analysis in a
future case before "craft[ing] a proper and meaningful princi-
ple of construction when a statute purports to change an iden-
tified common law rule."80 However, while the court may have
thus delayed the official pronouncement of death and might
wish to conduct a more thorough autopsy in a future opinion,
the Wichert opinion dealt a mortal blow to the doctrine. In
the end, the court was willing to assume that the substituted
service of process statute indeed was in conflict with the com-
71. Theis v. Spokane Falls Gas Light Co., 34 Wash. 23, 31, 74 P. 1004, 1007 (1904).
72. See, e.g., McCluskey v. Bechtel Power Corp., 363 So. 2d 256, 261-64 (Miss. 1978).
73. Id. at 261.
74. 117 Wash. 2d 148, 812 P.2d 858 (1991).
75. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.28.080(14) (1991).
76. Wichert, 117 Wash. 2d at 153, 812 P.2d at 860.
77. Id. at 155, 812 P.2d at 861 (quoting 3 POUND, supra note 68, at 664).
78. Id. at 154, 812 P.2d at 861.
79. WASH. REV. CODE § 1.12.010 (1991).
80. Wichert, 117 Wash. 2d at 155-56, 812 P.2d at 862.
[Vol. 16:1
Tort Reform
mon law rule, but nevertheless refused to apply a strict con-
struction in interpreting the statute.8 ' Instead, the court
manifested a modern appreciation of the legislature as a full
partner in the development of the law. The court announced
that it would interpret a legislative enactment presumptively
modifying the common law in a manner giving full effect to
the spirit and intent of the statute-over and above the literal
letter of the law-so as to "best advance the perceived legisla-
tive purpose."' 2
This is the spirit that should animate any judicial interpre-
tation of RCW 4.22.070.
B. The Meaning of "Fault" in RCW 4.22.070
1. The Definition of "Fault" in RCW 4.22.015
Although RCW 4.22.070 requires determination of the per-
centage of "fault" attributable to every entity, the section itself
does not define "fault." However, RCW 4.22.070 was added to
RCW Chapter 4.22, which includes a specific definition of fault
in RCW 4.22.015.83 Based upon the legislature's purposeful
location of RCW 4.22.070 in the same chapter of the code, RCW
4.22.015 quite apparently was intended to supply the definition
of fault for the modification of joint and several liability. 4
There is no reason to believe that the legislature adopted one
definition of "fault" for comparative negligence and contribu-
tion purposes, while creating yet another concept of "fault" for
the allocation of responsibility under the modified joint and
several liability provision.
RCW 4.22.015 provides in pertinent part:
"Fault" includes acts or omissions, including misuse of a
product, that are in any measure negligent or reckless
toward the person or property of the actor or others, or that
subject a person to strict tort liability or liability on a prod-
uct liability claim. The term also includes breach of war-
ranty, unreasonable assumption of risk, and unreasonable
81. Id. at 156, 812 P.2d at 862.
82. Id at 151, 812 P.2d at 859.
83. WAsH. REV. CODE § 4.22.015 (1991).
84. RCW 4.22.015 governs the "comparison of fault for any purpose under RCW
4.22.005 through 4.22.060." However, because RCW 4.22.070 was added to the chapter
after the enactment of ROW 4.22.015, the failure to include ROW 4.22.070 within this
particular phrase cannot be interpreted as an intentional omission of this particular
section from the definition of "fault" contained in ROW 4.22.015.
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failure to mitigate damages.8 5
The incorporation of RCW 4.22.015's definition of fault has
important consequences for the application of RCW 4.22.070.
Because RCW 4.22.015 includes "strict tort liability" within the
meaning of "fault," RCW 4.22.070 applies to cases of strict lia-
bility just as it governs cases of simple negligence. Likewise,
because RCW 4.22.015 includes "liability on a product liability
claim" within the meaning of "fault," RCW 4.22.070 also
applies with full force to claims based upon defective products.
In sum, the statutory modification of joint and several liability
applies to all actions based upon the broad definition of fault,
whatever the theory of liability. 86
2. The Problem of the Intentional Tortfeasor
a. The Definition of Fault and Intentional Torts
Although the definition of fault in RCW 4.22.015 is broad,
it is not open ended. Intentional wrongdoing is not included
within the definition of "fault." Accordingly, as the Washing-
ton Supreme Court stated in Schmidt v. Cornerstone Invest-
ment, Inc.,8" RCW 4.22.015 has been understood to prevent
intentional wrongdoers from seeking to reduce liability
through the allocation of fault to another culpable party."8
With the incorporation of that definition of fault into the statu-
tory modification of joint and several liability, a party found
guilty of intentional wrongdoing could not claim the benefits of
RCW 4.22.070 to limit the extent of its liability. In other
words, an intentional tortfeasor remains liable for the full
measure of the plaintiff's damages.
This, of course, presupposes the validity of the traditional
assumption that intentional wrongdoing falls outside of the
concept of comparative responsibility in Washington. The
Washington comparative negligence statute is derived from the
85. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.015 (1991).
86. See Lundberg v. All Pure Chemical Co., 55 Wash. App. 181, 186, 777 P.2d 15, 19
(1989) (stating that, whatever the theory of liability, "the comparative fault doctrine
shall apply to all actions based on 'fault' ").
87. 115 Wash. 2d 148, 795 P.2d 1143 (1990).
88. Id at 161-62, 795 P.2d at 1149-50; Peck, Constitutional Challenges, supra note
13, at 697 n.72 (definition of fault found in RCW 4.22.015, and applicable to RCW
4.22.070, does not include intentional torts); Scott I. Anderson, Comment, Contribution
Among TortFeasors in Washington: The 1981 Tort Reform Act, 57 WASH. L. REV. 479,
483 (1982) (stating that intentional tortfeasors are excluded from the purview of the
comparative negligence and contribution statutes).
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Uniform Comparative Fault Act. The comments to the Uni-
form Act state that, while intentional torts are not generally
included within the Act's definition of fault, the courts of each
state could nevertheless appropriately decide to extend the
comparative fault principle to intentional torts as a matter of
common law. 9
At least one court has accepted that invitation. In the very
recent decision of Blazovic v. Andrich,90 the New Jersey
Supreme Court considered the case of a restaurant patron who
was assaulted after leaving the establishment. The plaintiff
patron brought suit both against his assailants for intentional
assault and battery and against the restaurant for negligence
in failing to provide adequate security and lighting outside the
building and for negligently serving alcoholic beverages to the
assailants.9 ' The question before the court was whether, under
the state's comparative responsibility statute that displaces
joint and several liability, the trier of fact must allocate fault
among a contributorily negligent plaintiff (who provoked the
fight), several defendants guilty of intentional misconduct (the
assailants), and a negligent defendant (the restaurant).92
Although the New Jersey court recognized that most
courts have refused to extend comparative fault principles to
intentional misconduct, the court nevertheless found the
exclusion of intentional torts from the comparative fault calcu-
lation to be "difficult to justify."93 The court reasoned that
intentional misconduct is different only in degree, not in kind,
from negligent conduct.94 The court observed that "the plain-
tiff's injury was caused by the combination of the intentional
tortfeasors' assaultive conduct, plaintiff's negligence in appar-
ently provoking the assault, and [the restaurant's] failure to
have provided adequate lighting and security in the parking
light."9  Under these circumstances, the court chose to
"adhere to the general principle that liability should be
imposed in proportion to fault. '96
The exclusion of intentional torts from the ambit of the
89. Uniform Comparative Fault Act § 1, Comment, 12 U.L.A. 44 (1979).
90. 590 A.2d 222 (N.J. 1991).
91. Id. at 224.
92. Id. at 223.
93. Id. at 227-28, 231.
94. Id. at 231-32.
95. Blazovic, 590 A.2d 233.
96. I&
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comparative fault system has also come under criticism in the
legal literature. A number of commentators have challenged
the traditional dogma that negligent and intentional wrongdo-
ing are different in kind, rather than merely "different points
on a continuum of fault."' These commentators argue that
intentional torts and other torts based upon fault "reflect a
continuum of conduct in violation of a singular social norm"
established for protecting the safety of citizens." Messrs. Dear
and Zipperstein suggest that the only true difference between
intentional and negligent misconduct is the degree of the
actor's knowledge of possible harmful consequences, ranging
"from a low level of objective knowledge (negligence) to a very
high level of subjective knowledge (intent)."' As Dean Wil-
liam L. Prosser expressed it: "As the probability of injury to
another, apparent from the facts within his knowledge,
becomes greater, his conduct takes on more of the attributes of
intent, until it reaches that substantial certainty of harm which
juries, and sometimes courts, may find inseparate from intent
itself. ' '"" ° Accordingly, these commentators submit that there
is no logical reason why intentional wrongdoing cannot be
compared with negligent conduct as part of the allocation of
fault under a comparative fault approach to tort liability. °'0
Moreover, in some instances, conduct, although deliberate,
may not be significantly more culpable or morally reprehensi-
ble than conduct that is careless and therefore negligent.'0 2
Professor William J. McNichols of the University of Oklahoma
97. Teresa Tracy, Comment, Comparative Fault and Intentional Torts, 12 LoY.
L.A. L. REV. 179, 186 (1978).
98. Jake Dear & Steven Zipperstein, Comparative Fault and Intentional Torts:
Doctrinal Barriers and Policy Considerations, 24 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 2 (1984).
99. Id. at 15.
100. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 31, at 145-46 (4th ed. 1971) (footnote
omitted).
101. Dear & Zipperstein, supra note 98, at 2 (urging "open and express application
of comparative fault principles" to "some intentional tort situations," other than self-
help measures such as a battery, which involve taking the law into one's own hands);
William J. McNichols, Should Comparative Responsibility Ever Apply to Intentional
Torts?, 37 OKLA. L. REV. 641 (1984) (in light of extension of comparative negligence to
strict liability cases, comparative responsibility should be applied to some carefully
tailored intentional tort cases); Tracy, supra note 97 (endorsing extension of
comparative fault principles to actions involving intentional tortfeasors). But see
William E. Westerbeke, Survey of Kansas Law: Torts, 33 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 31-32
(1984-1985) (tortfeasor who intends to cause the harm or knows with substantial
certainty that the harm will occur "has no compelling equitable claim" for a
proportionate reduction in liability).
102. McNichols, supra note 101, at 645.
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Law Center posits the following hypothetical: "Suppose that a
plaintiff negligently conceals his hemophiliac condition from
the defendant and then carelessly sets up a situation in which
defendant intentionally strikes him in a way that defendant
reasonably thinks is offensive but not harmful."' ' Is the
defendant's conduct truly different in kind from other types of
culpable behavior? Under such circumstances, is not a compar-
ative fault analysis appropriate as a matter of fairness and pub-
lic policy?
Perhaps. In my view, however, the Washington State Leg-
islature has not made that policy choice. Whatever the merits
of the proposal to include intentional wrongdoing within the
system of comparative fault, the definition of "fault" in RCW
4.22.015 quite clearly excepts intentional misconduct. The
courts, even in the exercise of common law powers, should not
intrude where the legislature appears to have made deliberate
choices in selecting the objects of the statute. The judiciary
should give great weight to the list of included culpable forms
of conduct in the statute and the obvious omission of inten-
tional torts when interpreting and applying the comparative
fault principle.
In its report upon the proposal that became RCW 4.22.015,
the Senate Select Committee on Tort and Product Liability
Reform stated: "The definition is intended to encompass all
degrees of fault short of intentionally caused harm."'1' The
Washington Supreme Court correctly concluded in Schmidt v.
Cornerstone Investment, Inc.,' °5 that "the Legislature's intent
to exclude intentional conduct from the definition of fault is
clear."' 1 That legislative choice has occupied this field of tort
law and should not be subject to judicial modification.
Moreover, both the New Jersey court in Blazovicl°7 and
the commentators advocating extension of comparative fault to
intentional torts0" have justified their new approach in part by
observing that the policy goal of punishing wanton acts can
better be achieved through assessment of punitive damages
against intentional tortfeasors. Punitive damages, however, are
103. Id at 652.
104. S. Journal, 47th Legis. Sess. 635 (1981).
105. 115 Wash. 2d 148, 795 P.2d 1143 (1990).
106. Id. at 162, 795 P.2d at 1149.
107. Blazovic v. Andrich, 590 A.2d 222, 231-32 (N.J. 1991).
108. Dear & Zipperstein, supra note 98, at 36; Tracy, supra note 97, at 187.
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not available in Washington. 109 Thus, for cases involving delib-
erate tortious injury, strict insistence that intentional
tortfeasors be held fully responsible for damages remains the
best and perhaps only means (other than criminal prosecution)
for punishment in Washington.
Finally, the expansion of the comparative responsibility
concept to intentional wrongdoing raises significant policy con-
cerns that are best resolved in the democratic branch of state
government. Beyond the threshold issue of whether compara-
tive fault should include intentional torts at all, there are ques-
tions of what situations are best suited for such an application,
and whether a strict joint and several liability approach should
be retained for certain outrageous forms of intentional
conduct.1 0
b. Combined Acts of Negligent and Intentional Tortfeasors
Assuming that intentional acts are indeed outside of the
scope of "fault" under the Washington comparative fault stat-
ute, what should be done in the case where the independent
acts of a negligent tortfeasor and an intentional wrongdoer
combine to cause injury to a plaintiff? One noted member of
the plaintiff's bar, Charles K. Wiggins, contends that the intro-
duction of an element of intentional wrongdoing into a tort
case, even if only one of several defendants engages in such
conduct, removes the entire case from the purview of RCW
4.22.070."' This result is contrary to common sense and mini-
mal standards of fairness. Through such an arbitrary applica-
tion of the statute, merely negligent tortfeasors are deprived of
the statute's benefits. Such an application thus raises constitu-
tional concerns.
Because RCW 4.22.015 fails to include intentional conduct
within the definition of fault, the intentional actor should not
escape full responsibility by assigning partial responsibility to
other actors who also contributed to the injury. In other
109. Fisher Prop., Inc. v. Arden-Mayfair, Inc., 106 Wash. 2d 826, 854, 726 P.2d 8, 24
(1986); Barr v. Interbay Citizens Bank, 96 Wash. 2d 692, 699, 635 P.2d 441, 443, as
amended, 649 P.2d 827 (1981). In considering the legislation that became the Tort
Reform Act of 1986, the Washington State Legislature expressly rejected a proposal to
permit recovery of punitive damages in Washington. S. Journal, 49th Reg. Sess. & 1st
Spec. Sess. 456-58 (1986).
110. McNichols, supra note 101, at 678-98 (outlining the policy issues involved in
considering how to extend comparative fault to intentional torts).
111. Wiggins, supra note 61, at 208-09.
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words, someone who commits an intentional tort should
remain jointly and severally liable for the full amount of the
plaintiff's damages.
But why should the defendant who unintentionally, albeit
negligently, contributes only in part to an accident suddenly
lose the protections of the modification of joint and several lia-
bility through the mere happenstance that some other defend-
ant acting independently may have committed an intentional
wrong? Although neither RCW 4.22.015 nor RCW 4.22.070
appear to contemplate this situation, there is no rational basis
for concluding that a negligent defendant is not entitled to a
determination by the trier of fact of its own separate share of
the total fault simply because some other independent defend-
ant has lost the right to allocation of fault under the statute.
As Professors William E. Westerbeke and Reginald L. Robin-
son of the University of Kansas School of Law have said, to
deny comparative allocation of fault to such negligent
tortfeasors would "create[] the anomalous rule that negligent
actors are subject . . .to joint and several liability, depending
not on the nature or culpability of their own acts, but on the
nature or culpability of some third party's unrelated acts."' 12
For example, take a situation where the actions of three
automobile drivers combine to cause an injury to one of the
three (the plaintiff). The plaintiff and one of the two defend-
ants were driving negligently, while the other culpable defend-
ant was either acting with such disregard for safety as to
constitute intentional indifference or perhaps was even acting
with the deliberate purpose of creating mayhem on the high-
way. The driver who is guilty of intentional misconduct should
remain directly and fully liable to the plaintiff driver, notwith-
standing the plaintiff driver's own contributory negligence or
the fact that the other defendant's negligent driving also con-
tributed to the accident. However, there is no more reason to
hold the negligent defendant jointly and severally liable with
the intentional wrongdoer than there would be if both drivers
had acted negligently. From the perspective of the negligent
defendant, it makes no difference that the other culpable
112. William E. Westerbeke & Reginald L. Robinson, Survey of Kansas Tort Law,
37 U. KAN. L. REV. 1005, 1049 (1989). See also Medina v. Graham's Cowboys, Inc., 827
P.2d 859, 863 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) ("[ilt would seem inconsistent with [the comparative
responsibility] approach to hold a negligent tortfeasor responsible for the entirety of
the damage if the concurrent tortfeasor happened to have committed an intentional
tort rather than a negligent tort") (citing Westerbeke & Robinson, at 1049).
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driver was harboring an intent to do wrong rather than having
simply acted without reasonable care for the safety of others.
It must be remembered that tort defendants, as well as
tort plaintiffs, are entitled to the protections of the state and
federal constitution. It may be a denial of equal protection"13
to arbitrarily apply" 4 the modification of joint and several lia-
bility to all negligent tortfeasors except those, who through no
action of their own, happen to be found at fault together with
another defendant who independently engaged in intentional
misconduct. Arguably, the defendant who intends to inflict
harm may be placed in a different category from the negligent
defendant, because the traditional view is that wrongful "con-
duct differs from negligence not only in degree but in kind,
and in the social condemnation that attached to it. 1" 5 But the
quality of a defendant's negligent conduct will not ordinarily
vary depending upon the nature of some other party's
independent contributing actions. In sum, it is difficult to posit
a rational justification for separating out one set of negligent
defendants for less favorable treatment under RCW 4.22.070
based upon the independent conduct of another culpable party
over whom the negligent defendants had no control." 6
To resolve this anomaly, Professors Westerbeke and
Robinson propose
a hybrid system in which the intentional tortfeasor is jointly
and severally liable for all damage, but the negligent
tortfeasor is limited to a proportionate fault share of the
total damages. This approach would retain the policy of
denying the benefits of the comparative negligence statute to
113. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall... deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 12 ("No law
shall be passed granting to any citizen, class of citizens, or corporation other than
municipal, privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not equally
belong to all citizens, or corporations").
114. A statute may be held unconstitutional only "as applied to a specific factual
situation," and thus remains capable "of valid application in other circumstances."
Foundation for the Handicapped v. Department of Social and Health Services, 97
Wash. 2d 691, 695, 648 P.2d 884, 887 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1146 (1983).
115. PROSSER, supra note 100, § 66, at 426 (explaining why the plaintiff's
contributory negligence is not a defense in the case of intentional torts). But see
Blazovic v. Andrich, 590 A.2d 222, 231-32 (N.J. 1991) (ruling that intentional
misconduct is only different in degree, rather than in kind, from negligent conduct).
116. See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979) (stating "rational relation" test of
constitutional equal protection); American Network, Inc. v. Washington Utilities and
Transp. Comm'n, 113 Wash. 2d 59, 77-82, 776 P.2d 950, 960-62 (1989) (equal protection
standards under both federal and state constitutions require a rational relationship
between a classification and a valid statutory purpose).
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intentional tortfeasors, and still honor the intent of the stat-
ute to require negligent tortfeasors to pay only in proportion
to fault.117
The Kansas Supreme Court recently considered the Wes-
terbeke-Robinson "hybrid" approach in Kansas State Bank &
Trust Co. v. Specialized Transportation Services, Inc."' In that
case, a child had been molested by her school bus driver. Suit
was brought against the driver for intentional battery and
against the school district and the bus service on theories of
negligent retention and supervision of the employee driver.
The trial court apportioned fault between the school district
and the bus service pursuant to the state's adoption of compar-
ative fault and abolition of joint and several liability. However,
the school district and bus service were held jointly and sever-
ally liable with the bus driver as the intentional tortfeasor.1 19
The school district and the bus service appealed to the Kansas
Supreme Court asking for the adoption of the "hybrid"
approach proposed by Professors Westerbeke and Robinson. 2 °
The Kansas court acknowledged the contradiction
involved in holding a negligent tortfeasor jointly and severally
liable when his or her actions combine with those of an inten-
tional tortfeasor, while negligent tortfeasors in other contexts
are held liable only for a proportionate fault share of the dam-
ages."' Nevertheless, the court "elect[ed] to follow the prece-
dential path" marked by earlier decisions that had declined to
compare negligent conduct with intentional conduct. 22
The Kansas State Bank decision is disappointing. The
court offered no analysis or reasoning for its result other than
to observe that no other court had adopted the hybrid
approach.123 But given the rather recent genesis of the modifi-
117. Westerbeke & Robinson, supra note 112, at 1049 (footnote omitted); see also
Westerbeke, supra note 101, at 33 (footnote omitted).
118. 819 P.2d 587 (Kan. 1991).
119. Id at 605.
120. Id
121. Id. at 606.
122. Id
123. The New Mexico Court of Appeals very recently adopted the "hybrid"
approach proposed by Professors Westerbeke and Robinson. The case involved a suit
against a restaurant owner for negligently hiring a violence-prone employee who
committed an assault against the plaintiff in the restaurant parking lot. Medina v.
Graham's Cowboys, Inc., 827 P.2d 859 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992). However, the court
nevertheless held the employer fully liable for the intentional tort of the employee on
a vicarious liability theory. Id. at 863-64.
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cation or abolition of joint and several liability in most states, it
is hardly surprising that few courts have yet had the occasion
to consider this problem. The unremarkable absence of
authority does not excuse a court from facing and resolving the
problem created when negligence combines with intentional
wrongdoing to result in a single harm. The Kansas court abdi-
cated its responsibility to provide a reasoned response to what
it confessed was a "contradiction" in the law.'24 Nor did the
court consider whether minimal but fundamental principles of
equity incorporated within the constitutional guarantee of
equal protection permit such an arbitrary denial of compara-
tive fault benefits to one set of negligent tortfeasors for rea-
sons unrelated to their own actions. Because the Kansas State
Bank case involved a special affirmative duty of protection
from other tortfeasors, there was indeed a rational, legitimate
basis for the outcome in that particular case. 25 However, the
Kansas court did not offer that analysis nor limit its ruling to
the unique setting of a special duty to take protective action.
In sum, the Kansas State Bank decision cannot be regarded as
persuasive authority and should not be followed in Washing-
ton. The equal protection argument remains unanswered.
Therefore, for purposes of applying RCW 4.22.070, the
courts in Washington must distinguish between the situation of
the intentional wrongdoer and the negligent tortfeasor, even
when both may coexist in the same case. The trial court must
instruct the jury to make separate determinations as to those
defendants accused of intentional torts and those accused of
fault-based errors. For those defendants accused of or found to
be liable only based upon negligence or other fault within the
meaning of RCW 4.22.015, the jury would be required to deter-
mine the respective percentage of culpability of those defend-
ants in comparison with all other responsible parties, including
any defendant found to have committed an intentional tort.
For purposes of this determination, the jury could be
instructed to treat the intentional wrongdoer as if it had acted
with negligent culpability.
c. Cases Involving a Duty to Protect Based Upon a "Special
Relationship"
Not all cases involving the combination of negligence and
124. Kansas State Bank, 819 P.2d at 606.
125. See infra part III.B.2.c.
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intentional misconduct are alike. There may be exceptional
circumstances where, by reason of the unique nature of the
duty allegedly breached, it would be inappropriate to allocate
fault between a party who negligently exposed another to
injury from intentional harm and the intentional wrongdoer.
One example would be the liability of an apartment owner for
negligently failing to protect tenants from criminal trespassers,
such as neglecting to provide sufficient lighting around the
building or keeping entrances locked or guarded to discourage
burglars or rapists.126 In that instance, the distinctive nature of
the duty of care-to prevent precisely such intentional wrong-
doing-is such that the negligent actor should not escape
responsibility to the plaintiff by shifting the major share of the
blame to the intentional wrongdoer.1 27
Both the New Jersey case of Blazovic v. Andrich28 and
the Kansas case of Kansas State Bank & Trust Co. v. Special-
ized Transportation Services, Inc.,129 which were discussed
above, 3° fall within this narrow category of cases involving an
affirmative duty to protect another from being harmed by a
third person. Unfortunately, neither court adequately
addressed this unique feature in those cases.
In the Kansas State Bank case, the Kansas Supreme Court
refused to allow the negligent tortfeasors to allocate fault to
the intentional wrongdoer, but it made that decision without
considering whether the exceptional nature of the duty
involved justified such a result. In that case, the school district
and the bus service had a special duty of care to supervise the
bus driver and ensure that children riding on the bus were pro-
126. E.g., Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C.
Cir. 1970) (tenant permitted to recover from landlord for injuries sustained in criminal
assault in apartment building when landlord had notice of repeated criminal assaults
and yet reduced protective measures in the building). See also Hutchins v. 1001 Fourth
Ave. Assoc., 116 Wash. 2d 217, 224, 802 P.2d 1360, 1364 (1991) (noting that some courts
have found a duty to take affirmative protective measures in the relationship of a
landlord and tenant). See generally Gary Spivey, Annotation, Landlord's Obligation to
Protect Tenant Against Criminal Activities of Third Persons, 43 A.L.R.3d 331 (1972).
127. It may be that the negligent party would be entitled to reimbursement for
the entire loss by the intentional wrongdoer through an action for contribution or
indemnity. The question here, however, is whether a party with a special duty to
protect someone against intentional wrongdoing may avoid responsibility to the
injured victim by pointing out that the intentional wrongdoer obviously is the primary
culprit.
128. 590 A.2d 222 (N.J. 1991).
129. 819 P.2d 587 (Kan. 1991).
130. See supra part III.B.2.b.
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tected from intentional harm by that driver. As stated
above, 3' the court utterly failed to justify its adoption of a gen-
eral rule precluding application of comparative fault principles
when the careless acts of a negligent defendant combine with
the independent, intentional wrongdoing of another defendant.
Although the court failed to articulate this justification, the
fact that the duty breached by the negligent tortfeasors was an
affirmative duty to protect the child from intentional wrongdo-
ing changes the nature of the case.
In Blazovic, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the
principle of comparative responsibility should be applied to
apportion fault among the intentional tortfeasors who
assaulted the plaintiff outside a restaurant, the plaintiff who
negligently provoked the fight, and the restaurant that negli-
gently failed to provide adequate security and lighting outside
the establishment.' 2 Indeed, the court adopted a general rule
providing for allocation of fault among all tortfeasors, even for
the benefit of the intentional wrongdoer, by treating inten-
tional misconduct as a species of fault.' s Unfortunately, the
court failed to adequately consider the effect of this particular
application of comparative fault upon the affirmative duty of
care to provide protection from intentional wrongdoing.
In the Blazovic case, the dissenting judge at the intermedi-
ate appellate court level expressed the view that where the
negligent defendant had breached a duty to maintain safe
premises, the plaintiff should be able to recover for the full
consequences of the defendant's negligence in providing ade-
quate security." 4 If comparative fault were to be applied
under such circumstances, this judge stated, "'the assailants'
paramount, and probably exclusive, responsibility for the vic-
tim's beating will be reflected in the jury's percentage alloca-
tion of fault.' "'" Consequently, little or no comparative fault
will be assigned to the negligent proprietor, thereby leaving
the injured plaintiff to a "dubious remedy" against the assail-
ants. 31 In addition, of course, such a result provides little
incentive to the restaurant owner to ensure safe premises for
customers.
131. Id
132. Blazovic, 590 A.2d at 233.
133. ML at 231-34.
134. Id at 225 (describing the dissenting opinion below).




The New Jersey Supreme Court acknowledged the force
of this concern that permitting apportionment under such cir-
cumstances "would dilute [the restaurant's] duty to prevent
violent confrontations in its parking lot."1 7 Nevertheless, the
court dismissed the dissenting judge's view, stating that the
dissenter's approach "ignore[d] the principle that the parties
causing an injury should be liable in proportion to their rela-
tive fault."'18 In so ruling, the court failed to fully consider
whether that principle appropriately applies in the unique con-
text of an affirmative duty of protection.
In my view, the dissenting appellate court judge in
Blazovic raises a point that requires further examination. The
principle of comparative responsibility is, and should be, the
general rule. Moreover, as argued above, 3 9 there ordinarily is
no rational basis for arbitrarily holding a negligent defendant
liable for more than a proportionate share of the fault simply
because his or her actions combine with the independent
actions of an intentional wrongdoer. However, a rational and
legitimate basis does arise for an exception to the general prin-
ciple of comparative fault when the duty of care that has been
breached by a negligent tortfeasor is the affirmative duty to
protect the injured plaintiff from intentional wrongdoing by a
third person. The very essence of the duty of care in such a
circumstance is one of protection. That duty would effectively
be nullified if we were to allow a negligent guardian to escape
responsibility by shifting the lion's share of fault to an inten-
tional wrongdoer who was not deterred because the guardian
afforded inadequate protection. In other words, an individual
with a fiduciary or other special relationship giving rise to a
duty to prevent harm by third-parties cannot evade responsi-
bility by pointing the finger at the third person who caused the
harm. To do so would render this affirmative duty of protec-
tion meaningless.
I have argued earlier that the constitutional standard of
equal protection mandates extension of RCW 4.22.070 to situa-
tions where a negligent tortfeasor's conduct has combined with
the independent intentional conduct of another party. How
then can I justify a contrary result in the particular context
137. Blazovic, 590 A.2d at 233.
138. I1&
139. See suipa part HII.B.2.b.
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above? As I have acknowledged, 141 the definition of fault in
RCW 4.22.015 does not include intentional torts, and the lan-
guage of RCW 4.22.070 does not appear to contemplate the situ-
ation of the combined negligent tortfeasor and intentional
tortfeasor. A deviation from the plain language of the stat-
ute-to extend the application of RCW 4.22.070 to the com-
bined acts situation-is therefore justified only to the limited
extent necessary to bring the operation of the statute within
the minimal requirements of the constitutional guarantee of
equity. Thus, if a rational and legitimate basis can be stated for
holding a merely negligent tortfeasor jointly and severally lia-
ble with an independent intentional tortfeasor, the statutory
exclusion of intentional conduct from the system of compara-
tive fault in Washington must be honored.
Where then is the dividing line? When does the exclusion
of a negligent tortfeasor from the application of RCW 4.22.070
cease to be an arbitrary denial of the statute's provision of
comparative responsibility? I suggest that the answer lies in
the nature of the duty of care involved in the particular case;
that is, when the actor's responsibility extends beyond the
ordinary requirement that one refrain from taking actions that
involve an unreasonable risk of harm to another and instead
involves a special duty to take affirmative actions to protect
another from a risk of harm from a third person. When the
direct consequences of a negligent act, combined together with
the consequences of an independent intentional act, cause
harm to another, the happenstance that one tortfeasor was act-
ing with intent provides no rational basis for denying the bene-
fits of comparative fault to the negligent tortfeasor. However,
when the claim against the negligent actor is based upon a fail-
ure to aid or protect another person or to control the conduct
of a third person, the negligent actor cannot avoid all responsi-
bility by assigning primary fault to the third person who
caused harm because of the very failure of the required
protection.
In this latter instance, we are talking about a linkage
between the legal duty of protection and a particular type of
relationship between the parties. 4 ' A guardian has a special
140. See supra part III.B.2.a.
141. See Keller v. State, 475 N.W.2d 174, 179 (Iowa 1991) (discussing requirement
of linkage of duty of care to a particular relationship between parties when the claim
is based on an alleged failure of an actor to aid or protect another person or to control
the conduct of a third party).
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relationship with a person under his or her care that entitles
that person to positive aid from the guardian; a custodian has a
special relationship with a person under his or her control that
obligates the custodian to protect others from the dangers
posed by that person.14 2
A comment to the Restatement (Second) of Torts explains
the origin and nature of the key distinction between these
types of legal duties:
The origin of the rule lay in the early common law distinc-
tion between action and inaction, or "misfeasance" and "non-
feasance." In the early law one who injured another by a
positive affirmative act was held liable without any great
regard even for [the relationship between the parties]. But
the courts were far too much occupied with the more fla-
grant forms of misbehavior to be greatly concerned with one
who merely did nothing, even though another might suffer
serious harm because of his omission to act. Hence liability
for nonfeasance was slow to receive any recognition in the
law. It appeared first in, and is still largely confined to, situ-
ations in which there was some special relation between the
parties, on the basis of which the defendant was found to
have a duty to take action for the aid or protection of the
plaintiff.143
Accordingly, the existence of such a special relationship, which
gives rise to a duty to take affirmative action for the protection
of another, provides a rational basis for removing the case from
the comparative fault system and strictly adhering to the statu-
tory exclusion of intentional wrongdoing from the comparative
fault calculation.
However, there remains one more quirk in the problem.
This "special relationship" duty of protection that we have
been discussing includes a duty to protect against both inten-
tional and negligent wrongdoing of third parties. Yet the prin-
ciple of comparative fault would provide for allocation when
protection fails against negligence of third parties, but not
when intentional wrongdoing overcomes inadequate protec-
142. See Hutchins v. 1001 Fourth Ave. Assoc., 116 Wash. 2d 217, 227, 802 P.2d 1360,
1365-66 (1991) (stating "the general rule that there is usually no duty to prevent a
third party from causing physical injury to another, unless 'a special relationship exists
between the defendant and either the third party or the foreseeable victim of the
third-party's conduct'" (quoting Petersen v. State, 100 Wash. 2d 421, 426, 671 P.2d 230,
236 (1983))). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965).
143. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 cmt. c (1965) (emphasis added). See
generally PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 36, § 56, at 373-74.
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tion. Doesn't this still leave us with an anomaly when applying
comparative fault to different sets of defendants? Professors
Westerbeke and Robinson offer the following hypothetical:
[A] restaurant owes a duty of reasonable care to protect its
guests from unreasonable risks of harm while they are on
the premises. Assume that a visibly intoxicated third person
in the restaurant negligently stumbles into and knocks down
one guest, then intentionally pushes down another guest. In
each case the restaurant breached its duty in the same man-
ner-by failing to remove the intoxicated person from the
premises before he harmed a guest. The results, however,
vary. The restaurant is liable for only a proportionate fault
share of the damages suffered by the first guest, but is
jointly and severally liable for all damages suffered by the
second guest.'"
This hypothetical, while troubling, is not unanswerable.
When the question is one of comparison of negligence, an allo-
cation of fault by the trier of fact is likely to include a substan-
tial assignment of responsibility to the party with the duty of
protection as well as to the third-party whose negligence was
not warded off. Thus, in the above hypothetical, a jury would
likely allocate a significant share of the fault to the restaurant
for failing to prevent the intoxicated person from stumbling
into the customer, even if the majority of the fault was
assigned to the intoxicated stumbler. Therefore, a sufficient
share of fault and attendant liability would fall upon the res-
taurant to give teeth to the duty of protection.
However, when the third person has acted with the pur-
pose of causing harm, the focus of the trier of fact is likely to
shift rather dramatically to the intentional wrongdoer. As the
dissenting appellate judge suggested in Blazovic v. Andrich,
the intentional tortfeasor's "'paramount, and probably exclu-
sive, responsibility for the victim's [injury] will be reflected in
the jury's percentage allocation of fault.' "" In the restaurant
hypothetical above, a finder of fact would likely assign a pre-
dominant share of fault to the intentional wrongdoer and by
doing so, the restaurant would effectively be relieved of its
144. Westerbeke & Robinson, supra note 112, at 1049.
145. Blazovic v. Andrich, 590 A.2d 222, 225 (1991) (quoting Landau, J., dissenting
opinion below). See also Robert N. Strassfeld, Causal Comparison, 60 FORDHAM L.
REVIEW 913, 929 (1992) (where intentional wrongdoing is occasioned by another's
negligence, "we would certainly select [intentional tortfeasors] as more important
causes of the harm").
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responsibility to provide protection against the very harm rep-
resented by the intentional tortfeasor. I recognize that this is
not a wholly satisfactory answer to this problem and still
leaves negligent tortfeasors in a similar situation facing differ-
ent results based upon the nature of a third-party's independ-
ent conduct. But I believe this partial response will have to
hold us until the legislature addresses this difficult area. If,
and when it does, the legislature will have to decide whether
and how to apportion responsibility while preserving the
meaningfulness of the special duty to protect others from the
wrongdoing of third-parties in this context.
In Hutchins v. 1001 Fourth Avenue Associates,'46 the
Washington Supreme Court recently reaffirmed "the general
rule that there is usually no duty to prevent a third party from
causing physical injury to another, unless a 'special relation-
ship exists between the defendant and either the third party or
the foreseeable victim of the third-party's conduct.' "147 In gen-
eral, a duty to protect another from harm has been confined to
special relationships in which "the plaintiff is typically in some
respect particularly vulnerable and dependent upon the
defendant who, correspondingly, holds considerable power
over the plaintiff's welfare."' 48 In such cases, the plaintiff's
expectation of protection often arises because the relationship
provides some economic advantage to the defendant.149 Other
exceptional relationships giving rise to a duty to protect are"custodial by nature, requiring the defendant to control his
charge and to guard other persons against his dangerous
propensities."' 50 Both situations involve narrow exceptions to
"the general rule ... that a private person does not have a duty
to protect others from the criminal [or intentional] acts of
146. 116 Wash. 2d 217, 802 P.2d 1360 (1991) (holding that a building owner has no
generalized duty to provide security measures on the premises to protect passers-by
from the risk of criminal assault).
147. Id. at 227, 802 P.2d at 1365-66 (quoting Petersen v. State, 100 Wash. 2d 421,
426, 671 P.2d 230, 236 (1983)). The Hutchins court also suggested that a duty to protect
someone from the intentional misconduct of a third-party might also arise under
exceptional circumstances, such as where a person creates "a special or peculiar
temptation or opportunity" for intentional harm that involves "a high degree of risk of
harm." Id. at 232, 802 P.2d at 1368 (emphasis in original).
148. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 36, § 56, at 374
(footnote omitted); see also Hutchins, 116 Wash. 2d at 227-28, 802 P.2d at 1366.
149. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 36, § 56, at 374.
150. Id. § 56, at 383 (footnote omitted). See also Hutchins, 116 Wash. 2d at 228-29,
802 P.2d at 1366-67.
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third parties.""'5' Accordingly, the limited instances in which
such an affirmative duty arises to protect one person from
another ensure that this type of case will remain an isolated
exception and seldom provoke a problem in the application of
RCW 4.22.070.
d. Conclusion
Although the question of whether to hold a negligent
tortfeasor jointly and severally liable with an intentional
wrongdoer poses an interesting and complicated legal problem
for the operation of RCW 4.22.070, it is unlikely to be of practi-
cal concern in any but the most unusual of cases. The general
rule remains that an individual has no obligation to protect
others from persons intending to cause harm. Under most cir-
cumstances, intentional wrongdoing will be regarded-either
by the court as a matter of law or by the jury in practical fact
finding-as a superseding cause breaking any link between the
negligent tortfeasor's carelessness and the ultimate injury to
the plaintiff."5 2 In sum, in most cases involving allegations that
more than one defendant contributed to a single injury, the
court or jury is likely to conclude that any defendant who is
guilty of intentional wrongdoing is the one solely responsible
for the harm to the plaintiff.
3. The Problem of the Indivisible Fault Case
Opponents of the movement toward comparative fault as a
substitute for joint and several liability often illustrate their
arguments by reference to troublesome and unusual cases in
which it is logically impossible or very difficult to divide fault
among multiple tortfeasors:
151. Hutchins, 116 Wash. 2d at 223, 802 P.2d at 1364.
152. See, e.g., Henry v. Merck & Co., 877 F.2d 1489, 1494-96 (10th Cir. 1989)
(intentional or criminal conduct likely to be considered an independent and
supervening cause of harm); Muniz v. Flohern, Inc., 553 N.Y.S.2d 313, 315 (1990) ("the
intervening criminal act of a third person will generally be deemed a superseding
cause which severs the liability of the original tortfeasor"), rev'd, 568 N.Y.S.2d 725
(1991); Pratt v. Thomas, 80 Wash. 2d 117, 491 P.2d 1285 (1971) (owner of car, which was
not locked and was later stolen, is not liable to those injured in collision with the car
being driven by the thief). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 448
(1965) (the act of a third person in committing an intentional tort is a superseding
cause of harm, although the actor's negligent conduct created an opportunity for the
intentional tortfeasor, unless the actor realized or should have realized at the time that
such a situation would be created and a third person would avail him or herself of the
opportunity to commit the tort).
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The trier of fact may be able to roughly allocate fault
(including cause) in those case[s] in which the negligence of
two or more actors combined to cause a single indivisible
result which neither alone would have caused. There are
cases, however, in which two or more actors concurrently
cause a single result which either actor alone would have
caused.'53
Dean Prosser offered several examples of this type of situation.
In one case, two defendants pass the plaintiff at the same time
on motorcycles, frightening the plaintiff's horse; the horse then
runs away and injures the plaintiff. In another case, separate
fires set by two defendants merge and burn over the plaintiff's
property, when either fire alone would have caused the dam-
age.'-' In these cases, although there are two defendants, the
actions of either acting alone would have achieved the same
harmful result.
The problem of the indivisible fault case, while providing
grist for interesting academic debate, is not frequently repli-
cated in the real world. In most cases involving more than one
culpable party, it is quite possible to make a meaningful com-
parison of the different degrees of responsibility of the differ-
ent tortfeasors in terms of the offensiveness of the behavior
and the proximity of the conduct to the harm caused. Under
RCW 4.22.015, the comparison of fault "shall involve a consid-
eration of both the nature of the conduct of the parties to the
action and the extent of the causal relation between such con-
duct and the damages."1 5 Cases "where the separate defend-
ants are truly indistinguishable in their degree of culpability"
are genuinely rare. 56 Such unusual cases certainly cannot
serve as a foundation for a tort liability system.
What then shall we do on those unusual occasions when a
case of true indivisible fault does arises? When two or more
defendants, each acting independently, 5 7 commit negligent
153. Wiggins et al., supra note 13, at 238-39 (footnote omitted).
154. William L. Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CAL. L. REV. 413, 433
(1937).
155. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.015 (1991). See also Strassfeld, supra note 145, at 914-
15 & n.9 (identifying Washington as a state that has adopted comparative causation as
part of the comparative fault inquiry).
156. HUBER, supra note 44, at 217. See also Vecchione v. Carlin, 168 Cal. Rptr. 571,
576 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (referring to those "few situations" where there are concurring
independent causes for a tortious injury, such that either cause operating alone would
have been sufficient to cause the result).
157. If the tortfeasors are acting in concert then the case would fall within the
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acts that by themselves would cause the entire harm to the
plaintiff, the plaintiff almost invariably is an innocent party.
In a situation where two defendants act independently and
their actions do not concur or combine to cause the harm, but
rather are independent and sufficient causes of the harm, it
necessarily means that the defendants have been acting in iso-
lation from each other and, likely, in isolation from the plain-
tiff as well. Thus, the case of indivisible fault among multiple
tortfeasors should almost always involve an innocent plaintiff
as a passive victim. Indeed, in each of the examples given by
Dean Prosser, the plaintiff was without contributory negli-
gence.15 8 When the plaintiff is without fault, Paragraph (1)(b)
preserves joint and several liability among all defendants
against whom judgment is entered.159 Unless one of the
defendants is immune from liability or otherwise not joined to
the action by the plaintiff, the plaintiff will be able to obtain
full recovery from either defendant.
In the still rarer situation where there is indivisible fault
among two or more tortfeasors, and where one of the
tortfeasors cannot be joined to the action or the plaintiff some-
how is also culpable, it is true that RCW 4.22.070 applied liter-
ally would nevertheless require apportionment of fault. If the
plaintiff could establish that this was genuinely one of those
exceptional cases where the tortfeasors are truly indistinguish-
able in fault (both in terms of conduct and causation), and no
legitimate reason could be given for separating the responsibil-
ity in damages of those entities, perhaps one could argue that
application of RCW 4.22.070 in that circumstance violates prin-
ciples of due process or equal protection.16°
The rarity of such a case, however, makes it impossible to
give this remote possibility much weight in the development of
modern tort liability policy or in the interpretation and validity
of RCW 4.22.070. Should the indivisible fault scenario arise
more frequently or prove more problematic than I predict, the
legislature might take that occasion to consider a narrow
express limitation in Paragraph (1)(a), which preserves full joint and several liability
between parties acting in concert. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1)(a) (1991). See also
infra part III.E.1 (discussing vicarious liability for those acting in concert).
158. See supra text accompanying note 154.
159. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1)(b) (1991).
160. See Foundation for the Handicapped v. Department of Social and Health
Services, 97 Wash. 2d 691, 695, 648 P.2d 884, 887 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1146
(1983) (a statute may be held unconstitutional only "as applied to a specific factual
situation," and thus remains capable "of valid application in other circumstances").
[Vol. 16:1
192]Tort Reform
exception. Any such exception should be carefully crafted to
apply only in the instance of indivisible fault. The language
should be drafted so as to foreclose any interpretation of the
added exception as reintroducing joint and several liability into
ordinary cases involving merely indivisible harm, rather than
indivisible fault.
We must recognize and maintain the distinction between
the rare case of truly indivisible responsibility and the common
case in which it is merely alleged that the harm is indivisible.
Through the adoption of comparative fault, the Washington
State Legislature rejected the "tortured analysis" that "harm
which is indivisible leaves no logical basis for apportion-
ment." '161 The unitary nature of the harm and the assignment
of responsibility are two separate matters. When multiple
proximate causes have been determined for a single injury, the
trier of fact still must determine and apportion the responsibil-
ity based upon the varying degrees of culpability and causation
among the actors. As commentators have explained: "It does
not follow that simply because the harm is indivisible that
there is no basis for apportionment. It is the responsibility for
causing the harm which should be the focus of the inquiry. '"162
Initially through the adoption of comparative negligence
between plaintiffs and defendants that have concurrently
caused the harm, and subsequently through the enactment of
RCW 4.22.070 to govern the accountability among multiple
tortfeasors contributing to a single injury, Washington has
adopted comparative fault as the touchstone for apportionment
of responsibility in damages. 163
161. See Larry Pressler & Kevin V. Schieffer, Joint and Several Liability: A Case
for Reform, 64 DEN. U.L. REV. 651, 677 (1988); see also Stratton v. Parker, 793 S.W.2d
817, 818 (Ky. 1990) (in contrast with the common law theory that "it was impossible to
divide a single indivisible injury into parts and determine which part each of the joint
tortfeasors was responsible for," several states have now adopted approaches that,
"while recognizing that a single injury is indivisible ... allocate among tortfeasors the
degree of percentage of legal causation of an injury" and thereby make liability
"depend upon the degree of fault of each").
162. Pressler & Schieffer, supra note 161, at 677 (footnote omitted).
163. See generally McLaughlin & Fisher, supra note 13 (Washington's adoption of
comparative fault as a basis for apportionment of liability is a constitutionally valid
legislative choice). Commentators have offered several approaches for weighing
multiple causal factors as a means for apportioning liability. See generally Strassfeld,
supra note 145 (concluding that comparative causation is a feasible means of
apportioning legal responsibility for harm, through the combined use of two
approaches: (1) judgments of counterfactual similarities (that is, using imaginative
alternatives to the actual course of events to determine whether something similar to
the event would have occurred in the absence of a particular cause); and (2) the
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C. The Nature of "Every Entity" to Which Fault Must Be
Attributed Under the Statute
RCW 4.22.070(1) establishes a general rule of "several
only"'" 4 liability on the part of defendant tortfeasors; in other
words, "a person should not be liable for more than his own
proportionate share of the claimant's total damages. "165 That
comparative responsibility normative evaluation of causes based upon value judgments
concerning the actors, their conduct, their states of mind, their respective capacities,
the purposes sought by the activities, the interests affected, the forseeability and
magnitude of the risk, and other policy factors); Aaron D. Twerski, The Many Faces of
Misuse: An Inquiry Into the Emerging Doctrine of Comparative Causation, 29
MERCER L. REV. 403, 413-14 (1978) (arguing that, in addition to comparative proximate
causation, we should adopt a comparative cause-in-fact approach rather than "torture
ourselves with an all or nothing rule in causation"; under this comparative cause-in-
fact approach, we factor "the uncertainty of the causal connection into a fault
apportionment" by allowing the jury "to consider the likelihood on a percentage basis
that a party's activities caused harm") (emphasis in original)).
164. WASH. REv. CODE § 4.22.070(1) (1991).
165. Sisk, supra note 13, at 440. The statute refers to the liability of defendants as
"several," which some commentators suggest is a misuse of the term. Harnetiaux,
supra note 13, at 198 n.19; Brian P. Harnetiaux, RCW 4.22.070, Joint and Several
Liability and the Indivisibility of Harm, 26 TRLAL NEWS (Washington St. Trial
Lawyers Ass'n), Feb. 1991, p. 1, 16; Peck, Washington's Partial Rejection, supra note 2,
at 339 n.20. These commentators state that the classical use of the term "several"
indicated a tortfeasor's responsibility for the entire harm. Id. Whatever may have
been the meaning of the term at common law, these commentators do acknowledge
that the legislature applied the term "several" in the statute to limit a defendant's
liability to its proportionate share of the damages. Id. However, a few plaintiffs'
counsel in court papers have seized upon the supposed misuse of this term to argue
that the legislature actually failed to modify joint and several liability at all in enacting
RCW 4.22.070. The gist of the argument is that the term "several liability" at common
law meant that a tortfeasor could be sued separately and held responsible for the
entire amount of damages even if others might also be liable but had not been joined
to the action. Thus, these plaintiffs' counsel argue that legislators, by selecting the
term "several" liability in RCW 4.22.070(1), inadvertently retained the very type of full
liability that they thought they were changing. This argument, of course, is frivolous.
Whatever may have been the technical meaning assigned to the term "several"
liability at common law, the meaning of the term in a statute must be drawn from its
context in that statute. Subsection (1) provides for "several only" liability as part of a
provision stating that judgment shall be entered against each defendant "in an amount
which represents that party's proportionate share of the claimant's total damages."
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1) (1991). The context makes unmistakably clear that the
term "several only" liability refers to liability that is limited to a defendant's
proportionate share of the damages based on percentage of individual fault. As Mr.
Harnetiaux recognizes, the legislature intended the term "several" in the statute to be
"the equivalent of proportionate fault." Harnetiaux, supra note 13, at 198 n.19. See
also Peck, Washington's Partial Rejection, supra note 2, at 339 n.20 (word "several" is
used differently in the statute than at common law and refers to a tortfeasor's
"proportionate share of the plaintiff's total damages"). Even if the context left any
doubt, this legislative intent settles the matter. It is also significant that Washington is
not alone in adopting the term "several" liability to achieve this purpose. For
example, the California Fair Responsibility Act of 1986 also provides that, in
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proportionate share is determined by the trier of fact's alloca-
tion of fault to "every entity" that contributed to the plaintiff's
injury or damage. This is the rule that applies whenever the
plaintiff is also at fault for the incident that led to the injury or
damage.
Under Paragraph (1)(b), 1 if the plaintiff is determined to
be without fault, the defendants found at fault by judgment
remain jointly and severally liable for "the sum of their pro-
portionate shares of the claimant[']s total damages."'1 67  Each
defendant, thus, is fully responsible for its own share of the
damages and for the proportionate shares of every other entity
which has been joined as a defendant to the action and against
whom a legitimate judgment of fault is entered.1' 6  The defend-
ants are not, however, liable for that part of the damages
attributable to the fault of an "entity" that has not been made
a party defendant to the action or that was joined as a defend-
ant but was released before judgment.169
Accordingly, the nature of those "entities" to whom fault
must be allocated under the statute, has direct consequence for
the plaintiff's ability to obtain the full measure of damages.
This follows from the fundamental premises of the statutory
movement to a system of liability based upon comparative
fault:
The cornerstone principle of a comparative fault system is
that each person who contributes to cause an injury must
comparative fault cases, "the liability of each defendant for noneconomic damages
shall be several only and shall not be joint." CAL. CIV. CODE 1431.2(a) (Supp. 1992).
The California courts have had no difficulty recognizing that "several" liability
indicates liability limited to a proportional share. See, e.g., DaFonte v. Up Right, Inc.,
828 P.2d 140, 144 (Cal. 1992); Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 753 P.2d 585 (Cal. 1988).
See also ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2506(A) (Supp. 1991) (providing that in tort
actions, "the liability of each defendant for damages is several only and is not joint")
and Bisaillon v. Casares, 798 P.2d 1368 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (applying Arizona statute
as limiting defendant's liability to that percentage of the damages reflecting the
defendant's percentage of fault); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.485(2) (1991) (liability of
defendants for noneconomic damages "shall be several only and shall not be joint").
The "clincher" to any argument that "several only" in RCW 4.22.070 means something
other than proportionate liability lies in the recent Washington Supreme Court
decision in Clark v. Pacificorp, 118 Wash. 2d 167, 822 P.2d 162 (1991). In Clar, the
court applied RCW 4.22.070 as requiring a tortfeasor to "pay its proportionate share of
damages." Id. at 181, 822 P.2d at 169.
166. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1)(b) (1991).
167. Id.
168. See infra part III.F (discussing Paragraph (1)(b)).
169. See also infra part III.C.L.c (discussing allocation of fault to entities released
by the claimant) and part III.C.1.f (discussing allocation of fault to nonparties).
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bear the burden of reparation for that injury in exact pro-
portion to his share of the total fault which contributed to
cause the injury.... [Iln order to achieve a fair distribution
of the financial burden in a true comparative fault system, it
is imperative that the fault of all culpable actors, whether or
not they are parties to the legal action, be measured and
assigned. To the extent that a given legal system ignores the
fault of any tortfeasor, and shifts the financial burden from
one culpable party to another, the fundamental principle of
comparative fault is compromised. 7 °
1. The Meaning of "Entity"
RCW 4.22.070(1) provides in pertinent part:
In all actions involving fault of more than one entity, the
trier of fact shall determine the percentage of the total fault
which is attributable to every entity which caused the claim-
ant's damages, including the claimant or person suffering
personal injury or incurring property damage, defendants,
third-party defendants, entities released by the claimant,
entities immune from liability to the claimant and entities
with any other individual defense against the claimant.'7 1
What is the meaning of this "entity" to which fault must
be attributed by the finder of fact under Subsection (1)? I sub-
mit that the meaning of "entity" is simple and straightforward.
It means "entity," nothing more, nothing less. The term needs
no interpretation. By a dictionary definition, "entity" means
anything with real and separate existence. 7 2 In other words,
the term "entity" "denotes anything that exists."'7 3
"Entity" is the broadest 7 4 possible word of inclusion for
conveying the statutory mandate that every person, organiza-
170. Leonard E. Eilbacher, Comparative Fault and the Nonparty Tortfeasor, 17
IND. L. REv. 903, 903 (1984).
171. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1) (1991) (emphasis added).
172. See, e.g., WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 377 (1981) ("entity"
defined as including "something that has separate and distinct existence and objective
or conceptual reality"); THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 437 (1969) ("entity" defined as "[t]he fact of existence; being" and
"Is]omething that exists independently, not relative to other things").
173. See United States v. Angelilli, 660 F.2d 23, 31 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 945 (1982) (interpreting the term "entity" in the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act).
174. See Palestine Information Office v. Shultz, 853 F.2d 932, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(in interpreting the word "entity" in the Foreign Missions Act to include the Palestine
Information Office, the court stated that "[t]he meaning of the word 'entity' in general
usage is quite broad").
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tion, corporation, unincorporated business, government or
agency, or other being that contributed to the plaintiff's injury
or damage must be part of the fault allocation equation.
Indeed, as Professor Peck suggests, the broad term "entity"
appears to encompass all but inanimate objects or forces of
nature;'75 things as to which the concept of "fault" cannot have
meaningful application.
Subsection (1) includes a number of examples of "entities"
to which fault must be allocated by the trier of fact:
a. The Claimant or Person Suffering Injury or Damage
RCW 4.22.070(1) first lists "the claimant or person suffer-
ing personal injury or incurring property damage."'76 Thus, the
trier of fact must determine the percentage of total fault that
is attributable to the plaintiff, the person on whose behalf the
plaintiff is suing (such as in a guardianship action), or the per-
son whose injury forms the basis for the lawsuit (such as in a
wrongful death, survival, or loss of consortium action). In this
respect, Subsection (1) simply restates the principle of compar-
ative fault that had earlier been enacted in the comparative
negligence statute. 7
175. Peck, Washington's Partial Rejection, supra note 2, at 243 (suggesting that
"'entity' must be a juridicial being capable of fault, and does not include inanimate
objects or forces of nature"); Cornelius J. Peck, Reading Tea Leaves: The Future of
Negotiations for Tort Claimants Free From Fault, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 335, 343
(1992) (same) [hereinafter Peck, Reading Tea Leaves].
176. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1) (1991).
177. The comparative negligence statute, RCW 4.22.005, previously provided a
proportionate dimunition of the plaintiff's recovery based upon the plaintiff's
contributory fault. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.005 (1991). Similarly, if the plaintiff's
action was derivative in nature from another person's harm-such as in a survival
action brought on a decedent's behalf by the estate or a wrongful death action brought
by the surviving beneficiaries-the recovery would be reduced to allow for the
comparative negligence of the person whose injury or death formed the basis of the
action. Ginochio v. Hesston Corp., 46 Wash. App. 843, 733 P.2d 551 (1987) (imputing
negligence of decedent to reduce recovery in survival action by estate and wrongful
death action by decedent's wife); Griffin v. Gehret, 17 Wash. App. 546, 564 P.2d 332
(1977) (parent's recovery for wrongful death must be reduced to allow for minor
decedent's comparative negligence). See also Brown v. Spokane County Fire
Protective Dist. No. 1, 21 Wash. App. 886, 586 P.2d 1207 (1978) (recovery of wrongful
death beneficiary must be reduced by contributory negligence of beneficiary in
contributing to cause of decedent's death). Under RCW 4.22.020, "[i]n an action
brought for wrongful death or loss of consortium, the contributory fault of the
decedent or injured person shall be imputed to the claimant in that action." WASH.
REV. CODE § 4.22.020 (1991).
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b. Defendants and Third-party Defendants
Subsection (1) requires allocation of fault to other parties
joined in the action, including defendants and third-party
defendants. 178 Anyone joined to a lawsuit, whether named as a
defendant by the plaintiff or impleaded as a third-party
defendant by the defendant (or, for that matter, added as a
fourth-party defendant by the third-party defendant), shall be
added to the calculation of the total percentage of fault.
Of course, should the court determine by adjudication on
the merits that a defendant or third-party defendant must pre-
vail in the action either before or at trial, then there is no fiult
to be allocated to that particular "entity." For example, in the
Indiana case of Bowles v. Tatom,179 which involved application
of a similar comparative fault statute, several defendants origi-
nally joined in the action were dismissed at trial at the close of
the plaintiff's case.' 80 The remaining defendant in the case
contended that the dismissal of those parties did not preclude
the assessment of fault against them because the statute pro-
vided for allocation of fault to nonparties.'' The Indiana
Supreme Court rejected this defendant's argument that the
dismissed defendants reverted to nonparty status. The court's
ruling depended, in part, upon provisions in the Indiana statute
concerning the definition of "nonparty" and placing the burden
of proof upon a defendant to assert that a nonparty is at
fault, 82 provisions that are not paralleled in the Washington
statute. However, the result also follows from the fact that the
dismissal of the defendants constituted an adjudication on the
merits. When the evidence is insuffficient to allow the case for
the liability of certain defendants to go to the trier of fact, the
resulting dismissal is a final determination that the dismissed
defendants are not at fault in any respect or to any degree.
Simply put, a defendant prevailing on the merits is removed
from the picture.
An adjudication in favor of one defendant has rather
direct consequences for the other defendants. As the Indiana
court advised in Bowles:
In cases where motions at the conclusion of the plaintiff's
178. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1) (1991).
179. 546 N.E.2d 1188 (Ind. 1989).
180. Id. at 1189.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1189-90.
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evidence threaten to remove a party that a remaining
defendant claims should remain a party or nonparty for pur-
poses of allocation of fault, such remaining defendant may
and should oppose the motion or request that any ruling be
delayed until the remaining defendant has an opportunity to
present his evidence. In such event, the nature and purpose
of the [comparative fault statute], together with the efficient
administration of justice, would normally result in a trial
court's refusal to prematurely dismiss and discharge such
parties.183
In sum, each defendant to a lawsuit now has an emphatic
interest in the resolution of the merits of accusations of culpa-
bility against other parties to the action. If one defendant
seeks to be released from the action (on the merits of the case
rather than because of an immunity or individual defense)-
whether on motion to dismiss, summary judgment, or by
motion for directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the
verdict at trial--every other defendant may be directly
affected. The removal of any defendant from the fault alloca-
tion equation leaves the remaining defendants potentially at
risk for greater ultimate responsibility in damages.
For that reason, each defendant must regard every other
defendant as a potential adversary."s For tactical reasons, a
plaintiff may choose not to present evidence against a particu-
lar defendant or elect not to oppose a defendant's motion for
dismissal.8 " Or a plaintiff may simply fail to competently and
183. 1& at 1190.
184. See Sewell v. Wilson, 684 P.2d 1151, 1157-58 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984) (separate
peremptory challenges to jurors were properly granted to each defendant where the
interests of the defendant were antagonistic to that of other defendants under a
comparative fault approach, since multiple defendants will seek to establish the fault
of other defendants).
185. There are many reasons why a plaintiff might not press a case against a
particular defendant, even if that defendant is indeed partially responsible for the
plaintiff's harm. A plaintiff may find that a particular defendant is without sufficient
resources to pay any judgment (i.e., is "judgment-proof"). A plaintiff may wish to
avoid the necessity of accusing a sympathetic defendant of wrongdoing. A plaintiff
may have a relationship with a particular culpable person, such as a spouse or parent,
and thus prefer not to charge that person with wrongdoing. A plaintiff may wish to
avoid the effort of proving partial fault by each of a number of actors, instead hoping
that the list of defendants can be narrowed so that the entire recovery can be obtained
from remaining defendants. A plaintiff may believe that proving responsibility by a
particular defendant may be more difficult than proving the fault of another
defendant, even if actually less responsible. A plaintiff may be concerned that a
particular defendant, if pursued, would present a more vigorous or skilled defense
than other defendants. For any of these reasons, a plaintiff might prefer that a
particular defendant be dropped from the case-provided there is a judgment
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adequately press the claim against a particular defendant. In
such events, the remaining defendants must be given the
opportunity to be heard and to fill the gap in the evidence left
by the plaintiff. Thus, when a single defendant files a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim or for summary judgment
or for dismissal at trial, the other defendants as well as the
plaintiff are entitled to respond. The trial court should not
prematurely grant any single defendant's motion on the merits
of a case without considering the interests of both the plaintiff
and the other defendants.
c. Entities Released by the Claimant
Subsection (1) provides for an allocation of fault to "enti-
ties released by the claimant."' 6 Under Paragraph (1)(b),"8 7
when a plaintiff is found to be without fault, joint and several
liability is preserved, but only among those defendants to the
action against whom judgment is entered. Because released
entities, as well as other nonparties, are not retained in the
action for the entry of judgment, that share of the fault is not
part of the joint and several liability award. Thus, even if the
plaintiff is innocent of contributory fault, the remaining
defendants to the action will not be held jointly and severally
liable for the percentage share of fault attributable to the
released entity. If the plaintiff voluntarily chooses to release a
responsible entity from liability, either as an act of charity or
friendship or in the course of a settlement, "that plaintiff is
hardly in a position to demand that the share of damages
attributable to the released entities be imposed on others. The
plaintiff remains free to refuse a release and, instead, retain
that entity as a party."'l8
To evade this operation of the statute, plaintiffs' attorneys
have recently suggested that a settlement with a single defend-
ant in a multiple defendant case could be structured to retain
the defendant in the case until entry of the judgment, but with
a covenant not to execute that judgment against the particular
defendant."8 9 In this way, the defendant, although actually
released from liability by agreement with the plaintiff, would
(uncontested by the plaintiff) that the defendant is not at fault-so that the entire
fault will be allocated only among the remaining defendants.
186. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1) (1991).
187. Id. § 4.22.070(1)(b).
188. Sisk, supra note 13, at 470.
189. Heller, supra note 18, at 13; Kilpatrick, supra note 18. See also Peck, Reading
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supposedly remain one of those "defendants against whom
judgment is entered."'" Thus, assuming the plaintiff is with-
out contributory fault, the other nonsettling defendants would
purportedly remain jointly and severally liable for the share of
the settling defendant. Through this mechanism, the plaintiff
would hope to avoid the risk of a poor settlement with the sin-
gle defendant, in that the amount of the settlement might not
correspond to the percentage of fault ultimately attributed to
that settling defendant by the finder of fact.
While certainly a clever procedural suggestion, I do not
think this evasion of the statute can succeed. To begin with, as
a practical matter, few settling defendants are likely to agree
to have judgment entered against them after reaching a settle-
ment agreement. Even if an agreement not to execute the
judgment is entered with the plaintiff, the defendant would
still have a judgment recorded against it as a public record. A
covenant not to execute "does not amount to a release or satis-
faction of the debt" and "does not extinguish the cause of
action or the judgment."'191 The effect upon one's ability to
obtain credit, transact business, or transfer real property is
obvious.192
Most importantly, RCW 4.22.070 must be interpreted in a
manner consistent with its manifest object as expressed in the
language of the statute. 93 Subsection (1) expressly provides
for allocation of fault to "released entities"' ' and then deliber-
ately states that the limited form of joint and several liability,
which is available under Paragraph (1)(b) when a plaintiff is
without fault, applies only among defendants against whom
judgment is entered.'9 5 The statute, read in full context,
plainly contemplates that "released entities" will not be among
Tea Leaves, supra note 175, at 343-44 (characterizing this "scheme" as "imaginative"
but concluding it will "fail to obtain its objective").
190. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1)(b).
191. Ivy v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 320 P.2d 140, 147 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958).
192. In Ivy, the court held that an attorney had committed malpractice by
stipulating to a judgment without the client's consent, notwithstanding that the
judgment was obtained with a covenant not to execute the judgment against the client
and to collect the balance from an insurance company. 320 P.2d at 145-48. The client
had suffered harm by the mere entry of the judgment because he had thereafter been
unable to transact business and because his credit had been impaired. Id.
193. See Philip A. Talmadge, Product Liability Act of 1981: Ten Years Later, 27
GONZ. L. REV. 153, 165 (1991/92) (arguing that contingent settlement agreements that
undermine the purpose of statutory tort reform are void as against public policy).
194. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1) (1991).
195. Id. § 4.22.070(1)(b).
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those as to whom judgment is entered. It is therefore illogical
to hold a nonsettling defendant liable for the share of loss
attributable to a settling entity simply because the plaintiff and
the settling defendant structure their arrangement in a partic-
ular manner.
Indeed, Professor Peck concludes that this scheme will fail
because it mistakenly "assumes that a contract not to execute
is not a release within the meaning of RCW 4.22.070(1)."196 He
notes that RCW 4.22.060, which governs settlement agree-
ments, treats "a release" and a "covenant not to enforce judg-
ment" '9 7 as "being interchangeable for the purpose of
determining the effect of a settlement agreement."' 98 More-
over, as Professor Peck observes, Washington courts have
refused to blindly accept recitals of a document in determining
whether it was properly characterized as a release or a cove-
nant not to sue.' 9 Accordingly, he predicts "that a court will
treat a contract not to execute as a release or settlement under
RCW 4.22.070, in spite of recitals stating that an agreement is
only a contract not to enforce a judgment."'12 °
In addition, the term "judgment" in Paragraph (1)(b) must
also be understood in the context of the statute. This provision
of the statute preserves a limited form of joint and several lia-
bility when the plaintiff is without contributory fault. But the
provision also limits that joint and several liability to those
defendants who are truly subject to liability to the plaintiff,
i.e., those defendants "against whom judgment is entered."' '
The thrust of the provision is that, if a plaintiff is innocent of
any culpability, joint and several liability remains among those
who are still party to the case when it concludes with an
adverse judicial disposition.
The term "judgment" in this context plainly denotes an
adverse ruling with concrete, detrimental consequences for the
judgment-debtor. A defendant who had previously obtained a
settlement with a covenant preventing execution of the judg-
ment cannot truly be said to have had an adverse judgment
entered against it. The word "judgment" in Paragraph (1)(b)
196. Peck, Reading Tea Leaves, supra note 175, at 343-44.
197. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.060 (1991).
198. Peck, Reading Tea Leaves, supra note 175, at 344.
199. Id. (citing Haney v. Cheatham, 8 Wash. 2d 310, 318, 111 P.2d 1003, 1006 (1941);
Rust v. Schlaitzer, 175 Wash. 331, 336, 27 P.2d 571, 573 (1933)).
200. Id.
201. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1)(b) (1991).
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thus is similar in meaning to the term "final decision" in 28
U.S.C. 1291,202 which provides for appellate jurisdiction in the
federal appellate courts over "final decisions" in the district
courts. The federal courts have declared that a final decision is
appealable only if it is adverse to the party seeking the
appeal.2 "3 A party who has stipulated to a judgment or is the
beneficiary of an agreement not to enforce the judgment would
not have a sufficient adverse interest to prosecute an appeal.
Nor would that person be the subject of "an involuntary
adverse judgment" 204 with concrete, detrimental consequences
such that the share of fault attributable to that person would
be part of the joint and several liability responsibility of other
nonsettling defendants. In sum, only those defendants truly
subject to "an involuntary adverse judgment" remain in the
boat together when the lawsuit comes to shore for entry of
judgment.
In any event, the trial court should decline to permit such
circumvention of the statute. The court should insist that any
such covenant not to execute a judgment be revealed prior to
entry of final judgment," 5 and then it should refuse to enter
judgment against a party that is not truly subject to its conse-
quences. The court retains the power of judgment and may
refuse to exercise that power when the parties seeking such a
judgment are attempting to manipulate the judicial process to
an improper end.
d. Entities Immune From Liability
Among the most significant of its reforms, the Tort
Reform Act of 1986 relieves a partially responsible defendant
from liability for the actions of another tortfeasor that pos-
sesses an immunity from liability to the plaintiff. Under Sub-
section (1), fault must be allocated by the trier of fact to"entities immune from liability to the claimant. ' '206 Under
Paragraph (1)(b), even when the plaintiff is without contribu-
202. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West Supp. 1992).
203. See Seidman v. City of Beverly Hills, 785 F.2d 1447, 1448 (9th Cir. 1986)
(parties cannot appeal unless there has been "an involuntary adverse judgment
against" them).
204. See id&
205. Under RCW 4.22.060(1), parties entering into a settlement are obliged to give
five days written notice of that intent to all other parties and the court. WASH. REV.
CODE § 4.22.060(1) (1991).
206. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1) (1991).
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tory fault, the defendants are jointly and severally liable only
for the sum of their own proportionate shares of the total dam-
ages. °7 Consequently, defendants to a joint and several liabil-
ity judgment are never liable for the share of fault attributable
to nonparties, including those entities that are immune from
liability. °8 The policy justification for this change in the law
has been stated in my earlier article on the statute:
With respect to entities that are immune from liability, a
social judgment has been made that a particular type of
entity should not be subject to suit. There is no compelling
basis for requiring a defendant to bear the cost of this social
policy judgment and pay that portion of damages attributa-
ble to the fault of the immune entity. If the plaintiff has
been aggrieved in such circumstances, the complaint goes to
the policy decision to afford immunity to that entity. The
plaintiff cannot legitimately demand that the difference in
award be made up by imposing additional liability upon a
party defendant who was not immune from suit.209
The most common example of the operation of this statu-
tory change occurs in the situation where an employee is
injured and culpability lies with both the employer, immune
from liability under the Industrial Insurance Act,2 10 and a
third-party that is not immune, such as the manufacturer of a
machine or equipment with which the employee was work-
ing.211 Under prior law, the third-party could be held liable for
the entire loss, notwithstanding that the employer had contrib-
uted to the accident and that the employee was able to collect
workers' compensation benefits as reparations for the
employer's share of the fault. Today, the employer remains
immune from liability, and the employer's share of the fault
continues to be compensated through the industrial insurance
system. However, with the enactment of RCW 4.22.070, the
third-party tortfeasor may allocate fault to the employer and
thereby reduce its own percentage share of the damage liabil-
ity to the plaintiff.
207. Id. § 4.22.070(i)(b).
208. See also infra part III.F (discussing the limited form of joint and several
liability among defendant as to whom judgment is entered in favor of an innocent
plaintiff).
209. Sisk, supra note 13, at 451 (footnotes omitted).
210. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.04.010 (1991).
211. See also infra part IV.B (discussing conjunction of worker's compensation
statute and the Washington comparative fault statute).
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In aark v. Pacficorp,212 the Washington Supreme Court
recognized the application of RCW 4.22.070 in the context of a
suit by an injured employee against a third person when the
immune employer's fault is also at issue. Quoting Professor
Peck, the court stated that "'the primary purpose of the provi-
sion permitting allocation of fault to an entity with immunity
was to provide relief for defendants in workers' compensation
third party tort actions.' ",213 The court ruled that subjecting
every entity-including the employee beneficiary under the
workers' compensation system, the immune employer, and the
third-party being sued-is fair in light of the interests at
stake.21 4 Courts in other jurisdictions, which have adopted
comparative fault statutes providing for allocation of fault to
nonparties, have rather uniformly concurred in the conclusion
that a third-party tortfeasor sued by an employee should be
able to allocate fault to a nonparty, immune employer.1 5
Beyond its application to employers immune under the
workers' compensation system, the provision for allocation of
fault to immune entities sweeps still more broadly. For exam-
ple, parents are generally immune from liability to their chil-
dren for injuries resulting from negligent supervision.216
However, if a third-party were sued for injuries to the child,
and the parents were responsible in part for that injury, the
third-party would be entitled to allocate a share of the fault to
the parents. 7 In the Kansas case of Lester v. Magic Chef,
Inc.,2 8 a child injured on a stove brought suit against the man-
ufacturer of the stove. The contributory culpability of the
child's parents was unmistakable. The child had been left
212. 118 Wash. 2d 167, 822 P.2d 162 (1991).
213. Id. at 180, 822 P.2d at 169 (quoting Peck, Washington's Partial Rejection,
supra note 2, at 245).
214. Id. at 180-81, 822 P.2d at 169.
215. See, e.g., Dietz v. General Electric Co., 821 P.2d 166 (Ariz. 1991); DaFonte v.
UpRight, Inc., 828 P.2d 140 (Cal. 1992); Williams v. White Mountain Constr. Co., 749
P.2d 423, 429 (Colo. 1988); Pape v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 647 P.2d 320 (Kan. 1982);
Taylor v. Delgarno Transp. Inc., 667 P.2d 445 (N.M. 1983); Bode v. Clark Equip. Co.,
719 P.2d 824 (Okla. 1986); Mills v. MMM Carpets, Inc., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 813 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1991). But see Hill v. Metropolitan Trucking, Inc., 659 F. Supp. 430, 434 (N.D. Ind.
1987) (Indiana comparative fault statute expressly excludes "the employer of the
claimant" as a nonparty to whom fault may be allocated).
216. Baughn v. Honda Motor Co., 105 Wash. 2d 118, 712 P.2d 293 (1986); Jenkins v.
Snohomish County Pub. Util. Dist. 1, 105 Wash. 2d 99, 103-06, 713 P.2d 79 (1986).
217. Brown v. Keil, 580 P.2d 867 (Kan. 1978) (under comparative fault statute,
intra-family immunity rules do not preclude consideration of the immune family
member's negligence in apportionment of fault).
218. 641 P.2d 353 (Kan. 1985).
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unsupervised. She climbed up on the stove to get a cookie,
which her parents stored above the stove. The girl accidentally
turned on a burner on the stove that set her clothing on fire.
The stove was old and apparently had not been properly main-
tained. The parents knew the burner could be turned on acci-
dentally by brushing against it, and yet they stored cookies up
above the stove where the child knew they were.219 Under a
comparative fault statute similar to the Washington enactment,
the Kansas Supreme Court held that the third-party manufac-
turer could properly allocate fault to the parents for their neg-
ligent supervision of the child.22
This kind of result has been criticized as effectively imput-
ing the negligence of the parents to the child.22 ' This is not the
case. No negligence is imputed to the child, nor is the child
limited in his or her ability to recover from a third-party to the
full extent of that third-party's fault. The third-party simply
will not be held liable for the share of the harm caused by
another party. As I have said previously, "it is not apparent
why another party should be held responsible for the parent's
proportionate responsibility simply because of the fortuitous
circumstance that one of the culpable parties was the parent of
the injured plaintiff."'222
In cases where the child is without fault, Professor Peck
suggests that the parents could waive their immunity and be
joined to the lawsuit in order to allow the child to take advan-
tage of the limited joint and several liability provision.223 If the
parents agree not to plead immunity, Professor Peck argues
that the other defendants should not be able to have the par-
ents dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.224 He fears, however,
that the defendants may be able to achieve a dismissal before
entry of judgment on the grounds that joinder of the parents
interferes with the defendants' substantive right under the
statute to name other entities for the purpose of limiting
liability.225
If the joinder of the parents as defendants to a lawsuit by
a child against a third-party is a mere procedural ploy with no
219. Id. at 354.
220. Id& at 355.
221. Peck, Washington's Partial Rejection, supra note 2, at 246.
222. Sisk, supra note 13, at 452 n. 86.





true consequences, then the parents cannot properly be made
part of the joint and several liability equation. Paragraph
(1)(b) provides for joint and several liability among those
defendants joined to that action against whom judgment is
entered.226 As stated earlier, the term "judgment" in Para-
graph (1)(b) denotes an adverse disposition with concrete detri-
mental consequences for the defendant.22 7 The statute does
not permit, and the court should not sanction, the manipula-
tion of the judicial process to hold a defendant jointly and sev-
erally liable with another entity who is not truly subject to the
adverse consequences of the judgment.
However, I believe that would not be the case if parents of
an injured child truly waived their immunity to be joined as
defendants to an action against a third-party tortfeasor. But
the waiver of immunity would have real consequences. First,
the parents would actually be subject to an enforceable judg-
ment in favor of their own child. The judgment would be of
public record, with attendant consequences for credit and prop-
erty transactions. The child, at least upon emancipation, would
be entitled to execute it. Second, the parents' choice to waive
their immunity could not be conditional or partial; a party can-
not pick and choose which aspects of the statute they wish to
take advantage of and which they wish to avoid. A waiver of
parental immunity for the purpose of being held liable to a
judgment under Paragraph (1)(b) means that the immunity
from liability has been surrendered for all purposes related to
the action. Thus, the traditional immunity of parents from lia-
bility for contribution to third-party tortfeasors228 would be
waived as well. If judgment was entered against the parents
and the third-party defendants, and the child executed the
entire judgment against the jointly and severally liable third-
party defendant, that defendant could fairly insist upon contri-
bution from the parents. The parents' contribution would
reflect the parents' adjudicated share of the fault.2 29
226. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1)(b) (1991).
227. See supra part III.C.l.c (discussing allocation of fault to entities released by
the claimant).
228. Baughn v. Honda Motor Co., 105 Wash. 2d 118, 119, 712 P.2d 293, 294 (1986).
229. RCW 4.22.070 itself mandates this result. In Subsection (2), the statute
provides that if any defendant is held jointly and severally liable under Paragraph
(1)(b) (where the plaintiff is not at fault and the defendant is one of those against
whom judgment is entered), then that defendant shall have a right to contribution
against another jointly and severally liable defendant pursuant to RCW 4.22.060-070.
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(2) (1991). In sum, any defendant who is among those
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In sum, the parents' decision to waive immunity could
carry consequences that would not make this choice worth the
perceived benefits to be obtained by taking advantage of the
limited joint and several liability approach in Paragraph (1)(b).
As with other schemes to avoid the comparative responsibility
thrust of the statute, attempts at evasion of the statutory pur-
pose are not likely to prove successful. If a plaintiff's goal is to
structure the disposition of the case so as to leave a defendant
liable for the responsible share of another entity who is not
truly subject to the power of the court to form an effective
judgment, the statute by its terms and intent forecloses the
scheme.
Professor Peck points out that a similar situation arises
when the actions of one spouse combine with those of a third-
party tortfeasor to cause an injury to the other spouse.23°
Because there is no longer a general interspousal immunity
from liability,23 ' the problem is not one involving allocation of
fault by the third-party tortfeasor to an immune nonparty.
However, Professor Peck argues that allocation of fault to the
culpable spouse, like allocation of fault to the negligent par-
ents of an injured child, amounts to imputation of the negli-
gence of one spouse to the other.2" 2 RCW 4.22.020 expressly
provides that "[t]he contributory fault of one spouse shall not
be imputed to the other spouse ... to diminish recovery in an
action by the other spouse. 2 33 Professor Peck accordingly sug-
gests the Tort Reform Act of 1986 creates a direct statutory
conflict.2  I disagree. 23 5
The allocation of fault to all responsible entities mandated
by RCW 4.22.070 and the imputation of one individual's negli-
gence to another are distinctly different matters. For example,
against whom a joint and several liability judgment is entered under Paragraph (1)(b)
constitutes "another jointly and severally liable defendant" who is a proper subject of
a claim for contribution pursuant to Subsection (2). See also infra part III.G
(discussing Subsection (2)).
230. Peck, Washington's Partial Rejection, supra note 2, at 246-49.
231. Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 500 P.2d 771 (1972); Vasey v. Snohomish
County, 44 Wash. App. 83, 721 P.2d 524 (1986).
232. Peck, Washington's Partial Rejection, supra note 2, at 246-47.
233. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.020 (1991).
234. Peck, Washington's Partial Rejection, supra note 2, at 247.
235. To the extent that there is any conflict, and I submit that there is none, the
later enacted reforms established in the 1986 Act must prevail over the earlier and
inconsistent provisions of RCW 4.22.020. RCW 4.22.070 is explicit and mandatory in its
command that fault be allocated to "every entity," Clark v. Pacificorp, 118 Wash. 2d
167, 181, 822 P.2d 162, 170 (1991), and therefore must take precedence.
[Vol. 16:1
Tort Reform
Professor Peck poses a hypothetical in which "the injured
spouse was a passenger in an automobile which collided with
another through the combined negligence of the other driver
and the driver-spouse."2" Under Subsection (1), "the trier of
fact shall determine the percentage of the total fault which is
attributable to every entity which caused the claimant's dam-
ages." ''  Thus, the trier of fact must compare the fault of the
injured passenger-spouse, the driver-spouse, and the third-
party driver. In the event that the injured spouse somehow
had contributed to the fault, such as by distracting the driver-
spouse or bumping the wheel of the car,238 the liability of the
third-party driver will be several only and limited to that
driver's own individual share of the responsibility.
This result does not amount to any imputation of the
driver-spouse's fault to the injured spouse; it simply reflects
the equitable principle that the third-party driver will be held
responsible only for the percentage of the fault which he or
she caused. The fact that a married couple forms a common
economic unit and any reduction in recovery will affect both
members of that unit is a collateral matter to the question of
fault for the accident. There is no apparent reason why a
third-party driver who is only partially at fault for an accident
should be held liable for the responsible share of another
driver simply because that other driver is the spouse of the
injured plaintiff.23 9
If the injured spouse in the automobile accident is inno-
cent of contributory fault, as is ordinarily the case when a pas-
senger is injured, the liability of the defendants against whom
judgment is entered remains joint and several. Thus, the inno-
cent spouse is fully entitled to take advantage of the form of
236. Peck, Washington's Partial Rejection, supra note 2, at 248.
237. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1) (1991).
238. E.g., Geschwind v. Flanagan, 65 Wash. App. 207, 828 P.2d 603 (1992)
(passenger who watched driver consume numerous alcoholic drinks and bump cars in
front and behind as they left the last location was contributorily negligent in riding
with the obviously intoxicated driver); Griffin v. Gehret, 17 Wash. App. 546, 564 P.2d
332 (1977) (passenger was 50 percent negligent in automobile accident for grappling
and fighting over wheel with driver).
239. In Messmer v. Teacher's Ins. Co., 588 So. 2d 610 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), the
Florida Court of Appeals ruled that the Florida comparative fault statute mandated
assigning fault to the plaintiff's husband who was the driver of the automobile in
which the plaintiff was a passenger, notwithstanding Florida's continued adherence to
interspousal immunity. The court stated, in words fully applicable to the Washington
context, that the comparative fault statute must be interpreted in light of the
legislative intent "to implement a system of equating fault with liability." Id at 612.
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joint and several liability that is expressly preserved for the
plaintiff who is without fault. In other words, absolutely no
fault is imputed to the passenger-spouse. If the negligence of
the driver-spouse were actually imputed to the passenger-
spouse, the injured spouse would not be treated as an innocent
plaintiff entitled to the benefits of Paragraph (1)(b). Instead,
the statute extends its benefits to the innocent plaintiff spouse,
as much as to any nonculpable claimant. In sum, by its very
terms and operation, RCW 4.22.070 does not provide for any
imputation of negligence from one spouse to another, or, for
that matter, from a parent to a child.
In the unique context where one spouse is partially at
fault for an injury to the other spouse, the economic realities
of the marital relationship do indeed raise some interesting
problems. None of these problems, however, are caused by the
third-party tortfeasor or raise any basis for holding that third-
party responsible for a greater share of the fault than RCW
4.22.070 would command in any other context. Moreover,
spouses may make choices to legitimately take advantage of
the provisions of RCW 4.22.070, provided they are also willing
to accept the consequences for those elections.
Continuing with the automobile accident hypothetical,
Professor Peck outlines those choices and consequences in
words that I cannot improve upon:
If a plaintiff is free from fault, liability of the defendants is
joint and several for the sum of their proportionate shares of
a plaintiff's total damages. It may, therefore, be advanta-
geous for the injured spouse to file suit against the negligent
spouse as well as the other driver for the purpose of includ-
ing the share of the damages of the negligent spouse in the
total for which there is joint and several liability. Indeed, to
do so would make an even stronger case that the injured
spouse was entitled to recover damages for one-half of the
lost earning capacity as separate property because that
would be the relief to which the injured spouse was entitled
in the action against the spouse at fault. Joining the spouse
at fault would also preclude reducing the damages recover-
able as separate property for pain and suffering or loss of
consortium which would result from allocating a share of
those damages to the spouse at fault if that spouse were not
a party to the suit. The injured spouse need not seek satis-
faction of the judgment from his or her spouse but may
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instead proceed to obtain that satisfaction from some other
defendant.
Of course, if the injured spouse does obtain satisfaction
from a defendant other than the spouse at fault, the couple
must consider the possibility that the satisfying defendant
will seek contribution from the spouse at fault, as the satis-
fying defendant is entitled to do under the 1986 statute. If
the couple has substantial community assets the amount lost
in paying contribution may equal the gain from avoiding the
diminution of an allocation of fault to the spouse as a non-
joined entity. But if the couple does not have substantial
community assets, and if the recovery by the injured spouse
is characterized as separate property in accordance with the
court of appeals' recent decision, the couple will have much
to gain from a suit which includes the spouse at fault as a
defendant. The other defendant will not be able to recover
contribution from that part of the recovery obtained by the
injured spouse as separate property, and the negligent
spouse may free future earnings by obtaining a discharge in
bankruptcy.24 °
In conclusion, when a culpable entity is immune from lia-
bility, the fault attributable to that entity will nevertheless be
allocated to it and will not be shifted to the other defendants
who are amenable to suit. That share of the loss will remain
where it falls-on the plaintiff-because of the societal judg-
ment that a particular entity is to be protected from liability.
If, however, an immune entity decides to truly waive its
exemption and accepts the full consequences of being adjudi-
cated a responsible tortfeasor, then an innocent plaintiff would
be entitled to a judgment of joint and several liability among
all of the defendants, including the share of fault attributable
to the entity that has surrendered its immunity.
e. Entities With an Individual Defense
Subsection (1) also provides for allocation of fault to "enti-
ties with any other individual defense against the claimant." 1
As with released and immune entities, entities that are dis-
missed from an action because of an individual defense will not
be part of the equation for limited joint and several liability
under Paragraph (1)(b) of the statute. By "individual
defense," the statute means a defense, other than one on the
240. Peck, Washington's Partial Rejection, supra note 2, at 248-49.
241. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1) (1991).
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merits, which is unique to that individual entity. Included
would be such threshold defenses as the statute of limitations,
inadequate service of process, or absence of personal jurisdic-
tion over that entity.
In my earlier article, I stated the policy justification for
this provision:
[I]f an entity escapes liability to the plaintiff because of an
individual defense, there is no basis for shifting the burden
of that share of liability to another defendant. Ordinarily,
the availability of an individual defense is attributable to an
error or omission by the plaintiff. To use a common individ-
ual defense as an example, if the plaintiff is unable to sue a
potential defendant because the statute of limitations has
run, it is entirely equitable to require the plaintiff to bear
any losses that result from the failure to file a timely action.
Indeed, it would be unjust to require other defendants to
bear the burden of the plaintiff's negligence in failing to pre-
serve the right to recover against that individual
defendant. 2
The same reasoning applies to other individual defenses. If, for
example, a plaintiff has failed to properly serve a particular
defendant, the fault for the problem lies at the plaintiff's own
doorstep.
With respect to the possibility that personal jurisdiction
could not be obtained over a responsible entity residing outside
of the state, the problem is likely an "illusory one. "241 Profes-
sor Peck correctly notes that, "considering the broad interpre-
tation which the Washington Court has given to the
Washington long-arm statute, [it is] unlikely that an entity
outside the state could not be made subject to the personal
jurisdiction of a Washington court."2 " And in the rare case
where personal jurisdiction could not be obtained over an indi-
vidual defendant in Washington, the plaintiff ordinarily will
have an available forum elsewhere. No defendant should be
held liable for the fault of another entity merely because the
plaintiff has chosen a forum that is not suited for all possible
242. Sisk, supra note 13, at 451. See also Eilbacher, supra note 170, at 912 ("a
defendant should not be penalized for a plaintiff's lack of diligence in identifying and
suing each tortfeasor").
243. Sisk, supra note 13, at 469 n.172.
244. Peck, Constitutional Challenges, supra note 13, at 696 (citing Philip A.




defendants.245 In an unusual situation, a plaintiff may have to
bring successive suits against separate defendants in more than
one forum, although that possibility certainly existed prior to
the modification of joint and several liability.
f Nonparty Entities
Upon the 1986 enactment of RCW 4.22.070, every commen-
tator agreed that the statute's plain language mandated the
trier of fact to allocate fault to all responsible entities, includ-
ing those culpable "entities" not named as parties to the law-
suit. Professor Peck found it apparent that the term "entity"
meant more than defendants to the action and also included
potential defendants, immune entities, and unidentified per-
sons, bodies, and associations.246 Messrs. Wiggins, Harnetiaux,
and Whaley, three lawyers active in the plaintiffs' bar, con-
curred that the statute required determination of responsibility
by those entities "who are not present in the courtroom" and
that, even under the limited joint and several liability provi-
sion of Paragraph (1)(b), damages could not be collected for
fault allocated to "absent tortfeasors or immune entities. 247
The Washington Supreme Court Committee on Jury Instruc-
tions, which has always included noted members of the plain-
tiffs' bar, adopted pattern jury instructions to implement the
statute by requiring the jury to determine the fault of all enti-
ties, including "entities not party" to the action. 48
In my previous article, I likewise agreed that the plain
meaning of the statute directs the allocation of fault to nonpar-
ties, including those whom the plaintiff elects not to name as
defendants: "If a plaintiff, for whatever reason, voluntarily
chooses not to name some responsible entity as a defendant to
a case, there is no basis to complain if that entity's share of the
245. Similarly, a plaintiff may choose to file suit in federal court based upon
diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. As a consequence of that forum choice, the
plaintiff may be unable to join all possible defendants because some tortfeasors are
nondiverse and their joinder would destroy federal subject matter jurisdiction. Under
such circumstances, the plaintiff can hardly complain that his or her voluntary choice
of forum has limited the ability to name all tortfeasors, although the fault of those
unjoined parties will be considered in determining the defendants' proportional share
of liability. Greenwood v. McDonough Power Equip. Co., 437 F. Supp. 707, 711 (D.
Kan. 1977) (applying Kansas comparative fault statute in diversity of citizenship case).
246. Peck, Washington's Partial Rejection, supra note 2, at 243.
247. Wiggins et al., supra note 13, at 236.
248. Washington Pattern Jury Instructions-Civil, § 41.04, 6 WASHINGTON
PRACTICE 337 (1989). For a list of the members of the committee, see i. at III-IV and
the 1990 Supplement at III-IV.
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damages is not awarded."2 A9
In other jurisdictions that have adopted similar modifica-
tions of joint and several liability that allow for allocation of
fault beyond the parties joined to the action, courts have also
held that "the comparative fault of all persons and entities
contributing to the occurrence, whether named as parties or
not, is to be considered in determining the liability of the par-
ties to the action.' '2-° Therefore, "any damages sustained by
the plaintiff will be diminished, not only in proportion to his
own fault, but also in proportion to the fault attributed to any
nonparties. 2 5'
In 1990, however, Mr. Wiggins departed from his earlier
commentary on the operation of the statute and offered a revi-
sionist interpretation designed to prevent allocation of fault to
those entities that the plaintiff elects not to name as defend-
ants. Mr. Wiggins now contends that the term "entity" under
RCW 4.22.070(1) should be narrowly read to denote only those
who are actually parties to the action or who could not be
made parties because of an immunity or other obstacle to join-
der.25 2  He obtains this result25 3 by applying the interpretive
doctrine of ejusdem generis, which holds that a general refer-
ence in a statute should be interpreted in light of the nature of
related specific references in the statute.2 4 He argues that the
249. Sisk, supra note 13, at 469.
250. Lester v. Magic Chef, Inc., 641 P.2d 353, 355 (Kan. 1982) (interpreting Kansas
comparative fault statute). See also Huber v. Henley, 656 F. Supp. 508, 509 (S.D. Ind.
1987) ("[w]ith the advent of Indiana's Comparative Fault Act .... the fault of one who
is not a party to the action is to be apportioned by the jury along with the relative fault
of the named defendants"); Dietz v. General Electric Co., 821 P.2d 166 (Ariz. 1991)
(Arizona comparative fault statute requires allocation to all persons who contributed
to the injury regardless of whether made a party to the lawsuit); Mills v. MMM
Carpets, Inc., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 813, 817 (Cal. App. 1991) (under the California
comparative fault statute, apportionment of fault must take into account all
tortfeasors, regardless of whether they are named as defendants, immune from
liability, or capable of responding in damages); Messmer v. Teacher's Ins. Co., 588 So.
2d 610 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (under Florida comparative fault statute, fault is to be
assigned to all participants in the accident), Rosiello v. Ladden, No. 90699, 1990 WL
283830, *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 7, 1990) (under Connecticut comparative fault
statute, "the trier of fact must allocate a percentage of responsibility for the damages
among all persons involved in the incident, including persons who are not party to the
action").
251. Huber, 656 F. Supp. at 509 (interpreting Indiana comparative fault statute).
252. Wiggins, supra note 61, at 210.
253. Id at 211..
254. The doctrine of ejusdem generis "requires that general terms appearing in a
statute in connection with specific terms be given meaning and effect only to the
extent that the general terms suggest items similar to those designated by the specific
[Vol. 16:1
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listing of certain specific entities in Subsection (1) limits the
meaning of the word "entity" to those illustrations.255 Mr.
Wiggins reasons that, because none of the specific entities
listed includes a nonparty that the plaintiff neglects to name to
the lawsuit, such nonparties should be understood as falling
outside the statute's general reference to "entity."25
The conspicuous flaw in this argument is that it contra-
venes the plain language of the statute-the mandate that a"percentage of the total fault" be attributed to "every
entity.1257 Ejusdem generis is merely a canon of statutory con-
struction. "[L]ike other canons of statutory construction, [it is]
only an aid to the ascertainment of the true meaning of the
statute.1258  It cannot be relied upon to vary clear statutory
language.259
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Harrison v.
PPG Industries, Inc.21° is particularly instructive. In Harrison,
the Court considered a statute governing judicial review of cer-
tain administrative decisions made by the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency. The statute provided for
terms." State v. Sigman, 60 Wash. App. 1, 4, 802 P.2d 142, 144 (1990), rev'd on other
grounds, 118 Wash. 2d 442, 826 P.2d 144 (1992). See also 2A NORMAN J. SINGER,
SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.17, at 188 (Sands 5th ed. 1992) (where"specific words follow[] general ones," the doctrine of ejusdem generis applies to
"restrict[] application of the general term to things that are similar to those
enumerated") (note omitted)).
255. Wiggins, supra note 61, at 210-12. See also Heller, supra note 18, at 2, 13.
256. Wiggins, supra note 61, at 210-12.
257. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1) (1991).
258. Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 89 (1934).
259. State ex rel. Health & Social Services Dept. v. Natural Father, 598 P.2d 1182,
1186 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979) (in refusing to apply doctrine of ejusdem generis, court held
that "when the statutory words are unambiguous, there is no basis for utilizing a rule
of construction to determine legislative intent; rather intent is determined from the
statutory language"); 2A SINGER, supra note 254, § 47.22, at 210 ("general words are
not restricted in meaning to objects of the same kind (ejusdem generis) if there is a
clear manifestation of a contrary intent") (note omitted)).
Judge Mann, in a dissent that was later adopted by the Florida Supreme Court,
offered the following apt commentary on the use of canons of construction:
In the search for meaning there are no shortcuts, and Latin is no substitute
for thought. Of course expressio unius est exclusio alterius if the alterius is
excluded from the unius by context or common sense. . . . But neither
expressio nor ejusdem determines the correct interpretation of a statute.
These Latin labels are affixed after interpretation by us judges. When they
are taken seriously,.. .as factors in the process of decision, the result often
distorts the legislative intent.
Akey v. Murphy, 229 So. 2d 276, 279 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (Mann, J., dissenting)
(emphasis in original), rev'd, 238 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 1970).
260. 446 U.S. 578 (1980).
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direct review in a federal court of appeals over certain specifi-
cally listed types of decisions and of "any other final action" by
the Administrator.261 The petitioners in the case argued that
the phrase "any other final action" should be narrowly con-
strued under the doctrine of ejusdem generis "not to reach all
final actions of the Administrator, but only those similar to the
actions under the specifically enumerated provisions that pre-
cede that catchall phrase in the statute. 262
The Court began its response with the reminder that the
rule of ejusdem generis "'is only an instrumentality for ascer-
taining the correct meaning of words when there is uncer-
tainty.' ,2 6 3 The Court discerned no uncertainty in the subject
phrase and held that it "must be construed to mean exactly
what is says, namely, any other final action."264
This same analysis applies with full force to the Washing-
ton comparative fault statute. RCW 4.22.070(1) states that
fault is to be allocated to "every entity. '2 65 There are no words
of exception--every entity is to be included within the fault
equation. It doesn't matter whether the entity is a plaintiff, a
defendant, a third-party defendant, or not a party at all. It
doesn't matter whether the entity is not a party because it
could not be made a party or because the plaintiff simply
neglected to do so. In Clarke v. Equinox Holdings, Ltd.,266 the
Washington Court of Appeals echoed the Harrison opinion:
"A statute will be held to mean exactly what it says, and rules
of construction will not be applied, where the language of the
statute is free of ambiguity. '267 RCW 4.22.070(1) states simply
and unequivocally that every entity must be considered in
determining the percentage of fault to be allocated to defend-
ants in the action. A canon of interpretation cannot be relied
upon to delete a phrase from a statute or to give it an unnatu-
ral, restrictive meaning.261 The phrase "every entity" means
261. I. at 579-80.
262. Id. at 587 (note omitted).
263. Id at 588 (quoting United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 91 (1975)).
264. I& at 589 (emphasis in original) (note omitted).
265. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1) (1991) (emphasis added).
266. 56 Wash. App. 125, 783 P.2d 82 (1989).
267. Id at 130, 783 P.2d at 85.
268. As noted earlier, the term "entity" is the broadest possible word of inclusion
for conveying the statutory mandate that every person, organization, corporation,
unincorporated business, government or agency, or other being that contributed to the




exactly what it says.
In addition, Subsection (1) requires the trier of fact to
determine "the percentage of the total fault" that is attributa-
ble to every entity.269 In Mills v. MMM Carpets, Inc., ° the
California Court of Appeal relied upon the use of the term"percentage" in the California comparative fault statute to con-
clude that apportionment of fault must take into account all
tortfeasors, regardless of whether they are named as defend-
ants, immune from liability, or capable of responding in dam-
ages. 1' The court observed that "percentage" means "'a part
of a whole expressed in hundreds.' ",272 The court then noted
that the "defendant's percentage of fault would not constitute'a part of a whole' if it were quantified in comparison with the
fault of fewer than all culpable parties. '27 3 Accordingly, the
court ruled, the language of the comparative statute "most
readily suggests comparison with the fault of the entire field of
tortfeasors. ' '12 4
The Florida Court of Appeals reached the identical conclu-
sion in Messmer v. Teacher's Insurance Company."5 The court
held that "the plain meaning of the word percentage" in the
Florida comparative fault statute was "a proportionate share of
the whole. ' ' 216 For that reason, the court held, "a party's per-
centage of the total fault of all participants in the accident is
the operative percentage to be considered."2 77 Accordingly, the
Florida court held that fault must be assigned under the stat-
ute to the plaintiff's husband who had been the driver of the
car in which the plaintiff was a passenger, even though Florida
law held spouses immune from tort liability to one another.278
Even if it could be reconciled with the plain language of
the statute, Mr. Wiggins's ejusdem generis argument is less
than compelling. The six specific listed entities in Subsection
(1)-which the statute says are merely included within the
larger term "every entity"--do include entities that are not
269. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1) (1991) (emphasis added).
270. 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 813 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
271. Id, at 814.




275. 588 So. 2d 610 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
276. Id. at 612.
277. Id. at 611.
278. Id at 612.
1992]
66 University of Puget Sound Law Review
parties to a legal action. Among the listed entities are "entities
released by the claimant," "entities immune from liability to
the claimant," and "entities with any other individual defense
against the claimant. 2 79 Like the potential defendant not
joined at a plaintiff's election, these entities also are not parties
to the lawsuit. It is undisputed that fault must be attributed to
each of them.
Mr. Wiggins nevertheless argues that these three entities
are not parties because they cannot be made parties.280 By rea-
son of the release, immunity, or individual defense, these enti-
ties cannot be joined or retained in a lawsuit. Therefore, Mr.
Wiggins contends, "[p]ersons who could have been named as
defendants but were not, either intentionally or through over-
sight, are not of the same kind and quality" as those entities
listed in the statute.281 In other words, Mr. Wiggins acknowl-
edges that nonparties must be included within the fault alloca-
tion equation but wishes to limit the responsible nonparties to
those entities that cannot be joined to the lawsuit because of a
release, an immunity, or an individual defense.
If Mr. Wiggins's peculiarly rigid application of the ejusdem
generis canon were to prevail, the meaning of the phrase
"every entity" would effectively be limited to the very specific
natures of the six listed entities-the plaintiffs, defendants,
third-party defendants, released entities, immune entities, and
entities with an individual defense. We would then be left
with a statute that provides for allocation of fault only to those
referenced entities, notwithstanding that they are listed only
as examples. Thus, once again, to reach such a narrow con-
struction, it would be necessary to delete from the statute the
words, "every entity."
Furthermore, the doctrine of ejusdem generis can be
applied just as easily to reach the opposite of Mr. Wiggins's
preferred result. As stated, the rule defines the application of
a general term followed by specific terms to matters similar in
kind or classification to those specified. Thus, it is significant
that an omitted defendant is not really any different in nature
from a defendant dropped from a lawsuit because he or she is
released from liability by the plaintiff. In both cases, the entity
is exempted from the continuing litigation because of a volun-
279. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1) (1991).
280. Wiggins, supra note 61, at 211.
281. Id, at 212.
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tary action (or inaction) taken by the plaintiff. In either
instance, it is a matter of the plaintiff's choice.
Finally, there is no rational basis for excluding unnamed
parties from the fault equation. Mr. Wiggins suggests that "no
social purpose is served by allocating fault to an absent party
who could have been named to a lawsuit but was not."2 "2 The
opposite seems more accurate. No social purpose is served by
allowing a plaintiff to skew the fault equation and limit the
entities to whom fault will be allocated by picking and choos-
ing among the culpable entities to be sued. The "voluntary...
decision not to sue certain individuals should [not] be available
to plaintiff as a strategic weapon to eliminate or avoid" the
comparative fault provisions of a statute modifying joint and
several liability.2" 3 The Tort Reform Act of 1986 now abolishes
the practice by plaintiffs of targeting particular defendants to
bear the burden of the damages.
In the final analysis, the Washington Supreme Court in its
recent Clark v. Pacificorp decision, 281 has laid to rest any argu-
ment that the RCW 4.22.070 is equivocal on this point or that
the trier of fact's duty of fault allocation can be construed
narrowly:
The language of RCW 4.22.070(1) is clear and unambiguous:
"the trier of fact shall determine the percentage of the total
fault which is attributable to every entity which caused the
claimant's damages." (Italics ours.) "Shall" is presumed
mandatory. Reserving the question to a trier of fact pre-
vents manipulation by any one of the parties. We hold that
RCW 51.24.060(1) and RCW 4.22.070 require a trier of fact to
determine the percentage of total fault attributable to every
entity which caused plaintiff's damages.285
Accordingly, the mandatory language of Subsection (1) plainly
commands the allocation of fault to all responsible entities,
embracing all nonparties, and including those potential defend-
282. Wiggins, supra note 61, at 212.
283. Greenwood v. McDonough Power Equip. Inc., 437 F. Supp. 707, 713 (D. Kan.
1977). See also Eilbacher, supra note 170, at 912-13 (it is unfair to place the burden of
liability on the remaining tortfeasor where the plaintiff makes a selective decision not
to sue a culpable entity); Lawrence P. Wilkins, The Indiana Comparative Fault Act at
First (Lingering) Glance, 17 IND. L. REv. 687, 736, 738 (1984) (although commentator
has doubts about the "empty chair" defense in several contexts, he agrees that
apportionment of fault to a nonparty is particularly appropriate when the plaintiff
simply chooses not to name that person).
284. 118 Wash. 2d 167, 822 P.2d 162 (1991).
285. Id, at 181, 822 P.2d at 170 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
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ants inadvertently or intentionally omitted from the lawsuit by
the plaintiff. 86
g. Unidentified Entities
New Mexico was one of the first states to abolish the doc-
trine of joint and several liability at the advent of the new era
of comparative responsibility. The New Mexico Court of
Appeals took this bold step in the context of an automobile
accident case involving an unidentified tortfeasor. In Bartlett
v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc.,28 7 the driver of the lead-
ing car on the highway made a sudden and unexpected change
in speed and direction, causing the plaintiff driver to slam on
her brakes. The defendant driver was behind the plaintiff
when she braked and his truck skidded into the rear of her
car. The identity of the lead driver was unknown.18 The jury
found the defendant truck driver's negligence to have contrib-
uted 30 percent to the accident and the negligence of the
unknown driver to have contributed to the extent of 70 per-
cent.28 9 The New Mexico Court of Appeals ordered judgment
to be entered on the jury verdict with an award to the plaintiff
against the defendant for the defendant's responsible thirty
percent share of the damages.2"
The fact that one of the entities responsible for an incident
is unknown-what is sometimes referred to as a "phantom
tortfeasor"-provides no basis under RCW 4.22.070 for omit-
ting that culpable entity from the fault allocation equation. As
the New Mexico court recognized in the Bartlett case, an
unidentified entity is simply one of the many types of non-
parties to whom fault is appropriately allocated under a com-
parative fault system of liability. The preceding discussion 291
on the meaning of "every entity" under Subsection (1) and the
allocation of fault to nonparties applies with full force to the
context of the unidentified nonparty. The Washington
Supreme Court's unequivocal holding in Clark v.
286. See Huber v. Henley, 656 F. Supp. 508, 511 (S.D. Ind. 1987) (Indiana
comparative fault statute providing for allocation of responsibility to nonparties
includes "inadvertently omitted tortfeasors" and "intentionally omitted tortfeasors").
287. 646 P.2d 579 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982).
288. Id at 580.
289. Id
290. Id. at 586.
291. See supra part III.C.l.f.
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Pacificorp, 2 9 2-ruling that the mandatory language of RCW
4.22.070(1) requires "a trier of fact to determine the percentage
of total fault attributable to every entity which caused claim-
ant's damages"2 3 --certainly suggests the allocation of fault to
entities that cannot now be identified.
Professor Peck recognizes that the broad concept of"entity" in RCW 4.22.070 encompasses "unidentified per-
sons." 29 4 However, he suggests that the due process require-
ments of notice and an opportunity to be heard may be
violated by the assignment of fault to an unknown entity." 5
Mr. Wiggins also argues that "fault should not be allocated to
an unknown entity because it is difficult to apply a calculus of
fault to someone about whom you know nothing.'" 29 These
arguments are unpersuasive.
As I have written previously:
The fact that an entity cannot be identified does not neces-
sarily mean there is any lack of evidence concerning the
entity's existence or the extent to which the entity contrib-
uted to the tort. Witnesses to the incident-presumably
including the plaintiff-may be able to testify to another
entity's conduct and involvement in the incident. The fact
that the entity is not available to appear in court does not
bar the presentation and consideration of evidence on the
entity's comparative fault. 97
Because a defendant in any action is always entitled to avoid
liability altogether by establishing that an unknown entity was
the sole cause of the plaintiff's harm, there is "no logical rea-
son why a defendant might not also attempt to reduce expo-
sure to full liability by attributing a portion of the fault to an
unidentified entity whose existence and culpable conduct can
be proven through competent corroborating evidence. "298
Mr. Wiggins objects that my argument "confuses allocation
of fault with causation of damages." ' However, the Washing-
292. 118 Wash. 2d 167, 822 P.2d 162 (1991).
293. Id, at 181, 822 P.2d at 170 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
294. Peck, Washington's Partial Rfection, supra note 2, at 243. See also Wiggins
et al., supra note 13, at 236 (trier of fact must determine the fault of entities not in the
courtroom including those entities that are "simply unidentified (such as the driver of
a phantom car in an automobile case)").
295. Peck, Constitutional Challenges, supra note 13, at 697.
296. Wiggins, supra note 61, at 214.
297. Sisk, supra note 13, at 456-57.
298. Id. at 457.
299. Wiggins, supra note 61, at 214.
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ton comparative fault statute expressly considers the questions
of fault and causation as intertwined when determining respec-
tive shares of responsibility for an injury or damage. Under
RCW 4.22.015, which defines "fault" for the entire statutory
chapter,30° the comparison of fault must include "consideration
of both the nature of the conduct of the parties to the action
and the extent of the causal relation between such conduct and
the damages."3 1
Moreover, merely because one of the responsible entities is
unavailable for examination, the trier of fact is hardly pre-
cluded from reaching conclusions about degree of causation
and nature of the conduct. Certainly a defendant would not be
exonerated from negligence liability, for example, simply
because he or she refused to take the stand or testified that he
or she acted with reasonable care. Nor would the intervening
death of a defendant be grounds for dismissing the lawsuit
against his estate. The presence of a defendant on the stand to
testify is not a prerequisite to holding a defendant liable based
upon fault. In most cases, the circumstances surrounding the
incident will provide sufficient evidentiary background to
allow the trier of fact to make a complete analysis of the
respective fault of all entities, including any absent or deceased
defendant, or any culpable, unidentified, entity. 0 2 Even when
all responsible persons are identified and are before the court,
there may be significant gaps in the evidence caused by failure
of memories, witnesses who were unable to see every aspect of
the event, lost physical evidence, or a multitude of other rea-
sons. Nevertheless, the case must be presented to the trier of
fact to make the best of the situation under the circumstances.
A perfect case is rarely, if ever, made to the trier of fact, and
yet our system of justice perseveres and largely succeeds.
300. See supra part III.B.1 (discussing definition of "fault").
301. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.015 (1991). See also supra note 163 (discussing
theories of comparative causation).
302. In Wilson v. Gillis, 731 P.2d 955 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986), the New Mexico Court
of Appeals rejected the argument that the jury will be confused if fault is allocated to
a nonparty:
[This] argument fails to recognize and credit the significant abilities and
talents of jurors to carefully sift through conflicting positions and ascertain
the true facts.... [The parties] will have every opportunity to explain to the
jury the circumstances surrounding the accident, and the jury can reasonably
be asked to make an assessment as to the percentages of negligence. An
entity does not actually have to be present in the courtroom for the jury to




The question of the "phantom tortfeasor" is nevertheless a
unique one that justifies certain precautions by the court in
presiding over the trial. Not every time that a defendant
asserts the fault of an unidentified party should the court per-
mit the issue to go to the jury for decision. In Ripka v.
Mehrs,0 3 the Minnesota Court of Appeals considered the case
of an automobile accident at an intersection. The defendant
driver claimed that she had been waved through by a road con-
struction worker. The plaintiff driver, who had the right of
way, collided with the defendant's car when it pulled into the
intersection."° The trial court refused to submit to the jury for
apportionment the alleged negligence of the unidentified
workman who had supposedly waved the defendant through
the intersection.305 The court of appeals affirmed the ruling,
stating that "a mere allegation by the defendant that a phan-
tom tortfeasor contributed to the accident is insufficient evi-
dence to justify submitting the alleged negligence of the
phantom tortfeasor to the jury for apportionment."3°6 The
court, mentioning fears that defendants might fraudulently
assert the negligence of unidentified parties, °7 apparently was
adopting a rule that a defendant seeking to allocate fault to an
unknown party must provide corroborating evidence beyond
the defendant's own testimony.
A court must, of course, be very careful not to remove gen-
uine questions of fact from the jury,308 particularly when a wit-
ness is prepared to testify to those facts under oath. However,
given the somewhat unusual concerns of protecting due pro-
cess and providing an opportunity to respond raised by this sit-
uation, it may be appropriate to require that a defendant at
least be able to provide some additional evidence of the exist-
ence of an unidentified entity. If the only evidence is self-serv-
ing testimony from the defendant's own mouth, the plaintiff
may be unable to fully respond. The difficulty of proving a
negative might lead to an inequitable result.
303. 390 N.W.2d 878 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
304. Id, at 879.
305. Id.
306. Id at 881.
307. Id at 882.
308. See Industrial Indemn. Co. v. Kallevig, 114 Wash. 2d 907, 915-16, 792 P.2d 520,
525 (1990) (a case may be taken from the jury only "if, when viewing the material
evidence most favorable to the nonmoving party, the court can say, as a matter of law,
that there is no substantial evidence or reasonable inferences to sustain a verdict for
the nonmoving party").
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There is precedent in Washington for such a corroboration
requirement when one party, who stands to gain, insists that
the fault for an injury or damage lies with an unidentified
actor. Under RCW 48.22.030(8),' ° an automobile insurer may
condition uninsured motorist benefit coverage by requiring
independent corroboration when the insured alleges that a"phantom vehicle" caused an automobile accident.3 1 0 The pur-
pose of the "phantom vehicle" statute is to prevent fraudulent
claims, based upon accidents actually resulting from the
insured's sole fault, by ensuring proof of the "phantom vehi-
cle" by someone who does not stand to benefit from the out-
come of the claim for benefits.3 1 '
Those same concerns would exist when a defendant seeks
to avoid or reduce liability to a plaintiff by indicting an uniden-
tified actor as the one truly responsible for the harm. The trial
court, therefore, could appropriately remove the issue of an
unidentified entity's culpability from the jury's fault allocation
consideration in those cases where the defendant cannot pro-
vide independent corroboration. Independent corroboration
might be presented through the testimony of another witness
to the incident, physical evidence such as tracks or paint, or
other circumstantial proof supporting the existence of the
responsible entity whose identity cannot now be established.
2. Responsibility for Raising Fault of Unjoined Entities and
Burden of Proof on Allocation of Fault
a. Raising the Issue: Pleading or Other Notice
The Committee on Court Rules and Procedure of the
Washington State Bar Association, with the approval of the
Board of Governors, has proposed amendments to the Wash-
ington Rules of Civil Procedure that would designate the issue
of a nonparty's fault as an affirmative defense to be raised by
the defendant in its answer.312 Plaintiffs' attorney Charles K.
309. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.22.030(8) (1991).
310. Gobin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 54 Wash. App. 269, 271, 773 P.2d 131, 132 (1989);
Power v. Viking Ins. Co., 44 Wash. App. 495, 498-502, 722 P.2d 1343, 1345-48 (1986).
311. Gobin, 54 Wash. App. at 273, 773 P.2d at 133.
312. Washington Proposed Rules Notice, published in, 118 Wash. 2d CXXXI, 818
P.2d LXXIV, XCIV-XCVI (1992) (advance sheet). Under the committee's proposal,
Civil Rule 8(c) would be amended to add "fault of a nonparty" to the list of affirmative
defenses. IM at XCV. Civil Rule 12 would be amended by the addition of a new
subsection, (i), to read:
Whenever a defendant or a third party defendant intends to claim for
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Wiggins, who was the chair of the committee proposing the
rule changes, had previously encouraged plaintiffs' counsel to
argue that "attribution of fault to a nonparty is an affirmative
defense which must be pled in the answer, subject to
waiver." '313 Professor Peck has likewise written that "[a] sensi-
ble rule would be that the identification [of a nonparty issue]
be made in an answer or amended answer filed well before
trial. 314
The state bar committee, in an accompanying commentary,
justified its proposed rule change by observing that, "under the
common law," allegations by a defendant that another party is
at fault "would amount to an affirmative defense, as contra-
vening the plaintiff's claim and tendering a new issue. 31 5
Given that RCW 4.22.070 rather dramatically effected a monu-
mental change in the common law, it is strange that a commit-
tee seeking to implement the statute procedurally would
return to the common law for direction. Even as a matter of
common law analysis, the committee's conclusion may be ques-
tioned. Prior to the enactment of the Tort Reform Act of 1986,
it was certainly permissible for a defendant to assert at trial
that it was wholly without liability because the harm was
caused solely by another entity. There was never any sugges-
tion that such an allegation was an "affirmative defense" that
the defendant was required to plead, as opposed to simply
being included within the defendant's general denial of
liability.
More importantly, the state bar committee asked the
wrong question. The issue is not whether nonparty fault
would have been an affirmative defense "under the common
law." The question is what the statute says, that is, what direc-
tion is provided by the language of RCW 4.22.070. In other
purposes of RCW 4.22.070(1) that a nonparty is at fault, such claim is an
affirmative defense which shall be affirmatively pled by the party making the
claim. The identity of any nonparty claimed to be at fault, if known to the
party making the claim, shall also be affirmatively pled.
Id. at XCVI.
After this Article had been sent to the printer, the Washington Supreme Court
entered an order adopting the amendments to Civil Rule 8 and Civil Rule 12. Wash-
ington Supreme Court Order No. 25700-A-510, Sept. 10, 1992, published in, 834 P.2d
CXXIV (1992) (advance sheet). See irfra note 348 (discussing the court's order).
313. Wiggins, supra note 61, at 215.
314. Peck, Constitutional Challenges, supra note 13, at 693.
315. Washington Proposed Rules Notice, published in, 118 Wash. 2d CXXXI, 818
P.2d LXXIV, XCVI (1991) (advance sheet).
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words, the real inquiry is whether the state bar committee's
approach-requiring the defendant to raise the issue of non-
party fault at the early pleading stage-can be reconciled with
the mandate of the statute. I submit it cannot.
In State v. Smith,316 the Washington Supreme Court
declared that it has the exclusive authority to adopt procedural
rules designed to guide "the essentially mechanical operations
of the courts. ' 317 By contrast, matters of "substantive law,
rights and remedies" are within the province of the legisla-
ture .31  The modification of joint and several liability certainly
is "a substantive, not a procedural, change in tort law, rights,
and remedies," within the authority of the legislative branch to
enact.319 The judicial branch may adopt a procedural court
rule as a "means to effectuate substantive rights, 323 but not in
a manner inconsistent with the source of that substantive law.
Accordingly, in evaluating the bar committee's proposed rule
amendments, we must consider whether the purported proce-
dural change actually conflicts with the substantive provisions
of the statute modifying joint and several liability.3 21
Several other states that have adopted legislation modify-
ing the doctrine of joint and several liability have chosen to
assign to defendants the duty to raise the question of allocating
fault to nonparties. For example, the Indiana comparative
fault statute denominates the issue of a nonparty's fault as a"nonparty defense"3 22 that the defendant "must affirmatively
plead. ' 323 If the defendant is aware of the nonparty defense, it
must be pleaded as part of the first answer. 24 If the defendant
discovers the nonparty defense after the filing of an answer,
316. 84 Wash. 2d 498, 527 P.2d 674 (1974).
317. Id. at 501, 527 P.2d at 677.
318. Id.
319. Sisk, supra note 13, at 486.
320. State v. Johnson, 21 Wash. App. 919, 921, 587 P.2d 189, 190 (1978). See also
Edward W. Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An Essay on Juristic Immaturity, 12
STAN. L. REV. 5, 5 (1959) ("all are agreed that procedure exists only for the purpose of
putting the substantive law effectively to work").
321. The committee's report acknowledges that there was considerable debate
within the committee about whether the proposed rule changes were "substantive" or
"procedural." Washington Proposed Rules Notice, published in, 118 Wash. 2d CXXXI,
818 P.2d LXXIV, XCV (1991) (advance sheet).
322. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-33-10(a) (Burns 1986).
323. Id. § 34-4-33-10(b). See generally Huber v. Henley, 656 F. Supp. 508, 510 (S.D.
Ind. 1987) (describing statutory nonparty defense and burden of pleading and proof as
placed on defendant).
324. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-33-10(c) (Burns 1986).
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the defendant is obliged to plead the defense "with reasonable
promptness. 3 25 If the plaintiff served the complaint more
than one hundred and fifty days before the statute of limita-
tions would expire against a nonparty, the defendant is ordina-
rily required to plead any nonparty defense at least forty-five
days before the limitations period expires. This allows the
plaintiff an opportunity to join that entity as a party to the
action. 26 However, the statute instructs the trial court that
the time period for raising the nonparty defense may be
altered in order to give the defendant "a reasonable opportu-
nity to discover the existence of a nonparty defense," while
balancing the plaintiff's interest in having "a reasonable oppor-
tunity" to add the nonparty as an additional defendant before
the statute of limitations has expired. 27
As another example, the Colorado comparative fault stat-
ute provides that the fault of a nonparty may be considered if
"the defending party gives notice that a nonparty was wholly
or partially at fault within ninety days following commence-
ment of the action unless the court determines that a longer
period is necessary. '328 The defendant provides notice by filing
a pleading that either names the nonparty or gives "the best
identification of such nonparty which is possible under the cir-
cumstances." 29 The defendant's notice must also provide a
brief explanation of the basis for asserting that fault should be
allocated to the nonparty.330 The Arizona comparative fault
statute provides more generally that the negligence or fault of
a nonparty may be considered "if the defending party gives
notice before trial, in accordance with requirements estab-
lished by court rule, that a nonparty was wholly or partially at
fault."33 1
The Washington State Legislature, however, did not
choose to adopt language making the trier of fact's duty, to
325. Id.
326. I&
327. Id. § 34-4-33-10(c)(1), (2).
328. CoLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-111.5(3)(b) (Supp. 1991).
329. IcL
330. Id-
331. ARmZ. REv. STAT. § 12-2506(B) (Supp. 1991). See also LyphoMed, Inc. v.
Superior Court, No. 1 CA-SA 91225, 1992 WL 49922, *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 19, 1992)
("each defendant who claims that other persons or entities who have not been joined
in the action are responsible for the plaintiff's injury must file a notice of nonparty at
fault" pursuant to a court rule allowing as much as 150 days after filing the answer to
file the notice).
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determine the fault attributable to nonparties, contingent upon
whether the defendant pleads the issue in an answer or pro-
vides other notice. RCW 4.22.070(1) instead states in unequivo-
cal language that in "all actions involving the fault of more
than one entity, the trier of fact shall determine the percent-
age of the total fault which is attributable to every entity
which caused the claimant's damages .... 332 In Clark v.
Pacificorp,3 33 the Washington Supreme Court held that the
term "shall" in this provision is "mandatory" language that
clearly and unambiguously commands the trier of fact to allo-
cate fault to every culpable entity.3
The import of the unqualified language in the Washington
Tort Reform Act is plain. The intent of the legislature is
unmistakable. If more than one entity contributes to a tortious
incident, then every responsible entity is to be considered in
the allocation of fault. Given this strong statement of legisla-
tive purpose, a procedural court rule may not establish obsta-
cles that significantly restrict the ability of the trier of fact to
obey the statutory command to consider the responsibility of
every entity. In devising any procedure for implementation of
the statute, the primary emphasis must be upon assuring that
fault is indeed attributed to all responsible entities. A proce-
dural exception to this general principle may be justified only
by the compelling interest of judicial order in the trial of law-
suits, and only to the extent of such necessity.
Some procedure, of course, must be adopted so that the
issue of a nonparty's responsibility may be presented to the
trier of fact in a manner consistent with the principles of due
process. Every litigant is certainly entitled to both notice and
an adequate opportunity to be heard. Professor Peck has
observed that the literal language of RCW 4.22.070 would not
preclude the identification of an entity for allocation of fault as
late as the closing oral argument or even in a judge's prepara-
tion of findings of fact and conclusions of law.335 However,
Professor Peck correctly objects to such a result. If a defend-
ant is permitted to delay until the waning moments of the trial
before introducing a new culprit, the plaintiff could be
ambushed and left without any meaningful opportunity to
332. WAsH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1) (1991) (emphasis added).
333. 118 Wash. 2d 167, 822 P.2d 162 (1991).
334. Id at 181, 822 P.2d at 167.
335. Peck, Constitutional Challenges, supra note 13, at 692-93.
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respond. In our modern system of civil justice, the trial is to be
"less a game of blindman's bluff and more a fair contest with
the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable
extent." '336
The problem is one of balance. On one side is the legisla-
ture's strong direction that fault is to be allocated to all respon-
sible entities, including nonparties. This is the general rule
that may be qualified only by the most compelling of counter-
vailing interests. On the other side is the judiciary's truly com-
pelling interest in the timely presentation of legal issues and
theories, and the orderly production of evidence in the court-
room. The judiciary's concern is to uphold the principle of fair
notice and an opportunity to be heard. In weighing these
opposing concerns, the Washington Supreme Court should
develop a procedural approach that guarantees fair notice to
plaintiffs in advance of the trial and that also allows defend-
ants a reasonable opportunity, after being informed of a law-
suit, to fully explore the possibility that other entities may also
be responsible for the plaintiff's injury or damage.
As noted, the state bar committee recommends altering
the pleading rules to impose a duty upon the defendant to raise
the nonparty issue as an affirmative defense in the answer,
under penalty of otherwise having the issue of a nonparty's
fault removed from consideration by the trier of fact. Unfortu-
nately, this approach does not reflect a considered balancing of
the statute's substantive command with the court's procedural
needs. A defendant is generally obliged to serve an answer
within twenty days after service of the plaintiff's complaint.-37
At that point, a defendant obviously should be aware of its own
conduct vis-A-vis the plaintiff and presumably also of the plain-
tiff's actions, at least as they relate to the defendant's pur-
ported role in the tortious incident. Thus, even at the early
pleading stage, we may legitimately expect a defendant to
plead affirmative defenses arising from its own activities and
perhaps to raise allegations of the plaintiff's contributory fault.
However, at the outset of the litigation, it is unrealistic to
expect the average defendant to be familiar with all the char-
acters in the story, especially those other actors who may have
come on the stage before or after the defendant's scene.
336. Taylor v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 39 Wash. App. 828, 835, 696 P.2d 28, 32 (1985)
(discussing the purposes of the rules of discovery).
337. WASH. R. CrV. P. 12(a)(1) (West 1991).
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At the early pleading stage of a lawsuit, the tort plaintiff is
often in a superior position. A plaintiff and his or her attorney
frequently will have spent considerable time in investigation
and preparation before the action is ever filed. By contrast,
the defendant, suddenly subjected to suit, may not be in a posi-
tion to immediately identify all possible contributing tort-
feasors so as to allege their participation within only twenty
days after service of the complaint. It is therefore both inequi-
table and contrary to the statutory mandate to impose the duty
of raising the issue of the nonparty's fault at this premature
point in the judicial proceedings.
Even those states that have adopted statutes assigning to
defendants the duty to plead the fault of nonparties recognize
the defendant's need for adequate time to discover the exist-
ence and conduct of nonparties. The Indiana comparative fault
statute directs that a defendant be given "a reasonable oppor-
tunity to discover the existence of a nonparty defense.13 s3 The
Colorado statute, rather than demanding immediate pleading
in the answer, provides that the defendant should give notice
of a nonparty's responsibility within ninety days after the law-
suit is filed and served, unless the court determines that a
longer period is necessary." Yet the Washington state bar
committee proposes changing the civil rules to mandate imme-
diate pleading of this issue by the defendant in the original
answer. The committee in its apparent eagerness to shift the
entire burden of pleading to the defendant has failed to make
any allowance for the legitimate needs of defendants.
It is true that leave to amend a pleading is to be liberally
granted in Washington.340 Thus, even under the state bar com-
mittee's approach, a defendant who later learned of the
responsibility of a nonparty, in the exercise of due diligence in
discovery and investigation, would ordinarily be permitted to
amend the answer to include that allegation. However, while
the standard for amendment is indeed a liberal one, there is no
right to amend. Unless the defendant became aware of the
issue within the short period for the filing of the answer to the
complaint or within the additional short period provided by the
rules for amendment of a pleading once as a matter of
338. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-33-10(c)(1) (Burns 1986).
339. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111.5 (Supp. 1991).
340. WASH. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (West 1991); Herron v. Tribune Pub. Co., 108 Wash. 2d
162, 165, 736 P.2d 249, 253 (1987).
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course,"' the defendant would have to seek court permission
to raise the affirmative defense of nonparty fault. Moreover,
the trial court's decision whether to grant leave to amend is a
discretionary one and will be reversed on appeal only for an
abuse of discretion.' In any event, it is an inefficient proce-
dure to adopt a pleading rule concerning a matter that quite
frequently will not have been adduced as an issue at an early
stage in the lawsuit. It makes little sense to require a matter
to be pled when we expect that amendment to the pleading
will be necessary in a large number of cases. The circum-
stances thus suggest that this is a matter which does not lend
itself to regulation by pleading.
Fortunately, there are many procedural alternatives better
in keeping with the statutory mandate that fault be allocated
to every entity in all cases. First, the matter could appropri-
ately be left to clarification in discovery. There is nothing to
preclude the plaintiff from exploring the question in routine
discovery of the defendant. The plaintiff may ask directly by
interrogatory whether the defendant will assert that culpable
nonparties contributed to the incident. Or the plaintiff may
serve a request for admission asking the defendant to acknowl-
edge that no one other than the parties to the litigation have
any responsibility. The defendant is obliged to respond to such
discovery, or face the consequences. When a party fails to
properly disclose a matter in discovery, the trial court should
exclude any evidence on that issue at trial. 3 It is not appar-
ent why this is an unsatisfactory approach to the problem.
After all, even before the adoption of RCW 4.22.070, a defend-
341. Under Civil Rule 15(a), a party has the right to amend a pleading once as a
matter of course (1) at any time before a responsive pleading is served, or (2) if the
pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not yet
been placed upon the trial calendar, within 20 days after the pleading is served. WASH.
R. Civ. P. 15(a) (West 1991). Even the brief period for amendment as a matter of right
is in danger of extinction in Washington. The Washington Court of Appeals has
interpreted Rule 15(a) as extending a right to amend a pleading as a matter of course
only until the action is placed on the trial calendar. Wolfe v. Legg, 60 Wash. App. 245,
251, 803 P.2d 804, 808 (1991). Some county superior courts, including King County,
now place a case on the trial calendar immediately upon the filing of the complaint.
KING Cry. Loc. R. 4 (West 1991). Because the court of appeals viewed Rule 15(a) as
withdrawing the right to amend when the case is set for trial, the traditional
entitlement to one early amendment of a pleading appears to have been nullified in
King County Superior Court.
342. Walla v. Johnson, 50 Wash. App. 879, 882, 751 P.2d 334, 337 (1988); Phillip A.
Trautman, Pleading Principles and Problems in Washington, 56 WASH. L. REv. 687,
712 (1981).
343. Taylor v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 39 Wash. App. 828, 835, 696 P.2d 28, 32 (1985).
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ant was entitled to assert that another entity was wholly and
solely responsible for the plaintiff's damages. Nevertheless,
the rules did not require the defendant to plead the other
entity's responsibility in the answer. The issue was left for
development through the ordinary process of discovery.
Second, the Washington Supreme Court might develop a
rule requiring the defendant to file a specific notice that the
defendant intends to assert that a nonparty is wholly or par-
tially responsible for the plaintiff's injury or damage. The
deadline for such a notice would have to fall sufficiently in
advance of the trial as to give adequate notice to the plaintiff
(absent extraordinary circumstances where the fault of a non-
party is discovered at a later date notwithstanding due dili-
gence of the defendant). However, to avoid the defects of the
state bar committee's proposal, the time period for filing such a
notice would also allocate substantial time after the com-
mencement of the lawsuit, allowing the defendant ample
opportunity to investigate the possibility of culpable conduct by
other unjoined entities.
Finally, Washington Rule of Civil Procedure 16 may pro-
vide the most opportune method for clarifying the issues,
including the question of nonparty fault, at the most appropri-
ate point. Under Rule 16, the court on its own initiative or on
motion of the parties may hold a pretrial conference to con-
sider such matters as the simplification of the issues.' At an
appropriate time, presumably after the close of discovery, the
plaintiff could request a pretrial hearing for the very purpose
of exploring the defendant's intent to assert the responsibility
of a nonparty.T s 5 At the conference, the defendant would be
obliged either to reveal her intent or to explain why she is not
yet ready to make that determination and when she likely will
be able to do so. Upon completion of a pretrial conference,
Rule 16 directs the court to enter an order which recites the
action taken at the conference, including any limitation of
344. WASH. R. Civ. P. 16 (West 1991).
345. Under Rule 16(a), the superior court is granted discretion in determining
whether to hold a pretrial conference. WASH. R. CIv. P. 16(a) (West 1991). If the
supreme court deems the provision of specific notice of a nonparty fault issue as
important enough to merit modification of existing court rules, Rule 16 perhaps could
be amended to require the trial court to hold a pretrial conference whenever a party
files a motion, stating that discovery is completed and that a conference is necessary to





The Rule 16 pretrial conference procedure was crafted to
address situations such as this, where the parties desire gui-
dance and clarification of the issues to be tried. Under the
rule, a trial court can determine whether the defendant has
fully responded to discovery on the nonparty issue and
whether the defendant has been given a reasonable opportu-
nity to investigate the matter. The court is able to determine
the appropriate point in the lawsuit for defining the nature of
the issues to be tried, including the nonparty fault question.
Taking into account the particular circumstances of the case,
the trial court is then able to fashion a pretrial order. That
order can either establish further deadlines for revealing the
issues to be tried or, based upon the parties' representations at
the conference, can limit the matters to be tried to those truly
at issue. The pretrial order then "control[s] the subsequent
course of the action, unless modified at the trial to prevent
manifest injustice." 347
In view of these superior procedural alternatives, I hope
that the Washington Supreme Court will turn back the state
bar committee's one-sided, rigid proposal to require the defend-
ant to raise the nonparty issue as an affirmative defense in the
answer348 In the event that the state bar committee's rule
amendments are adopted, defendants would be advised to take
the safe approach by fully complying with the rule and plead-
ing the nonparty issue as an affirmative defense. A case may
arise, however, where a defendant neglects to plead the non-
party issue at such an early stage, or where a defendant only
learns of a nonparty's responsibility after serving the answer
but is nevertheless denied leave by the trial court to amend the
answer to add the allegation. In that event, the defendant
346. WASH. R. CIV. P. 16(b) (West 1991).
347. 1& See also Esmieu v. Schrag, 92 Wash. 2d 535, 537-38, 598 P.2d 1366, 1368
(1979); Stempel v. Department of Water Resources, 82 Wash. 2d 109, 115, 508 P.2d 166,
170 (1973).
348. Subsequent to the writing of this Article, the Washington Supreme Court
entered an order adopting new rules to be effective on September 1, 1992. Washington
Supreme Court Order No. 25700-A-501, June 4, 1992, published in, 829 P.2d CLXVIII
(1992) (advance sheet). The order conspicuously did not include amendments to Civil
Rule 8 or Civil Rule 12, perhaps indicating that the court was hesitant to adopt the
proposals. However, after this Article had been sent to the printer, the Washington
Supreme Court entered a later order adopting the amendments to Civil Rule 8 and
Civil Rule 12. Washington Supreme Court Order No. 25700-A-510, Sept. 10, 1992,
published in, 834 P.2d CXXIV (1992) (advance sheet).
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deprived of the statutory right to demand allocation of fault to
every responsible entity may still have recourse through a
challenge to the very validity of such a pleading rule.
A substantive law embodied in a statute prevails over any
conflicting court rule.349 When a court adopts a procedural
rule for the management of litigation, it is acting in its admin-
istrative rulemaking role, not in its judicial capacity. The
administrative adoption of a court rule does not constitute a
judicial decision on the validity of the rule. If and when a rule
is challenged in the concrete context of an actual case or con-
troversy, the court must don its judicial robes and adjudicate
the validity of the rule, including its consistency with substan-
tive constitutional or statutory limitations.3s Judged on that
standard, a pleading rule that reduces the issue of nonparty
fault to an affirmative defense cannot be sustained.
b. Assigning the Burden of Proof-Or Not
The burden of proof on an issue ordinarily follows the bur-
den of pleading.35' However, this is not invariably the case. 52
Deciding who must provide notice that a controversy exists
through the pleadings or otherwise, and determining who has
the burden of persuasion on that matter, are two separate
inquiries. We have concluded above that the issue of allocation
of fault to another entity should not be viewed as an affirma-
tive defense to be raised in the defendant's original answer.n3
But we have not thereby resolved the assignment of the bur-
den of proof with respect to such an allocation of fault among
the tortfeasors. In other words, to conclude that the matter is
or is not an affirmative defense to be pled by the defendant
349. State v. Frampton, 95 Wash. 2d 469, 510, 627 P.2d 922, 943 (1981) (Rossellini,
J., dissenting).
350. See, e.g., Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941) (considering challenge to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35(a), which had earlier been adopted by the Supreme
Court, as invalidly affecting matters of substance); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460
(1965) (same with respect to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(1)).
351. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 337, at 948 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984). See, e.g.,
Haslund v. City of Seattle, 86 Wash. 2d 607, 620-21, 547 P.2d 1221, 1230 (1976) (because
the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, the burden of proof is on the
defendant to prove those facts establishing the defense); Fulle v. Borlevard
Excavating, Inc., 20 Wash. App. 741, 744, 582 P.2d 566, 568 (1978) (because doctrines of
estoppel, waiver, and laches are affirmative defenses, defendant has the burden of
proof).
352. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 351, § 337, at 949.
353. See supra part III.C.2.a.
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does not by itself answer the question of where the burden of
proof should fall.
As with the question of responsibility for raising the issue
of the fault of nonparties, the location of the burden of proof
requires us to look to the statute and the legislative intent.
When a cause of action or an element of an action finds its
source in a statute, the imposition of the burden of proof is a
question of statutory interpretation.3 4 Comparative fault stat-
utes enacted in some other states have implicitly or explicitly
assigned to the defendant the burden of proof on allocation of
fault to a nonparty, while reserving to the plaintiff the ulti-
mate burden of establishing the liability of defendants. 5 The
Washington State Legislature did not choose to address the
issue of burden of proof directly in the statute. However, as
with the issue of appropriate procedures for raising a nonparty
fault issue, RCW 4.22.070 provides a benchmark for any resolu-
tion of the issue by stating that the trier of fact is to allocate
fault to all responsible entities.3" Our task is to allocate the
burdens of proof among the parties in the manner that "best
advances the legislative purpose"35 7 of ensuring comparative
fault among all responsible entities.
At the outset, the burden of proof on two matters would
not seem to be in any serious dispute. First, as with any cause
of action, the plaintiff bears the primary and ultimate burden
of persuasion. "Since the plaintiff is the party seeking to dis-
turb the existing situation by inducing the court to take some
measure in his favor, it seems reasonable to require him to
demonstrate his right to relief. '33" Thus, the plaintiff must
persuade the trier of fact, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that any named defendant actually engaged in negligent or
other culpable behavior and that such conduct was a proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injury or damage.
Second, the defendant has traditionally had the burden of
354. Rozner v. City of Bellevue, 116 Wash. 2d 342, 804 P.2d 24 (1991) (assigning
burden of proof to claimant in forfeiture hearing to show that forfeited vehicle was not
used to facilitate the sale of an illegal controlled substance or was used without
consent or knowledge of the owner).
355. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-33-10(b) (Burns 1986) (placing the burden of proof of a
nonparty defense upon the defendant); N.M. STAT. ANN. 41-3A-l(B) (1989) (implicitly
placing burden of proof upon defendant by referring to defendant as "establish[ing]
that the fault of another is a proximate cause of a plaintiff's injury").
356. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1) (1991).
357. Rozner v. City of Bellevue, 116 Wash. 2d 342, 347, 804 P.2d 24, 27 (1991).
358. Cleary, supra note 320, at 7.
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proof of establishing any contributory or comparative fault on
the part of the plaintiff.3 9 If the defendant wishes to avoid lia-
bility by directly taking the case to the plaintiff and accusing
the plaintiff of proximately causing his or her own injury or
damage, the burden of both raising and proving that allegation
is properly left with the defendant. The plaintiff has no
affirmative obligation to prove his or her own nonculpability.
Given the strong historical tradition in Washington of treating
contributory or comparative fault by the plaintiff as an affirm-
ative defense to be established by the defendant, we would
expect a more explicit statement by the legislature before
assuming that RCW 4.22.070 reversed that understanding.
The more difficult question concerns assigning the burden
of proof on the allocation of fault among the tortfeasors. If the
plaintiff has named more than one defendant, does the plain-
tiff have the burden of proving only liability without also
establishing the degree of each defendant's liability? Or does
the burden then shift to the defendants to persuade the trier of
fact on the amount of fault to be allocated to each? And if the
plaintiff has failed to join or cannot join a responsible entity,
who has the burden of proving the fault and degree thereof of
that nonparty? Because the plaintiff bears the responsibility of
establishing liability on the part of the defendant, doesn't that
duty include the burden of proving the degree of that liability
in comparison to other tortfeasors? Or perhaps the whole
inquiry is misguided and there is no need to assign the burden
of proof on allocation of fault to any party? Let us consider
the arguments on all sides.
If we were to set aside the legislative intent expressed in
the statute and attempt to determine how the burden on
respective degree of fault would be assigned under the com-
mon law, our analysis would likely favor the plaintiff.3 60 The
plaintiff of course would have the burden of proving that each
named defendant was liable, but the burden of showing the
extent of individual responsibility would probably be left to
the defendants. Two cases support this conclusion.
359. Godfrey v. State, 84 Wash. 2d 959, 965, 530 P.2d 630, 633 (1975).
360. Even under a common law analysis, it is not a foregone conclusion that the
burden of proof on allocation of fault would be assigned to the defendant. See 9
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2486, at 291 (Chadbourn rev. 1981) (in tort cases, the plaintiff "is




In Godfrey v. State,3 6 ' the Washington Supreme Court
ruled that the plaintiff's contributory or comparative fault was
appropriately left for the defendant to prove because the issue
only comes into play after the plaintiff has first established the
defendant's negligence and liability. 2  Thus, the court stated,
contributory negligence was "a coordinate or counterpart of a
defendant's negligence. '363 The same reasoning used in God-
frey could be applied to the question of allocation of degree of
fault among the tortfeasors. The issue of respective fault arises
only after it has first been established that a defendant is lia-
ble. If the defendant is exonerated from fault, the defendant
has no interest in the allocation of fault among the remaining
entities. In this sense, the issue of respective fault is "a coordi-
nate or counterpart of a defendant's negligence" 364 that would
properly be left to the defendant to prove as a matter of
defense.
The decision in Phennah v. Whalen36 5 provides further
support for this conclusion. In Phennah, the Washington
Court of Appeals considered the burden of persuasion in the
context of successive tortfeasors. In that case, the plaintiff had
been injured in two unrelated automobile accidents, but the
harm suffered was not easily segregated between the separate
tortious incidents.366 The court initially recognized that, in the
case of successive tortfeasors, "the injuries are inflicted by sep-
arate, discrete impacts and it therefore would seem that the
plaintiff ought to be able to ascribe to each wrongdoer respon-
sibility only for the damage he caused. 3 67 However, the court
stated, when segregation of the injuries separately inflicted is
not capable of proof, a requirement that the plaintiff show the
exact proportion of harm caused by each defendant would
effectively deprive the plaintiff of the right to redress for the
injury.368 Accordingly, the Phennah court adopted the
approach of Section 433B(2) of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, which provides that when a defendant "'seeks to limit
361. 84 Wash. 2d 959, 530 P.2d 630 (1975).
362. 1& at 964, 530 P.2d at 632.
363. Id. at 964, 530 P.2d at 632-33.
364. Id.
365. 28 Wash. App. 19, 621 P.2d 1304 (1980).
366. Id, at 21-22, 621 P.2d at 1306.
367. Id at 24, 621 P.2d at 1307.
368. Id at 24-25, 621 P.2d at 1307-08 (citing 1 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING
JAMES JR., THE LAW OF TORTS § 10.1, at 707-08 (1956); Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 5
(1948)).
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his [oint and several] liability on the ground that the harm is
capable of apportionment among [the tortfeasors], the burden
of proof as to the apportionment is upon each [defendant].' "369
The Phennah rule thus requires successive tortfeasors to
accept the burden of allocating the harm caused to the plaintiff
between the separate incidents or to assume joint and several
responsibility in damages. The same rationale applied to our
current problem would indicate that the defendant should
have the burden of proof when it seeks to limit liability by
apportioning part of the responsibility to another tortfeasor.
However, our task is not one of imagining the likely
assignment of burdens at common law. Rather it is to uphold
the intent of the Washington comparative fault statute. The
Godfrey and Phennah decisions, imposing on defendants the
burden of proof on contributory fault and segregation of harm,
reflected the traditional "policy of handicapping a disfavored
contention" by assignment of the burden of persuasion.
RCW 4.22.070 establishes a new principle of comparative fault
and implements that principle of proportionate responsibility
through an unequivocal command that the trier of fact deter-
mine the degree of fault of every responsible entity. This legis-
lative policy may not be undermined by treating the rule of
comparative responsibility as a "disfavored contention" to be
discouraged by imposing the burden of proof upon the party
raising the issue. Instead, we must determine what approach
"best advances the legislative purpose"; 7 ' that is, the purpose
of correlating extent of liability with degree of fault.
With the transition of liability law to a system of compara-
tive responsibility among tortfeasors, the Godfrey and Pzen-
nah decisions have lost their force and cannot be applied to our
situation. As noted above, the question of a plaintiff's contrib-
utory fault (the subject of Godfrey) is appropriately left to the
defendant's proof because it involves, not a denial of the
defendant's liability, but a direct counterattack upon the plain-
tiff. By contrast, under a system of comparative responsibility,
the degree of a defendant's fault leads inexorably to the extent
of liability. The existence of liability and the extent of liability
369. Id, at 28, 621 P.2d at 1310 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 433B(2) (1965)).
370. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 351, § 337, at 950 (footnote omitted).
371. Rozner v. City of Bellevue, 116 Wash. 2d 342, 347, 804 P.2d 24, 27 (1991).
[Vol. 16:1
Tort Reform
are thus logically intertwined, and the plaintiff has the full
burden of proof on liability.
With respect to apportionment of harm between successive
tortfeasors (the subject of Phennah), the court feared that
placing the burden of proof upon the plaintiff might deprive
the plaintiff of any remedy. If the plaintiff were obliged to
segregate the harm between separate incidents, but was unable
to make a sufficient evidentiary showing, the plaintiff would
be prevented from obtaining a recovery from either tortfeasor.
The court thus ensured a remedy to the plaintiff by holding
successive tortfeasors jointly and severally liable, unless a suc-
cessive tortfeasor could prove the divisibility of the harm. The
Phennah approach has been superseded, and a remedy to the
plaintiff has been guaranteed by different means. No longer is
the matter of division of responsibility measured by apportion-
ment of the harm, but rather by apportionment of the fault, a
determination that is eminently possible in all but the most
unusual of cases.372 RCW 4.22.070 has overturned Phennah by
providing for apportionment of liability based upon fault in
nearly all contexts formerly governed by the joint and several
liability doctrine, including the situation of successive
tortfeasors. Once the plaintiff has met the burden of proof of
showing a defendant's culpable conduct and proximate causa-
tion of the harm, the plaintiff is ensured of some recovery,
whatever may be the ultimate allocation of respective fault
among all responsible entities.
Under the new system of comparative fault, as established
by RCW 4.22.070, I think on balance that the burden falls upon
the plaintiff to prove both the existence and the extent of lia-
bility. The plaintiff's acknowledged burden of showing that a
particular defendant is at fault necessarily includes a showing
of that defendant's degree of fault. If the plaintiff desires to
hold one defendant fully responsible to the exclusion of all
other parties and entities, the plaintiff appropriately has the
obligation to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
this defendant, and this defendant alone, is at fault. When con-
tributory fault by the plaintiff is alleged, the defendant is seek-
ing to defeat or diminish liability by reversing it back upon the
plaintiff. In contrast, when the plaintiff contends that the
defendant is solely and fully liable for all damages, the plain-
372. See supra part III.B.3 (discussing division of fault as contrasted with division
of harm).
1992)
88 University of Puget Sound Law Review
tiff's burden includes the obligation of excluding the possibility
of fault and causation on the part of other entities. In conclu-
sion, in a system of comparative fault, part and parcel of the
plaintiff's affirmative case of proving that a defendant was at
fault and is responsible in damages is proof that some other
entity is not at fault and should not share in the responsibility
in damages.
When the fault of nonparties is at issue, it is appropriate to
impose upon a defendant the burden of producing some evi-
dence that an unjoined entity is responsible in whole or part
for the harm. The defendant's burden of production includes
the duty of bringing forward sufficient evidence to make a
prima facie case. The defendant must produce concrete evi-
dence of the nonparty's contribution to the tortious harm. The
defendant may not merely hint at possible involvement by
other entities and leave the plaintiff with the impossible task
of proving a negative. The plaintiff will instead be assured of a
tangible evidentiary basis in which to respond. The ultimate
burden of persuasion-to establish that the full share of
responsibility belongs with the defendant-remains always
upon the plaintiff. However, "although the defendant does not
bear a formal burden of persuasion, the defendant nevertheless
retains an incentive to persuade the trier of fact" '373 that fault
lies as well with other entities. Thus, the battle will be fully
joined, and the plaintiff's affirmative case will not involve
shadow boxing with an imaginary opponent.
When all is said and done, the dispute about burden of
proof is not likely to be consequential in practice. Indeed, I
submit that it is a false issue. The plaintiff indisputably has
the burden of proving liability by the defendant, meaning that
a failure of persuasion results in a verdict for the defendant.
By contrast, the burden of proof on apportionment of fault-
whether imposed on the plaintiff or on the defendant-is
unlikely to affect the jury's calculation. Once the trier of fact
has passed the threshold of liability and turns to the question
of the degree of fault, the risk of nonpersuasion fades away.
It is necessary to assign the burden of proof on the thresh-
old question of liability. Whether a party has any fault, and is
therefore liable, is an issue that can be evaluated by weighing
the evidence along a single dividing line between the negative
373. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981)
(unanimous decision allocating burdens of proof in employment discrimination case).
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and the affirmative. In other words, the determination of fault
versus non-fault is a question that can be answered "yes" or"no." The burden of persuasion on liability therefore has con-
sequence in those cases where the evidence is evenly balanced.
But when the issue of fault has already been answered in the
affirmative, the question of apportionment does not lend itself
to a simple, single, correct answer. On this point, it is essen-
tially meaningless to say that the evidence is in equipoise or
that the burden of proof on the question is not met. The large
range of possible answers defeats any attempt to define the
point at which the preponderance of the evidence is satisfied.
Once the threshold determination of liability is made,
based on a preponderance of the evidence, some degree of fault
will necessarily be allocated to the liable defendant. Because
apportionment of fault is not an all or nothing proposition, a
positive answer will always be given. A jury that has con-
cluded that the defendant is at fault does not assess the per-
centage of fault according to a formula based on the
preponderance of the evidence. This stage of the process impli-
cates a more complex weighing of all the evidence.
United States Senator Larry Pressler and Mr. Kevin V.
Schieffer, in arguing for reform of joint and several liability,
suggest that "[tlhere is no need to impose a requirement that
any particular party bear the burden with respect to apportion-
ment." '74 The legislative report of a United States Senate com-
mittee on a proposed national products liability act endorses
this approach:
[This bill] does not specify who has the burden of proof as to
apportionment .... Based on the evidence presented, the
trier of fact should apportion responsibility among all par-
ties. All the parties will have an opportunity to present
their case to the trier of fact as to the appropriate apportion-
ment of responsibility, so that liability can be assigned based
on that apportionment. The trier of fact shall make a deter-
mination as to apportionment without a requirement that
any particular party "prove" which apportionment formula
should be applied. 75
This approach strikes me as the best of all alternatives.
374. Pressler & Schieffer, supra note 161, at 667.
375. SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION, THE PRODUCT
LIABILrrY REFORM ACT, S. Rep. No. 422, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 6970 (1986) (majority
views).
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RCW 4.22.070 does not specify who has the burden of proof on
allocation of fault among all entities, although it unequivocally
mandates that such an allocation of fault be made. Asking
who has the burden of proof on this matter seems to be the
wrong question. The plaintiff certainly must bear the burden
of proof on the question of the defendant's culpable conduct
and proximate causation of the harm. Likewise, the defendant
should bear the burden of proof on the question of the plain-
tiff's culpable conduct and proximate causation of the harm.
Once the existence of fault is established, the degree of fault is
to be determined by the trier of fact, based upon all the evi-
dence, without any meaningless instruction concerning who
has the burden of proof. To instead "require any party to
prove the 'correct' apportionment is unfair"37 6-the "imposi-
tion of burdens confuses the issue. 's77
D. Determining "Proportionate Share" of Damages in the
Judgment
RCW 4.22.070(1) provides in pertinent part:
Judgment shall be entered against each defendant ... in an
amount which represents that party's proportionate share of
the claimant's total damages.3 78
1. Introduction
To implement the general rule of "several only" liabil-
ity,379 RCW 4.22.070(1) establishes a simple two-step approach
to apportion liability according to responsibility. First, the stat-
ute provides that "the trier of fact shall determine the percent-
age of total fault which is attributable to every entity. '38 0
Second, the statute provides that the court shall enter judg-
ment against each defendant for "that party's proportionate
share of the claimant's total damages."'"
The process is straightforward and, in my view, leaves
nothing for interpretation. The ordinary reader of the statu-
tory language would understand, for example, that if (1) the
trier of fact finds a defendant to be 25 percent at fault, with
376. Pressler & Schieffer, supra note 161, at 667.
377. Id at 668.






the remainder of the fault being attributed in various shares to
the plaintiff and other entities, joined or unjoined, then (2) the
court shall enter judgment against this defendant for a 25 per-
cent proportionate share of the plaintiff's total damages. How-
ever, the ordinary understanding has recently come under
challenge by advocates of the state plaintiff's bar.
2. Two Variant Deconstructionist Interpretations
As perhaps the most novel of the deconstructionist inter-
pretations propounded by the plaintiffs' bar, one commentator
argues that a defendant's "proportionate share" of the damages
is to be calculated by something more elaborate than a direct
application of the defendant's percentage share of the fault to
the total amount of the plaintiff's damages. Charles K. Wig-
gins suggests an interpretation of the statutory language that
would convert the term "proportionate share" into a rather
meaningless phrase, leaving trial lawyers free to urge a jury to
award damages based upon loose notions of equity, quite aside
from and perhaps unrelated to the comparative responsibility
of the parties.8 2
Mr. Wiggins contends that there are three possible inter-
pretations of the phrase "a party's proportionate share" in
Subsection (1), only one of which is the ordinary meaning of''proportionate" as a simple and direct mathematical
application:
First, under a "mechanical" interpretation, "proportionate
share" could mean that the plaintiff's total damages are sim-
ply multiplied by the percentage of fault allocated to the
defendant. Second, under a "party" approach, proportionate
share could mean that the damages are multiplied by a pro-
portion equal to the defendant's percentage of fault divided
by the fault allocated to all parties, including plaintiff,
defendants, and third-party defendants. Third, under a
'finder of fact" interpretation, "proportionate share" might
be a number found as a fact by the trier of fact-in other
words, the jury or judge would have to find both the per-
centage of fault allocated to all entities, and also the propor-
tionate share of damages. The jury/judge might choose to
calculate the proportionate share of damages based on the
percentage of fault, or might apply some other calculus to
reach it own best determination of a fair proportionate share
382. See Wiggins, supra note 61, at 215-22.
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of damages to be assessed against this defendant. 3 3
As demonstrated in detail below, Mr. Wiggins's second and
third "interpretations" simply are not legitimate constructions
of the statutory language. The plain meaning of "proportion-
ate share," the basic structure of the statute, and the intent of
the legislature to establish a general principle of comparative
responsibility preclude these unsupported alternative
approaches. Although critical of the results attained by the
straightforward mathematical approach, Mr. Wiggins provides
no support in the actual language of the statute for his alterna-
tives. Nor does Mr. Wiggins adduce any support from the leg-
islative history of the statute, or authority from any other
comparative fault jurisdiction, to adopt his counterintuitive
understandings of "proportionate share" in a comparative fault
statute. I will look at both of Mr. Wiggins's alternate interpre-
tations in turn and then return to the plain language approach,
which in my view is plainly the correct approach.
a. The "Party" Approach
Mr. Wiggins makes no effort to justify his second alternate
interpretation-the "party" approach-under the actual lan-
guage of RCW 4.22.070. He does, however, explain how it
would apply in practice. Under this variant approach, the
defendant's share of liability would not be based directly upon
its percentage share of the total fault attributable to all enti-
ties. Instead, the defendant's percentage share of the fault
would be compared only to the sum of the shares of fault
attributed to the other parties that had been joined to the law-
suit.3 ' Thus, before assigning a fractional share of liability to
each defendant, the fault of unjoined entities would be sub-
tracted from the total sum of the fault shares. In other words,
all those parties joined to the action would, in addition to their
own fault share, be held liable for a proportionate share of the
fault allocated to any unjoined entities. The fault of unjoined
entities would be reallocated to the parties.
Mr. Wiggins illustrates the "party" approach by postulat-
ing a case involving a comparatively negligent plaintiff, three
defendants, and one unjoined entity.8 5 Mr. Wiggins hypothe-
383. Id at 216.




sizes that a jury makes the following allocations of fault:3 6
TABLE 1
Plaintiff (P): 5 percent
Defendant 1 (D1): 5 percent
Defendant 2 (D2): 40 percent
Defendant 3 (D3): 30 percent
Unjoined Entity: 20 percent
Total Fault 100 percent
Under the simple mathematical approach (the approach I
conclude that statute plainly employs), each defendant would
be liable for a proportionate share of the plaintiff's total dam-
ages based upon an application of the found percentage of fault
to the total amount of the plaintiff's damages. Thus, assuming
P's total damages are $100,000, D1 would be responsible for 5
percent or $5,000, D2 for 40 percent or $40,000, and D3 for 30
percent or $30,000. The 20 percent share of the unjoined
entity, which amounts to a $20,000 proportionate share of the
damages, would not be awarded.
Under Mr. Wiggins's "party" approach, we instead adjust
that calculation to assign each of the parties a weighted frac-
tion of the fault share attributed to the unjoined entity. If we
assume $100,000 in damages, the "party" approach would apply
as follows:1 7
TABLE 2
Determining Sum of Fault Shares Attributed to Parties:
P + D1 + D2 + D3 = x
5% + 5% + 40% + 30% = 80%
Determining Proportion of Each Defendant's Fault Share to Sum of
Fault Attributed to Parties:
P: 5/80 x $100,000 - $ 6,250
D1: 5/80 x $100,000 $ 6,250
D2: 40/80 x $100,000 $50,000
D3: 30/80 x $100,000 = $37,500
Total Award
(Damages of $100,000 Less P's Share of $6,250)
386. I have substituted Defendants 1 through 3 for the fictional names used in Mr.
Wiggins's hypothetical.
387. Wiggins, supra note 61, at 217.
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As shown in these tables, under the "party" approach, the 20
percent fault share attributable to the unjoined entity is reallo-
cated among all of the parties, including the plaintiff. In other
words, the $20,000 share of the damages corresponding to the
unjoined entity's 20 percent share of the fault is divided on a
fractional basis among the parties-$1250 to D1, $10,000 to D2,
$7,500 to D3, and $1,250 to P.
The fatal flaw with Mr. Wiggins's "party" approach propo-
sal is that there is absolutely nothing in Subsection (1) to sup-
port this calculation of the damage award. Mr. Wiggins can
point to no language in the statute even hinting at a realloca-
tion of an unjoined entity's share of the fault among the joined
parties to the case according to this complex weighted fraction
formula. Indeed, such an approach appears to be unprece-
dented in any jurisdiction. 3sn A small number of states do pro-
vide that, when a plaintiff is unable to collect a severally liable
defendant's share of the damages, the uncollectible amount
will be reallocated among the other parties according to their
respective percentages of fault.3" 9 None of these statutes, how-
ever, provide for reallocation of the percentage of fault attrib-
uted to an unnamed entity. And the Washington statute
includes nothing that would suggest a reallocation of any
party's or entity's fault to someone else in the award of dam-
ages.3" If such a complex and unusual system of damage cal-
388. In other states that have adopted comparative fault statutes providing for a
general rule of several liability, the statutes have been uniformly interpreted to mean
that a defendant's share of the liability is directly related to the defendant's share of
the fault. See, e.g., Bisaillon v. Casares, 798 P.2d 1368, 1371 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (under
Arizona comparative fault statute, defendant's liability was limited to percentage of
damages reflecting percentage of fault); Graber v. Westaway, 809 P.2d 1126, 1128 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1991) (under Colorado comparative fault statute, the jury must "apportion
fault severally" among all entities and each defendant is then liable only for that
"percentage of plaintiff's damages which represents the amount of fault attributable to
him").
389. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h(g) (West 1991); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 600.6304(6) (West 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.067(2) (Vernon 1988).
390. During floor consideration of the Tort Reform Act of 1986, the Washington
State Legislature considered just such a proposal. An amendment was offered under
which the court would "reallocate" an insolvent defendant's uncollectible share of a
several liability judgment "among all other parties who were allocated a percentage of
fault, including a claimant at fault, according to the ratios of their respective
percentages of fault." H. Journal, 49th Reg. Sess. & Spec. Sess. 1047 (1986). Thus, if
the legislature had intended to provide for a reallocation of one culpable entity's share
of fault among the parties of a lawsuit based upon some ratio of respective fault, that
alternative approach was readily available. As finally enacted, however, RCW
4.22.070(1) does not include any such provision.
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culation was intended, we would certainly expect the statute to
allude to it in some way. It does not.
Similarly, nothing in Subsection (1) suggests that the cal-
culation of the "proportionate share" of damages owed by a
severally liable defendant involves adding up the sum of the
shares of fault of the parties to the case. By contrast, consider
the separate paragraph of the statute which preserves a limited
form of joint and several liability when a plaintiff was not con-
tributorily at fault. Under Paragraph (1)(b), if the plaintiff is
without fault, all defendants against whom judgment is
entered are jointly and severally liable "for the sum of their
proportionate shares of the claimant['s] total damages." '91
Thus, when the Washington State Legislature intended to
direct the courts to add together the shares of fault of parties
to reach a "sum," it clearly said so. The absence of any refer-
ence to the "sum of their proportionate shares" in the several
liability-only provision of Subsection (1) plainly bars the
importation of such a calculation formula into that part of the
statute.392
Finally, the "party" approach runs directly contrary to the
statute's explicit adoption of a "several only" rule, which gen-
erally limits a defendant's liability to its own share of fault.
Under Mr. Wiggins's "party" approach, a defendant who is
only partially at fault could easily be held liable for the poten-
tially larger share of fault attributable to an unjoined entity.
Consider the following scenario: the plaintiff is found to be 1
percent at fault, the joined defendant is found to be 20 percent
at fault, and an unjoined entity is found to be 79 percent at
fault. A comparison of the defendant's 20 percent share with
the sum of the shares of percentage fault assigned to all parties
leads to a fraction of 20/21-which converts to more than 95
391. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1)(b) (1991) (emphasis added).
392. Moreover, if the term "proportionate share" in Subsection (1) involves a
calculation of the sum of the parties' shares of fault, as Mr. Wiggins suggests, then
what does the same term mean in Paragraph (1)(b) when the statute explicitly directs
adding up the defendant's "proportionate shares" of fault to reach a "sum"? If the
term "proportionate share" standing by itself in Subsection (1) requires addition of
shares to reach a sum, then does the "sum" of "proportionate shares" in Paragraph
(1)(b) involve some type of double multiplication? Nonsense. Mr. Wiggins's artificial
reading of the term in one part of the statute leads to a confused and impossible
understanding of the same term in another part of the statute. Both provisions in the
same statute reinforce the common understanding of the term "proportionate share"
as meaning that share of the damages which corresponds to the defendant's individual
percentage share of the total fault.
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percent. Although only 20 percent at fault, that defendant
under the "party" approach would be on the hook for some 95
percent of the damages. This result is impossible to reconcile
with the language or intent of the statute.
b. The "Pair" or Equitable Share Approach
As another variant twist upon the statute, Mr. Wiggins
argues that holding a defendant liable for the defendant's "pro-
portionate share" of the damages actually means that the jury
may take whatever action strikes its members as roughly equi-
table, quite aside from the jury's own determination of the per-
centage of fault attributable to that defendant. As I have
suggested, RCW 4.22.070(1) plainly sets forth a two-step
approach.393 First, the jury determines the percentage of fault
attributable to every entity, whether named as a party to the
action or left unjoined. Second, the court then enters judg-
ment against each defendant for that defendant's proportionate
share of the damages. Comparative fault leads to comparative
liability.
Mr. Wiggins, however, suggests adding a third intervening
step to the statutory process. After the jury has already made
an allocation of fault, Mr. Wiggins would ask the jury to return
to the same subject and make some sort of ill-defined, unar-
ticulated finding as to who should bear what share of the dam-
ages notwithstanding the earlier allocation of percentages of
fault. As Mr. Wiggins acknowledges, the trier of fact could
choose to set aside its earlier findings on the shares of fault
allocated to all entities and instead apply "some other calculus
to reach its own best determination of a fair proportionate
share of damages to be assessed against this defendant."39 4
But where is this in the statute? The statute provides for
the trier of fact to allocate percentages of fault to every
responsible entity. There is no mention in the statute of
another step in the jury's deliberations. There is no reference
to a "fair" or equitable share approach. The statute refers to"proportionate share," a term that suggests quantity or magni-
tude-a mathematical concept. If percentage of fault is not to
be the basis for apportionment of damages, then what is?
What would this third step in the process involve? How would
393. Mr. Wiggins does acknowledge that the structure of RCW 4.22.070(1) supports
the two-step approach. Wiggins, supra note 61, at 218.
394. Id at 216.
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the jury be instructed under Mr. Wiggins's "fair share" or"equitable share" approach? Because the jury is required by
the statute to determine percentages of fault, what further
would it be asked to do? How would the trial court or the
reviewing appellate court assess what the jury had done? Mr.
Wiggins's approach would produce an unguided, arbitrary pro-
cess in violation of the due process rights of defendants.
3. The Ordinary Meaning of "Proportionate Share"
In the end, having found the variant deconstructionist
interpretations wanting, we must return to where we started-
an ordinary understanding of the plain language in the statute.
The structure of the statute, the words of the statute, and the
purpose of the statute independently and in combination con-
firm that the proportionate share of the damages assessed
against individual defendants under RCW 4.22.070(1) corre-
sponds directly to the percentage of fault attributed to that
defendant by the trier of fact.
a. Structure of the Statute
As Mr. Wiggins acknowledges,395 the basic structure of the
statute signals a simple "mechanical" application of each
defendant's percentage share of the fault to the total amount
of the plaintiff's damages to reach that defendant's proportion-
ate share of the damages to be awarded. The first sentence of
RCW 4.22.070(1) commands the "trier of fact" to "determine
the percentage of the total fault which is attributable to every
entity which caused the claimant's damages. ' '396 The second
sentence directs the entry of judgment against each defendant
"in an amount which represents that party's proportionate
share of the claimant's total damages." '397 A simple two-step
process: (1) assign percentage of fault, and (2) award damages
based upon that proportionate share.
Mr. Wiggins, however, suggests that the statute cannot be
so easily understood because it uses two separate terms-"per-
centage of fault" and "proportionate share"-which he believes
must have different meanings and involve different
processes.3 98 But the use of two separate phrases in discussion
395. Id at 218.
396. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1) (1991).
397. I&
398. Wiggins, supra note 61, at 215-16, 218-19. Mr. Wiggins also contends that
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of two different steps of the process presents no difficulty or
confusion. The trier of fact determines the "percentage of
fault" while the court enters judgment based upon the "pro-
portionate share" of the damages. The "percentage of fault"
found by the trier of fact serves as the basis for the court's
entry of judgment based on a "proportionate share" of the
damages. 3" Thus, the word "percentage" refers to the alloca-
tion of fault and the word "proportionate" refers to the trans-
lation of that allocation into an entry of judgment for a share
of the damages.
b. The Plain Meaning of "Proportionate"
The legislative choice of the term "proportionate" also
undermines Mr. Wiggins's proffer of an alternate approach.
The term does not lead one to think about fractional shares
based upon a sum of shares less than the whole or about an
arbitrary equitable share chosen at random by the jury.
Rather, the term "proportionate share" suggests to the ordi-
RCW 4.22.070(1) should not be applied in a strictly mathematical manner because such
an approach makes it unnecessary for the court to hold a reasonableness hearing to
approve a settlement as previously required under RCW 4.22.060. 1& at 220-21. Under
the joint and several liability regime, when one of multiple defendants settled with the
plaintiff, the amount of the settlement was credited against the plaintiff's damages
before entering judgment against the nonsettling defendants. To protect the
nonsettling defendants, the court was required to hold a hearing to determine whether
the amount of the settlement was reasonable and therefore reflected a legitimate
figure to credit against the plaintiff's damages as awarded against the remaining
defendants. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.060 (1991). RCW 4.22.070 institutes a general rule
of several liability and, even when the plaintiff is without fault, limits joint and several
liability to the sum of the defendants' shares of fault, excluding any percentage share
of fault allocated to nonparties. Accordingly, because the settling defendant's share of
the fault and proportionate share of the damages will not be assessed against the
remaining defendants, the reasonableness hearing is ordinarily unnecessary.
Therefore, Mr. Wiggins argues, a "mechanical" interpretation of RCW 4.22.070 renders
RCW 4.22.060 unnecessary. Mr. Wiggins thus concludes that adoption of the simple
mathematical approach violates the principle that all provisions of a statute should be
given effect. He simply forgets that RCW 4.22.070 is not without exceptions. As
detailed later in this Article, see infra part III.E and part III.H, Paragraph (1)(a)
preserves joint and several liability among tortfeasors acting in concert and of a
principal for an agent, and Subsection (3) sets out three complete exceptions to the
modification of joint and several liability. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(3) (1991). The
reasonableness hearing requirement of RCW 4.22.060 retains full vitality whenever
any of those exceptions come into play. See also infra part III.G (discussing settlement
under Subsection (2)).
399. Washington Pattern Jury Instructions-Civil, § 41.04, 6 WASHINGTON
PRACTICE 337 (1989) (Washington pattern jury instruction § 41.04 directs the jury to
determine "what percentage of the total negligence is attributable to each entity" and
explains that the jury's answers "will furnish the basis by which the court will
apportion damages" among the defendants).
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nary person a simple, mechanical, mathematical calculation.
Black's Law Dictionary says that "proportionate" and "pro
rata" are synonymous and mean "according to a certain rate,
percentage, or proportion."4  Thus, the plain language, as well
as the structure of the statute, compel the conclusion that the"proportionate" share of the damages it to be determined by
application of a certain "percentage"-the percentage of fault.
Moreover, RCW 4.22.070 is not the only provision in this
chapter of the Washington code that makes use of the term"proportionate." The comparative negligence statute, gov-
erning allocation of fault between plaintiffs and defendants,
uses much the same language. RCW 4.22.005 speaks in terms
of "charg[ing]" "contributory fault" to the plaintiff, and then
using that factual determination to make a "proportionate[]"
reduction in the judgment for damages. °U Mr. Wiggins con-
cedes 40 2 (as he must in light of the longstanding judicial con-
struction of the comparative negligence statute40 3 ) that the
proportionate reduction in recovery accomplished under RCW
4.22.005 is calculated directly from the percentage of fault
chargeable to the plaintiff.
It would certainly be strange for the same term "propor-
tionate" to be applied in one way as between plaintiffs and
defendants under the comparative negligence statute and yet
another way as among plaintiffs, defendants, and all other enti-
ties under the comparative fault statute. Before we could con-
strue the comparative fault statute in such an unnatural
manner, we would properly expect more direction in the lan-
guage or at least the legislative history of the provision. But,
as discussed, nothing in the actual language or in the legisla-
tive history of RCW 4.22.070 provides any support for any
understanding of the statute other than one that ties the
amount of liability in damages ("proportionate share" of dam-
ages) to the degree of fault ("percentage of fault").
c. The Purpose of the Statute
As I said at the outset of this Article, any proposed inter-
400. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1097-98 (5th ed. 1979).
401. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.005 (1991) ("any contributory fault chargeable to the
claimant diminishes proportionately the amount awarded as compensatory damages").
402. Wiggins, supra note 61, at 218-19.
403. See, e.g., Godfrey v. State, 84 Wash. 2d 959, 965, 530 P.2d 630, 633 (1975) (under
the comparative negligence statute, "[riecovery will ... be diminished in proportion to
the percentage of negligence attributed to the party recovering").
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pretation of the statute that serves to undermine the guiding
principle of comparative fault in liability is not in accord with
either the plain language of the provision or the history of its
enactment.404 Following immediately after the statutory com-
mand to determine the percentage of fault, and after the direc-
tion to enter judgment for a proportionate share of damages,
we find the third sentence of RCW 4.22.070(1), which reminds
us of the basic legislative intent: liability of each defendant is
to be "several only." The first two sentences must be under-
stood in light of the third.4 °5
By "several" liability, the statute means that each defend-
ant is to be held responsible in damages only for his or her
individual share of the fault.406 As one commentary states:
"When joint and several liability is replaced with several liabil-
ity, a defendant's liability to the plaintiff is directly propor-
tional to his percentage of the total negligence."4 7 During the
legislative debate, one member of the state senate explained
that the statute codifies the "good public policy" of having
"those persons who have contributed to the problem pay pro-
portionate to their contribution. '40 8
The essence of RCW 4.22.070 is comparative fault among
all entities. There is no room in the statute for retreat.
E. Acting in Concert and Agency: The Vicarious Liability
Provision
RCW 4.22.070(1)(a) reads:
(a) A party shall be responsible for the fault of another
person or for payment of the proportionate share of another
party where both were acting in concert or when a person
was acting as an agent or servant of the party.4 °9
RCW 4.22.070 abolishes the doctrine of joint and several
404. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
405. The Washington legislators well understood that they were abolishing the
doctrine of joint and several liability when the plaintiff is contributorily negligent.
See, e.g., S. Journal, 49th Reg. Sess. & 1st Spec. Sess. 466 (1986) (when the plaintiff is
also at fault "joint and several liability goes out the door") (remarks of Sen.
Talmadge); H. Journal, 49th Reg. Sess. & Spec. Sess. 1048 (1986) (provision "does away
with joint and several liability") (remarks of Rep. Padden); id. (same) (remarks of
Rep. McMullen); ici (same) (remarks of Rep. Wang).
406. See supra note 165.
407. 2 COMPARATivE NEGLIGENCE § 13.30, at 1339 (1991).
408. S. Journal, 49th Reg. Sess. & 1st Spec. Sess. 466 (1986) (remarks of Sen.
Thompson).
409. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1)(a) (1991).
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liability in most contexts, substituting instead a general rule
holding each tortfeasor separately responsible for its individual
degree of culpability. However, the statute contains certain
limitations and exceptions. Paragraph (1)(a) articulates the
first limitation on the general rule. Under this provision, a
party may be held responsible for the fault of another person
(1) if that party and the other person "act[ed] in concert," or
(2) if that other person "act[ed] as an agent or servant of the
party. 4 10 Fault will not be divided among individuals acting in
concert or when a principal or master is held to account for the
deeds of an agent or servant. Paragraph (1)(a) "reflects the
legislature's understanding that a party is appropriately held
responsible for truly indivisible wrongs committed in concert
and for those torts committed by one who acts as an agent or
servant for another party. '411
As discussed below, when the statute refers to persons"acting in concert," it means that two or more persons have
combined together purposefully to commit a tortious act. Simi-
larly, when a party anoints another person as an agent, the
party asks the world to recognize the agent as his or her alter
ego. In either case, the separate identities of the actors fades.
The actions of one are treated as the actions of the other.
Thus, it is impossible to apportion fault between the party and
the other person with whom he or she acted in concert or who
was employed as an agent or servant.412 Under a theory of
410. Professor Peck points out that Paragraph (1)(a) speaks in terms of a "party"
being responsible for the fault of another "person" or for payment of the share of
another "party," rather than using the word "entity," which is used elsewhere in the
section to broadly denote both parties and nonparties. Peck, Washington's Partial
Rejection, supra note 2, at 250. Professor Peck is quite correct to criticize the
legislature for this inconsistent use of terminology. See REED DICKERSON, THE
FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL DRAFrNG § 6.14, at 135 (2d ed. 1986) ("[Clonsistency, which
sharpens the tools of language, is the ranking principle [of drafting]. Nothing will
contribute so much to general clarity as following it, and nothing will contribute so
much to obscurity as neglecting it"). However, the inconsistency appears to be
inadvertent. As Professor Peck states, this "haphazard interchange" of terms "has no
apparent purpose." Peck, Washingtons Partial Reection, supra note 2, at 250. There
is no reason to believe that the legislature desired to limit the application of this
section to natural persons and thereby preclude the possibility of acting in concert
with or appointing as agent an artificial entity such as an organization or corporation.
The term "person" in this particular portion of RCW 4.22.070 appears to have the same
broad meaning as the word "entity" elsewhere in the statute. See supra part III.C.1
(discussing meaning of "entity").
411. Sisk, supra note 13, at 468.
412. Anderson, supra note 88, at 486 ("[b]ecause vicarious liability is based on the
relationship between the actual tortfeasor and some other party responsible for the
tortfeasor's conduct, assigning separate shares of liability to each is illogical").
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vicarious liability, the wrong committed is, by definition,
indivisible.
In the case of the ordinary joint tort, the tortfeasors may
have engaged in parallel conduct that combines to harm the
plaintiff or may have simply cooperated together in a lawful
enterprise that, combined with negligence or other fault, led to
injury. By contrast, there is an intimate alliance among per-
sons acting in concert and between a principal or master and
an agent or servant. In these contexts of vicarious liability, a
different rule of liability is appropriate. Because the law treats
people acting in concert as essentially a single entity, and
because the ordinary rules of agency make a principal respon-
sible for the actions of the agent, comparative fault has no
application. Paragraph (1)(a) "simply recognizes a practical
limitation on the ability to apportion fault among
tortfeasors. ' 413
1. Concerted Action
Holding persons '"acting in concert" responsible for each
other's fault represents a return to first principles of law. By
preserving vicarious liability when a party has acted in concert
with another person, the legislature intended to return the
doctrine of joint and several liability to its origins. Indeed, the
doctrine of joint and several liability was first recognized in,
and originally limited to, the context of concerted action.414
The earliest decision on point was Sir John Heydon's Case415 in
1613. In that case, the English court permitted suit on a joint
tort where the defendants had engaged in a joint enterprise, so
that "all coming to do an unlawful act, and of one party, the
act of one is the act of all of the same party being present." '416
As Dean Prosser explained, when the parties acted in concert
with a common purpose, each was liable "for the entire dam-
age done, although one might have battered the plaintiff, while
another imprisoned him, and a third stole his silver
buttons. 417
413. Sisk, supra note 13, at 468.
414. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 1094 (1st ed. 1941)
[hereinafter PROSSER ON ToRTS]; 1 SPEISER et al., supra note 36, § 3.7, at 393; Sisk,
supra note 13, at 436-37.
415. 77 Eng. Rep. 1150 (K.B. 1613).
416. Id See also PROSSER ON TORT, supra note 414, at 1094 (quoting Sir John
Heydon's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 1150, 1151 (K.B. 1613).
417. PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 414, at 1094.
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In the early common law, to have acted in "concert"
meant that the parties had acted to accomplish a wrongful pur-
pose with a common design.418  While an express agreement
was not necessary, there had to be at least a tacit understand-
ing among the parties.419 And the mere fact of an agreement
was not enough; the defendants had to actually commit acts of
a tortious character in carrying the common wrongful design
into execution.420 In other words, to constitute concerted activ-
ity, the defendants had to "intentionally unite in the wrongful
act" or be present and actively assist or participate in the
wrongdoing. 42 Indeed, the civil concept of concerted activity
418. One Washington decision rendered early in this century could be read as
defining concerted action more broadly to mean only that the tortfeasors acted with a
common plan or purpose, whether or not the purpose was wrongful in nature. In
Pealer v. Grays Harbor Boom Co., 54 Wash. 415, 103 P. 451 (1909), the Washington
Supreme Court considered a case involving a suit against two lumber companies that
had negligently permitted logs floating in the river to dam the flow and cause the
water to flood back upon the plaintiff's land. The court upheld a jury instruction
stating that the two companies should be found to have acted in concert if they had
acted "with a common purpose in obtaining and securing these logs for rafting, and
placing them on the market." Id. at 416, 103 P. at 452. The Pea/er decision must be
understood in historical context. At this point in time, the Washington Supreme Court
was in the process of moving the doctrine of joint and several liability beyond the
original limited context of concerted activity and extending it to tortfeasors who acted
independently but whose concurrent actions united to cause a single injury. The seeds
of a more expansive rule had been planted eight years before Pealer in Doremus v.
Root, 23 Wash. 710, 63 P. 572 (1901), and were soon to blossom into the adoption of the
modern doctrine of joint and several liability in Nelson v. Bromley, 55 Wash. 256, 104
P. 251 (1909), which was rendered later the same year that Pealer was decided.
Accordingly, Pealer is best understood as an interim point in the development of the
law, in which the court was stretching the traditional notion of concerted activity to
extend the law of joint torts one step further along the path toward joint and several
liability of concurrent tortfeasors. Indeed, the Pealer court, while mentioning the
common law concept of acting in concert, stated that the real issue was whether "the
acts of both [tortfeasors] contributed to the overflowing of plaintiff's land," or whether
the case involved "damage done by one and not the other." Pea/er, 54 Wash. at 417,
103 P. at 452. The court's analysis reveals that its concern was not with the traditional
and strict concept of concerted activity, but rather with whether joint and several
liability should apply to concurrent acts resulting in a single injury to the plaintiffs
land. In any event, the court concluded its decision on this point by noting that the
application of joint and several liability in that case was of no practical consequence.
Both of the defendant companies were owned by the same parties and were under the
same management, so the court stated that "it could make no possible difference" how
the judgment was divided between them. IA at 418, 103 P. at 453.
419. PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 414, at 1094-95.
420. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 cmt. b (1979).
421. 1 SPEISER et al., supra note 36, § 3.4, at 382 (the "settled and venerable rule"
of concerted action "applies to tortfeasors who intentionally unite in the wrongful act,
or who are present and assist or participate therein, actively and with common intent,
so that the injury results from the joint wrongful act of the wrongdoer") (footnote
omitted). See also Thompson v. Johnson, 180 F.2d 431, 433-34 (5th Cir. 1950) (same).
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was derived from the criminal doctrine of aiding and
abetting.42 2
In this early period, even the existence of a conspiracy was
not sufficient for imposition of joint liability on those who did
not directly act together in effecting the injury. The concept of
conspiracy was later used to expand joint and several liability
"beyond the active wrongdoer to those who had merely
planned, assisted or encouraged his acts. '423 Subsequently, the
doctrine of joint and several liability was further extended to
concurrent tortfeasors, taking the rule well beyond the initial
context of tortfeasors acting in "conscious concert. ' '4 2 4
From the early common law, we can thus derive a defini-
tion of "acting in concert" as involving an intentional combina-
tion of conduct and requiring all tortfeasors to actively engage
in the wrongful act." 5 Given the legislature's apparent desire
422. Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 823 P.2d 717, 726 (Haw. 1991). See also Peck,
Washington's Partial Rejection, supra note 2, at 235 (concerted activity torts ordinarily
were "intentional torts" and were "frequently criminal in nature").
423. PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 414, at 1095. See also Carroll v. Timbers
Chevrolet, Inc., 592 S.W.2d 922, 925-26 (Tex. 1979).
424. Welsh v. Gerber Prod., Inc., 839 F.2d 1035, 1037 (4th Cir. 1988).
425. If Paragraph (1)(b) is interpreted as returning the law of joint and several
liability to the strict view of concerted activity in the early common law, the term
presumably would not extend to individuals who were not present and actively
involved in the wrongdoing, but who instead encouraged or planned the activity or
assisted the active tortfeasors after the fact. As noted above, joint and several liability
was extended to these conspiratorial activities at a later point in the development of
the common law. The North Dakota comparative fault statute specifically preserves
joint and several liability for tortfeasors who "act in concert in committing a tortious
act or aid or encourage the act." N.D. CENT. CODE 32-03.2-02 (1991). The North
Dakota Supreme Court has interpreted this language as distinguishing between "two
different types of conduct by tortfeasors, those who act in concert in committing a
tortious act and those who aid or encourage a tortious act." Kavadas v. Lorenzen, 448
N.W.2d 219, 224 (N.D. 1989). But see Bergman v. Anderson, 411 N.W.2d 336, 341 (Neb.
1987) (approving a definition of concerted activity as involving the mere
encouragement of tortious conduct). If the North Dakota distinction is accepted, and it
is a distinction grounded in the traditional common law understanding of concerted
activity, it is notable that the Washington statute speaks only in terms of "acting in
concert" and does not preserve joint and several liability for those tortfeasors who aid
or encourage a tortious act. Under this interpretation, Paragraph (1)(b) holds a
tortfeasor who acts in concert fully responsible for the actions of those with whom he
or she combines in active wrongdoing. A tortfeasor who withholds from active
participation in the wrongdoing, but who assists in planning or encouraging the
conduct, would be liable only to the extent that the finder of fact concludes that this
activity is independently culpable and contributed to the harm suffered by the
plaintiff. In other words, fault would be separately allocated to the conspirator who
was not present and did not directly participate in the wrongdoing. However, in some
instances, involvement in planning or encouraging the wrongful activity of others
might be viewed as creating an implied agency relationship, thereby subjecting the
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to restore the original understanding of joint and several liabil-
ity, this strict and narrow understanding of concerted action
should govern application of Paragraph (1)(a).
Moreover, the modern understanding of concerted action
confirms its continued narrow application. In recent years
(before tort reform), the doctrine of joint. and several liability
was broadly extended to any case where the actions of more
than one person had united in causing a single injury, even if
those persons had acted independently of each other. There
was generally no need to fit cases into the mold of concerted
activity in order to impose joint and several liability. However,
in a few recent cases, the courts have considered the existence
of concerted activity when necessary to determine whether
tort liability could be extended to a particular actor in a partic-
ular situation.
For instance, the question of concerted action has arisen in
cases where a plaintiff has been injured by a generic product,
such as a drug, but has been unable to identify the particular
manufacturer that produced the individual product or dosage
that actually harmed the plaintiff. In these cases, the question
is whether liability should be imposed upon a member of the
industry in the absence of direct evidence on causation, that is,
evidence that the individual manufacturer produced the dosage
that was taken by the plaintiff. One of the theories of liability
offered by plaintiffs in these cases has been the allegation that
all manufacturers in the industry acted in concert to distribute
the product without adequate testing or otherwise cooperated
in distribution of a defective product. These concerted activity
allegations have met with little success." 6
For example, in Martin v. Abbott Laboratories,4 2 7 the
Washington Supreme Court considered a case involving a
person to liability under Paragraph (1)(b) as a principal responsible for the conduct of
the agent who carries out the tortious deed.
426. See, e.g., Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1015 (D. S.C. 1981)
(declining to apply concerted action theory for liability of drug manufacturers); Sindell
v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 993 (Cal.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980) (same);
Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So. 2d 275, 280 (Fla. 1990) (same); Smith v. Cutter
Biological, Inc., 823 P.2d 717, 726 (Haw. 1991) (same); Rastelli v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., No. 38, 1992 WL 60502 (N.Y. 1992) (declining to apply concerted action
theory for liability of tire rim manufacturer); Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash.
2d 581, 598, 698 P.2d 368, (1984) (declining to apply concerted action theory for liability
of drug manufacturers). But see Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 343 N.W.2d 164, 176 (Mich.),
cert denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984) (applying concerted action theory for liability of drug
manufacturers).
427. 102 Wash. 2d 581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984).
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woman who allegedly developed cancer as a result of prenatal
exposure to DES, a drug taken by her mother during preg-
nancy. The plaintiff was unable to identify the particular
pharmaceutical company which had produced the DES tablets
taken by her mother. The court adopted a new theory by
which manufacturers of the drug would be potentially subject
to liability in proportion to their share of the market at the
time the plaintiff's mother had ingested the drug." However,
the Martin court did reject the concert of action approach to
liability." 9 The court did not directly define concerted action
other than to say that "parallel or imitative conduct" by manu-
facturers in their testing and marketing of the drug did not
rise to the level of acting in concert.430 Still the court signaled
a narrow understanding of concerted activity through its
favorable citation of the California Supreme Court's analysis of
a similar allegation in the DES case of Sindell v. Abbott Labo-
ratories.43 The Martin court described the Sindell holding as
restricting the "acting in concert" theory to those situations
where it can be proved "that each defendant knew the other's
conduct was tortious" and that the defendants encouraged one
another in that conduct.432
Other courts have been more explicit in narrowly defining
concerted activity. For example, in Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co.,433
a federal district court declined to find that drug manufactur-
ers who may have imitated the actions of competitors in pro-
ducing and marketing a drug could be regarded as having acted
in concert. The court explained that the concept of concerted
action derives from the criminal law and "renders jointly and
severally liable all who intentionally participate in an unlawful
activity that proximately causes plaintiff's injury. ' '4 4 Thus, the
Ryan court defined concerted activity as entry into a "common
endeavor" and intentional participation in conduct that is "tor-
tious in nature. '435
428. Id. at 602-07, 689 P.2d at 381-83. See also infra part III.H.3 (discussing market-
share analysis of Martin).
429. Martin, 102 Wash. 2d at 595-99, 689 P.2d at 377-79.
430. Id. at 599, 689 P.2d at 379.
431. 607 P.2d 924 (Cal.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
432. Martin, 102 Wash. 2d at 598, 689 P.2d at 379.
433. 514 F. Supp. 1004 (D.S.C. 1981).
434. Id. at 1015.
435. Id. See also Rastelli v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 591 N.E.2d 222, 324 (N.Y.
1992) ("it is essential that each defendant charged with acting in concert have acted
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The case of Curtin v. Lataille4" provides another example
of the prevailing narrow application of the concerted activity
concept in modern tort law. In Curtin, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court considered whether members of a street gang
were liable on a concerted action basis for aiding and abetting
one of their members in a shooting.437 The court held that the
civil tort standard of liability for persons acting in concert is
the same as the criminal standard for aiding and abetting.438
On this basis, the court held that two elements must be proven
for concerted action liability: (1) that the alleged aiders and
abettors "share in the criminal intent of the principal," and
(2) "that there exist a community of unlawful purpose. 439
From both the early common law and the modern applica-
tion of concerted action, the strict and narrow nature of the
concept is manifest. Cooperation in a lawful enterprise, which
results in harm to a third person through negligence, does not
rise to the high level of concerted activity. Participation in a
legitimate commercial relationship does not constitute acting
in concert, even if a third person is harmed by the actions of
one of the parties or by a product that was distributed by the
parties through a contractual network. In our modern interde-
pendent society, people and businesses will cooperate and work
together in a wide variety of ways. Concerted activity involves
something different in both the extent of association and the
nature of motivation.
tortiously and that one of the defendants committed an act in pursuance of the
agreement which constitutes a tort").
436. 527 A.2d 1130 (R.I. 1987).
437. Id. at 1131.
438. Id. at 1132.
439. Id, The Washingtan Court of Appeals considered a similar factual situation
in Foster v. Carter, 49 Wash. App. 340, 742 P.2d 1257 (1987). Nine boys decided to
engage in a "BB gun v'ar," and one of the boys was injured by a shot in the eye. The
injured boy and his mother brought suit against the boy who fired the shot and the
boy's parents. The defendants sought contribution from the seven other participants,
alleging that the boys had combined in a joint enterprise or concerted action. Id. at
342, 742 P.2d at 1259. The court concluded that, although the boys had a unity of
purpose to play "BB gun war," there was no evidence of a concert of action against the
injured boy. Id. at 345, 742 P.2d at 1260. Nor was there any evidence that the
defendant boy's act of shooting the injured boy in the eye was done with the
knowledge or consent of the other boys. Id, The Foster court's analysis is of limited
use in determing the common law meaning of "acting in concert." The court was
instead addressing the responsibility of the participants under the then prevailing
general rule of joint and several liability among concurrent tortfeasors who engaged in
a "common enterprise." I& at 341, 345, 742 P.2d at 1258, 1260. Even so, it is notable
that the court refused to find liability absent evidence that the boys had knowledge of
or consented to the particular wrongful act that resulted in the plaintiff's injury.
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For entities to be regarded as having acted in concert, they
must have consciously joined together to act in an unlawful
manner. Concerted activity cases generally involve such mani-
festly unacceptable and dangerous behavior as group assault
upon an individual" 0 or highway drag-racing in which an inno-
cent bystander is injured.4" The purpose of the concert of
action theory is "to deter antisocial behavior."" 2  Accordingly,
as one member of the Washington plaintiff's bar has acknowl-
edged, concert of action cases "are rare events.""43
440. See, e.g., Thompson v. Johnson, 180 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1950); Lamb v. Peck,
441 A.2d 14 (Conn. 1981); Bergman v. Anderson, 411 N.W.2d 336 (Neb. 1987).
441. See, e.g., Bierczynski v. Rogers, 239 A.2d 218 (Del. 1968); Lemons v. Kelly, 397
P.2d 784 (Or. 1964); Skipper v. Hartley, 130 S.E.2d 486 (S.C. 1963); Andreassen v.
Esposito, 216 A.2d 607 (N.J. Super. 1966).
442. Lyons v. Premo Pharmaceutical Labs, Inc., 406 A.2d 185, 190 (N.J. Super.
1979) (refusing to apply concerted action theory to a drug manufacturer because "there
was nothing antisocial" about placing a drug on the market); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 illus. 1, 2 (1979) (presenting as illustrations of acting in
concert a combination to rob, assault, and imprison an individual and a drag-race
resulting in injury to an innocent third driver). As stated above in the text, the
defining elements of "concerted activity" are the purposeful and illicit motivation of
the actors in joining together and the inherently wrongful nature of the conduct.
However, by saying that defendants engaging in concerted activity must "intentionally
unite in the wrongful act," 1 SPEISER et al., supra note 36, § 3.4, at 382, we are not
restricting the concept of concerted activity to intentional torts, although such cases
frequently do involve intentional, even criminal, wrongdoing. As discussed earlier,
intentional tortfeasors remain subject to joint and several liability in any event
because intentional torts fall outside the meaning of "fault" for purposes of the
Washington comparative fault statute. See supra part III.B.2 (discussing meaning of
fault and the problem of the intentional tortfeasor). Thus, if concerted action were
defined narrowly as including only intentional torts engaged in by multiple
defendants, the express preservation of joint and several liability for individuals
engaging in concerted activity found in Paragraph (1)(a) might appear superfluous.
Instead, one may also be said to be acting in concert with another if both deliberately
join in activity that is inherently wrongful for reasons other than the carrying out of
an ultimate intent to cause harm. Drag-racing is a traditional example of concerted
activity, with the participants being held jointly and severally liable for any harm that
follows. If two drivers participate in an illegal drag-race that accidentally results in
the death of an innocent bystander, they have not committed an intentional tort
because the result was not intended by either driver. However, the drivers have
engaged in concerted activity by consciously joining together in the anti-social conduct
of drag-racing, an activity that is wrongful because of the unusually high risk
(although not the certainty) of harm. In sum, while joining together to actively
commit an intentional tort plainly would constitute concerted activity, the concept also
encompasses joint activity with a common purpose that, while inherently wrongful and
anti-social in nature, does not involve the intentional infliction of harm.
443. Kristin Houser, Exceptions to the Tort Reform Act's Elimination of Joint and
Several Liability, in LIVING WITH TORT REFORM: FIVE YEARS LATER 294, 299 n.1
(sponsored by Washington St. Trial Lawyers Ass'n, Jan. 10, 1992).
19921 Tort Reform10
2. Principal and Agent; Master and Servant
RCW 4.22.070(1)(a) imposes a regime of vicarious tort lia-
bility upon the relationship between a principal and an agent,
as well as upon that particular form of agency relationship
between a master and a servant. The "fiction of identity"
between the principal and the agent underlies modern agency
law."4 The principal may conduct affairs through the agent
"as if he were present and acting in person."4 4 5 Accordingly,
the law holds the principal responsible in substantial respects
for the actions of the agent. Because of the significance of that
legal relationship, Paragraph (1)(a) appropriately limits the
general rule of several only liability, by holding the principal
responsible for the fault of the agent and the master for the
fault of the servant.' 4
"Agency" describes the consensual and fiduciary relation-
ship that is created when an agent agrees to act on behalf of
and under the direction of a principal. 447 As the Washington
Court of Appeals recently summarized: "The agency concept is
flexible. The relation may be established for a limited purpose,
or it may be broad. The relationship may be express or arise
by inference from the relation of the parties .... The burden
of establishing the agency relationship is on the party asserting
it." '448 The creation of the agency relationship and the scope of
the principal's liability for the conduct of the agent is governed
by the law of agency, a full description of which is beyond the
scope of this Article.
A "servant" is a species of agent employed by a
"master. ' 44 9 The servant is a person "employed to perform
services in the affairs of another.., and who, with respect to
his or her physical conduct in the performance of the service,
444. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Agency, 4 HARV. L. REV. 345, 350 (1891).
445. ROSCOE T. STEFFEN, AGENCY-PARTNERSHIP IN A NUTSHELL § 2, at 4 (1977).
446. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1)(a) (1991).
447. STEFFEN, supra note 445, § 2, at 3 (emphasis in original) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(1) (1958)). See also Rho Co. v. Department of Revenue, 113
Wash. 2d 561, 570, 782 P.2d 986, 991 (1989) ("[ain agency relationship generally arises
when two parties consent that one shall act under the control of another"). See
generally HAROLD GILL REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY
AND PARTNERSHIP § 2, at 45 (2d ed. 1990).
448. CKP, Inc. v. GRS Constr. Co., 63 Wash. App. 601, 608, 821 P.2d 63, 67 (1991).
449. STEFFEN, supra note 445, § 5, at 9; REUSCHLEIN & GREGORY, supra note 447,
§ 7, at 16.
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is subject to the other's control or right of control."4s5 A ser-
vant works physically for a master, and is subject to the
master's control over that work, but ordinarily has no addi-
tional agency authority to bind the master in contract.451 A
master is subject to liability for the torts of his or her servants
committed in the scope of their employment.452
The defining element in the agency relationship is the
principal's right of control over the agent.45 3 With this power
to control the conduct of the agent or servant, the principal or
master assumes responsibility-including liability in tort-for
the actions of the agent or servant.4 1 Paragraph (1)(a) pre-
serves this responsibility by expressly directing that the fault
of the agent or servant be imputed to the principal or master.
As I have written elsewhere, "[ilt is the agency or servant rela-
tionship, quite distinct from the ordinary relationship among
tortfeasors, that calls for a different rule of liability here. It
would be a strange and indefensible abrogation of the law of
agency to provide for several liability in this unique
context. '455
Paragraph (1)(a) is deliberately written to hold the princi-
pal accountable for the actions of the agent and the master for
the actions of the servant. But the opposite is not true. The
agent or servant is not responsible under the statute for the
fault of the principal or master. This is in full accord with
principles of agency law. An agent, of course, is directly liable
to the plaintiff for his or her own tortious conduct.4 1 Ordina-
rily, "the fact that the agent is acting within the scope of
employment or the command of the principal [is not] a
defense. '457 However, in the absence of some form of mutual
agency (such as a partnership), 48 the agent has no right to con-
trol the conduct of the principal and thus has no responsibility
450. Chapman v. Black, 49 Wash. App. 94, 98, 741 P.2d 998, 1001 (1987). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(2) (1958).
451. REUSCHLEIN & GREGORY, supra note 447, § 50, at 102.
452. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958).
453. Chapman v. Black, 49 Wash. App. 94, 99, 741 P.2d 998, 1001 (1987) (in an
agency relationship, "[t]he crucial factor is the right of control"); REUSCHLEIN &
GREGORY, supra note 447, § 5, at 12-13.
454. Van Hook v. Anderson, 64 Wash. App. 353, 364, 824 P.2d 509, 514 (1992)
(vicarious liability "exists because of the master's right of control" over the servant).
455. Sisk, supra note 13, at 468.
456. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 343 (1958).
457. REUSCHLEIN & GREGORY, supra note 447, § 124, at 198.




for the principal's wrongful actions.459 The agent will not be
liable unless he or she has been a "responsible participant in a
tort.'
4 6 0
Washington case law confirms the conclusion that while a
principal may be vicariously liable for the actions of an agent,
the agent will be liable only when he or she breaches an
independent duty of care to the injured party. For example, in
Tennant v. Lawton,461 the Washington Court of Appeals con-
sidered the liability of a real estate agent for passing on to the
buyer a misrepresentation from the seller that a parcel of land
could support a sewage system and thus was "buildable." The
court ruled that, under the law of agency, the real estate
agent's duty was to the principal seller. 2 However, the court
found an independent legal duty from the real estate agent to
the buyer arising from the fact that a real estate broker "is a
professional who is in a unique position to verify critical infor-
mation given him by the seller." '463 Because the real estate
agent in Tennant should have been alerted by problems con-
cerning the information received from the seller, but did noth-
ing to verify that information, the court held the agent liable
for the misrepresentation. 4c4
In Hoffman v. Connall,465 the Washington Supreme Court
adopted the holding in Tennant and held that a real estate
agent is not liable for innocently and non-negligently convey-
ing a seller's misrepresentation to a buyer.4r6 The court held
that the real estate agent "must act as a professional, and will
be held to a standard of reasonable care" in taking steps to
avoid disseminating false information to buyers.4 7 The real
estate agent's potential liability to a buyer is based upon an
independent duty of care attendant upon his or her status as a
licensed professional, and not upon a doctrine of vicarious lia-
459. See id. § 128, at 203 ("[o]f course, the agent is not liable for the negligence of
the principal") (footnote omitted).
460. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 344 cmt. b (an agent who merely
communicates a message from the principal to a person who commits a tortious injury
upon a third party is "not a responsible participant in a tort which results from" the
message and thus is not liable to the third party).
461. 26 Wash. App. 701, 615 P.2d 1305 (1980).
462. 1d at 706, 615 P.2d at 1309.
463. Id.
464. Id. at 707-08, 615 P.2d at 1310.
465. 108 Wash. 2d 69, 736 P.2d 242 (1987).
466. Id. at 75-78, 736 P.2d at 246.
467. Id. at 77, 736 P.2d at 246.
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bility imposed upon an innocent agent for the wrongful actions
of the principal.
F The Limited Form of Joint and Several Liability Among
Defendants Liable to an Innocent Plaintiff
RCW 4.22.070(1)(b) provides:
(b) If the trier of fact determines that the claimant or
party suffering bodily injury or incurring property damages
was not at fault, the defendants against whom judgment is
entered shall be jointly and severally liable for the sum of
their proportionate shares of the claimant[']s total
damages. 4 M
The most important distinction drawn in RCW 4.22.070 is
that between the innocent and the culpable plaintiff. Subsec-
tion (1) enunciates a general rule of "several only" liability
among tortfeasors, by which the extent of each defendant's lia-
bility for the plaintiff's total damages is proportionate to the
percentage of the total fault attributable to that defendant." 9
However, when the plaintiff is without culpability, the general
rule of comparative responsibility is set aside. Under Para-
graph (1)(b), if the plaintiff or claimant is without fault, the
defendants to the action remain jointly and severally liable to
the plaintiff.470
The meaning and effect of Paragraph (1)(b) is vital to the
operation of the statute. This paragraph preserves a limited
form of joint and several liability. In the case of the faultless
plaintiff, the defendants against whom judgment is entered
remain jointly and several liable for "the sum of their propor-
tionate shares of the claimant[']s total damages. '47 1 In other
words, the joint and several liability calculation is limited to
the sum of the proportionate shares of the judgment attributa-
ble to the percentages of fault for each of the defendants
against whom the judgment is ultimately entered. No defend-
ant is held responsible "for that part of the damages attributa-
ble to the fault of an entity which was released by the plaintiff,
is immune from liability, has an individual defense against the
plaintiff, or otherwise was not made a party to the suit. 4 72 In
468. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1)(b) (1991).
469. Id. § 4.22.070(1).
470. Id. § 4.22.070(1)(b).
471. Id.
472. Sisk, supra note 13, at 440. See also Houser, supra note 443, at 299 (Under
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sum, the statute retains joint and several liability only among
the "named defendants. 473
The interpretation and effect of Paragraph (1)(b) has pre-
viously been fully discussed at length in the sections of this
Article analyzing the statutory requirement that fault be allo-
cated to every responsible entity, whether or not joined to the
lawsuit.474
G. Settlement and Contribution Under Comparative Fault
RCW 4.22.070(2) provides:
If a defendant is jointly and severally liable under one of the
exceptions listed in subsection (1)(a) or (1)(b) of this section,
such defendant's rights to contribution against another
jointly and severally liable defendant, and the effect of set-
tlement by either such defendant, shall be determined under
RCW 4.22.040, 4.22.050, and 4.22.060. 475
1. Pure Comparative Fault
In a world of pure comparative fault-that is, under the
general rule of "several only" liability established by Subsec-
tion (1)-the issues of settlement and contribution among
tortfeasors are simple.47' Because each defendant is severally
liable only for its own proportionate share of the damages
based upon its individual percentage of the total fault, the set-
tlement of one tortfeasor has no effect upon the liability of any
other tortfeasor. As the New Mexico Court of Appeals
Paragraph (1)(b), "a claimant who is found not at fault in causing the injury gets a
limited break in that the defendants against whom a judgment is entered share jointly
in the sum of damages assessed against each one of them. In other words, if there is no
judgment against one entity either because the statute of limitations has run against
that entity or it is exempt from suit (as with an employer), the remaining defendants
are not liable for that share of the fault.") (emphasis in original); Peck, Reading Tea
Leaves, supra note 175, at 339 ("a plaintiff receives no judgment for shares of damages
attributable to entities not joined as defendants and receives no compensation for
those portions of the losses suffered"); Wiggins et al., supra note 13, at 236 n.229
(noting that under Paragraph (1)(b), "the defendants are not liable for the
proportionate damages allocated to nonparty entities") (emphasis in original).
473. Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 112 Wash. 2d 636, 669, 771 P.2d 711, 728, amended,
780 P.2d 260 (1989).
474. See supra part III.C.1.c to g.
475. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(2) (1991).
476. See Harris, Partial Tort Settlements, supra note 53, at 88 (in a system of pure
several liability, there is no need for contribution or calculation of credit to be given
nonsettling defendants for settling defendant's payment to plaintiff).
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explained in Wilson v. Galt:4 7
If the injured person settles and releases one tortfeasor, the
consideration paid would satisfy only that tortfeasor's per-
centage of fault, even though no jury determination of the
amount of his liability exists at the time of settlement. If
the injured person pursues his claim against the other
tortfeasors, recovery will only be had against them for their
respective shares of the fault.478
In sum, "[e]ach defendant has a liability to the plaintiff
that can be neither increased nor decreased by the relative
amount of some other defendant's payment to the plaintiff."47 9
For that reason, the plaintiff is "entitled to keep the advantage
of his or her bargaining, just as he or she must live with an
inadequate settlement should the jury determine larger dam-
ages or a larger proportion of fault than the injured party
anticipated when settlement was reached. '48 0 Thus, the plain-
tiff does bear "the risk of an undervalued settlement," but the
plaintiff also "is able to keep any portion of the settlement that
is above the settler's equitable share of the obligation." 48 '
By the same token, in a system of pure comparative fault,
the "equitable need for contribution vanishes" because no
defendant will be obliged to pay more than its own percentage
share of the fault.48 2
477. 668 P.2d 1104 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983).
478. Id. at 1109.
479. Gray v. Chacon, 684 F. Supp. 1481, 1485 (S.D. Ind. 1988) (discussing Indiana's
comparative fault statute as abolishing joint and several liability). See also Eilbacher,
supra note 170, at 909 (under Indiana comparative fault statute, a settlement by one
tortfeasor does not affect the nonsettling defendants "since the terms of such
settlement are not determinative of the extent of any defendant's liability for
damages").
480. Dobson v. Camden, 705 F.2d 759, 769 ("[f]airness demands that the benefits of
the bargain remain where the bargaining parties place them, and that nonsettling
tortfeasors pay damages in proportion to their fault"), rev'd on reh'g on other grounds,
725 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc); Geier v. Wikel, 603 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Kan. 1979)
(discussing Kansas comparative fault statute). See also Roland v. Bernstein, 828 P.2d
1237, 1239 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (under Arizona comparative fault statute, the "benefit
of an advantageous settlement" is given to the plaintiff, just as the plaintiff who makes
a "disadvantageous settlement" must "b[ear] that consequence").
481. David Randolph Smith & John W. Wade, Fairness: A Comparative Analysis
of the Indiana and Uniform Comparative Fault Acts, 17 IND. L. REV. 969, 983 (1984)
(discussing Indiana comparative fault statute). See also Eilbacher, supra note 170, at
910-11 (whether the plaintiff will "gain a windfall or suffer a penalty" depends on "the
accuracy of plaintiff's forecast" of the percentage of fault that will be assigned to the
settling defendant and the amount of the damages to be awarded).
482. Teepak, Inc. v. Learned, 699 P.2d 35, 35 (Kan. 1985). See also Roland v.
Bernstein, 828 P.2d 1237, 1238 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (there is no contribution under
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2. Limitations on and Exceptions to Comparative Fault
The general rule of comparative fault established in RCW
4.22.070 is subject to certain limitations and exceptions that
make it impossible to completely escape from the earlier
regime of settlement credits and contribution among
tortfeasors.4 8 3 Paragraph (1) establishes two limitations upon
the general rule of "several only" liability. Under Paragraph
(1)(a),48 4 persons acting in concert are jointly and severally lia-
ble, and a principal or master remains responsible for the fault
of an agent or servant.48 5 Under Paragraph (1)(b), 48 6 if the
plaintiff is without fault, the defendants against whom judg-
ment is entered are jointly and severally liable for the sum of
their proportionate shares of the damages. 8 7 Subsection (2)48
clarifies that, in such cases, the previous statutory rules gov-
erning contribution and settlement-found in RCW 4.22.040, 41'
4.22.050, 49 and 4.22.06011- remain applicable. Moreover, Sub-
section (3)492 articulates three complete exceptions to the com-
parative fault statute, meaning that the preexisting statutory
rules for contribution and settlement continue to apply of their
own force to cases falling within the scope of those exceptions.
a. Contribution
RCW 4.22.040 provides that "[a] right of contribution exists
between or among two or more persons who are jointly and
severally liable upon the same indivisible claim for the same
injury, death, or harm, whether or not judgment has been
recovered against all or any of them.''493 Contribution thus
allows the loss to be distributed among the tortfeasors "by
requiring each other to pay a proportionate share to one who
comparative fault); Wilson v. Gait, 668 P.2d 1104, 1108 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983) (there is no
contribution in a system of several liability); Harris, Partial Tort Settlements, supra
note 53, at 83 ("each wrongdoer is responsible only for his own percentage share and
has no reason or authority to interject himself into another alleged wrongdoer's
dispute") (footnote omitted).
483. See generally Harris, Partial Tort Settlements, supra note 53.
484. WASH. REv. CODE § 4.22.070(1)(a) (1991).
485. See supra part III.E.
486. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1)(b) (1991).
487. See supra part III.F.
488. WASH. REv. CODE § 4.22.070(2) (1991).
489. Id, § 4.22.040.
490. Id. § 4.22.050.
491. Id. § 4.22.060.
492. 1d § 4.22.070(3).
493. Id. § 4.22.040(1). See generally Anderson, supra note 88.
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has discharged their 'joint' liability" by compensating the
plaintiff for damages.494 The basis for contribution is the com-
parative fault of each person.495
Under Paragraph (1)(b), when the plaintiff is without con-
tributory negligence, each defendant will be held jointly and
severally liable to the extent of the sum of the proportionate
shares of the other defendants who are retained in the action
for the entry of an adverse judgment.49 6 Under RCW
4.22.050(1), if the comparative fault of the parties has already
been established by the court in the original action, a defend-
ant who is required to pay damages in an amount that exceeds
the defendant's individual proportionate share, may recover a
judgment for contribution against the other defendants who
have paid less than their proportionate shares of the total dam-
ages. 497 Thus, resolution of claims for contribution arising
from joint and several liability under Paragraph (1)(b) will be
simple-the percentages of fault assigned to each defendant in
the original action by the plaintiff will establish the amount of
contribution to which each of the jointly and severally liable
defendants will be entitled.
Determining contribution in the case of defendants held
responsible for the fault of other persons under Paragraph
(1)(a) may be more difficult. This statutory paragraph holds
persons acting in concert jointly and severally liable for each
other's conduct and also holds a principal or master responsi-
ble for the fault of an agent or servant pursuant to the law of
agency.498 The underlying rationale for this limitation on the
comparative fault rule is that the degree of fault among those
acting in concert or in an agency relationship is truly
indivisible.4'
Because "in concert" activity and the agency relationship
do give rise to vicarious liability based upon a theory of indivis-
ible fault, the argument could be made that it is simply impos-
sible to allocate comparative responsibility among such
494. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 36, § 51, at 341.
495. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.040(1) (1991).
496. See supra part III.F.
497. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.050(1) (1991) ("If the comparative fault of the parties
to a claim for contribution has been established previously by the court in the original
action, a party paying more than that party's equitable share of the obligation, upon
motion, may recover judgment for that contribution.").
498. See supra part III.E.1 and part III.E.2.
499. See supra part III.E.
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entities. If so, the inability to make a finding on the percent-
age share of fault attributable to each entity will make it more
difficult to establish a basis for measuring the amount of
contribution.
With respect to concerted activity, however, it is one thing
to say that the vicarious nature of culpability is such that no
division of fault should be made that would limit the plaintiff's
ability to recover the full amount of the judgment from any
single defendant. It is another to conclude that assessment of
degrees of responsibility is impossible even among the
tortfeasors themselves. Given the intimate cooperation and
wrongful purpose of those acting in concert, the culpability of
each tortfeasor is properly regarded as identical in degree-
from the perspective of the plaintiff. The plaintiff has suffered
a single harm from a group of others acting as a single entity to
achieve an anti-social purpose.50° However, among those who
joined in concert, there may indeed be levels or degrees of
blameworthiness, measured according to who proposed the
action, who took the leading role in carrying out the wrongful
purpose, etc. The trier of fact can intelligently assign shares of
fault based upon these and similar factors, which will then
serve as a measure for contribution among those who are
guilty of wrongful concerted activity.5° 1
As between a principal and an agent, allocation of fault
may well be impossible.5 2 The principal is vicariously liable
for the very same culpable act as the primarily liable agent. As
one commentator has noted, "[b]ecause vicarious liability is
based on the relationship between the actual tortfeasor and
some other party responsible for the tortfeasor's conduct,
assigning separate shares of liability to each is illogical."" 3
Accordingly, comparative fault cannot serve as the basis for
500. See supra part III.E.1.
501. In the event that allocation of comparative fault among those acting in
concert were deemed truly impossible, contribution among the tortfeasors would
presumably be assessed on the "equality is equity" basis, "which means that each
tortfeasor is required ultimately to pay a pro rata share, arrived at by dividing the
damages by the number of tortfeasors." See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTs, supra note 36, § 50, at 340 (footnote omitted).
502. Under RCW 4.22.040(1), "the court may determine that two or more persons
are to be treated as a single person for purposes of contribution." WASH. REV. CODE
§ 4.22.040(1) (1991). This provision means that someone seeking contribution from a
principal may obtain full contribution for the fault attributed to the agent, thereby
treating both as a single entity. Unfortunately, the statute provides no guidance when
contribution is sought between the principal and the agent.
503. Anderson, supra note 88, at 486.
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contribution between a vicariously liable principal and a pri-
marily liable agent."°4 Instead, in accordance with the common
law of agency, 5 when a principal is held liable for the unau-
thorized tortious actions of an agent, the principal would pre-
sumably remain entitled to full indemnification from the
agent.506
For those cases that fall within the complete exceptions of
Subsection (3), the rules presented above governing contribu-
tion among tortfeasors would continue to apply with full and
independent force.
b. Settlement
Prior to tort reform, when a defendant had settled with a
plaintiff and that settlement was judicially determined to be a
reasonable one, the defendant was released from any further
liability in contribution to other defendants. °7 RCW 4.22.060
provided for a hearing before the trial court to determine the
reasonableness of the settlement, affording every party an
opportunity to present evidence.- 8 The remaining nonsettling
defendants were entitled to a pro tanto credit for the dollar
amount of a reasonable settlement as an offset from the final
judgment on the plaintiff's total amount of damages.5 °9
When a defendant is held responsible for the fault of
another person, either under the exceptions in Subsection (3)
504. See Kirk v. Moe, 114 Wash. 2d 550, 556, 789 P.2d 84, 87 (1990) (holding that a
vicariously liable principal has a right of contribution against a primarily liable agent,
but not explaining the measurement of contribution).
505. See generally STEFFEN, supra note 445, § 39, at 1001-04 (discussing employer's
right of indemnity against employee).
506. Thomas V. Harris, Washington's Unique Approach to Partial Tort
Settlements: The Modified Pro Tanto Credit and the Reasonableness Hearing
Requirement, 20 GONZ. L. REV. 69 (1985) (arguing the Washington contribution statute
should not be construed as abolishing the principal's right to full indemnity from the
agent); Harris, Partial Tort Settlements, supra note 53, at 78-79 (same). An agent
might also be permitted to seek contribution from the principal if the principal's
directions or actions led to the agent's primary liability to the plaintiff. See Karen P.
Clark, Note, "Respondeat Inferior": The Rule of Vanderpool v. Grange Insurance
Association, 64 WASH. L. REV. 419, 436 (1989) (because "contribution rights can run in
either direction," Washington law presents "no theoretical barrier to an agent seeking
contribution from a principal").
507. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.060(2) (1991). See generally Harris, Partial Tort
Settlements, supra note 53; Anderson, supra note 88, at 494-500.
508. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.060(1) (1991). See generally Glover v. Tacoma Gen.
Hosp., 98 Wash. 2d 708, 658 P.2d 1230 (1983) (on standards for determining
reasonableness of settlement under RCW 4.22.060).
509. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.060(2) (1991).
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or by reason of concerted activity or an agency relationship
under Paragraph (1)(a), the reasonableness hearing require-
ment and pro tanto credit rule of RCW 4.22.060 continue to
apply.510
However, the reasonableness of one tortfeasor's settlement
is irrelevant to those defendants held jointly and severally lia-
ble to an innocent plaintiff under Paragraph (1)(b). Each
defendant is subject to a joint and several judgment only for
the sum of the shares of fault attributable to the remaining
nonsettling defendants. Defendants will not be responsible in
damages for the percentage shares of fault attributable to cul-
pable entities that are not joined to the action or to tortfeasors
who are released from the action by settlement. As one com-
mentator on settlements under Washington's comparative fault
statute states, "nonsettling defendants are not liable for the
proportionate share ultimately attributed to the settling
defendant by the trier of fact."51' The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit adopted an identical approach
with respect to partial settlements in federal securities cases:
This scheme contemplates a partial settlement .... Nonset-
tling defendants are ... barred from further rights of contri-
bution from the settling defendants. At trial, the jury is
asked not only to determine the total dollar damage amount,
but also the percentage of culpability of each of the nonset-
tling defendants as well as that of the settling defendants.
Nonsettling defendants as a whole will then be required to
pay the percentage of the total amount for which they are
510. Harris, Partial Tort Settlements, supra note 53, at 77-80. The preexisting
rules governing the effect of a release under RCW 4.22.060 will also continue to apply,
including the line of cases governing the effect of a release of the agent or principal
upon the liability of the other. See, e.g., Vanderpool v. Grange Ins. Ass'n, 110 Wash. 2d
483, 486-87, 756 P.2d 111, 112-13 (1988) (a plaintiff's settlement with a vicariously liable
principal does not automatically release the primarily liable agent); Glover v. Tacoma
Gen. Hosp., 98 Wash. 2d 708, 722, 658 P.2d 1230, 1238 (1983) (when a plaintiff settles
with a solvent agent from whom he or she could have received full compensation, the
principal is released by operation of law, because the principal is only secondarily
liable under a theory of respondeat superior); Pickett v. Stephens-Nelsen, Inc., 43
Wash. App. 326, 331, 717 P.2d 277, 280 (1986) (when a plaintiff settles with an agent
who is financially unable to compensate the plaintiff, the plaintiff may protect the
right to proceed against the principal if the judge determines the settlement is
reasonable and considers on the record the fact that full compensation was unlikely to
be obtained from the agent).
511. Harris, Partial Tort Settlements, supra note 53, at 91 (footnote omitted). See
supra parts III.C.l.c (discussing allocation of fault to entities released by the claimant)
and III.F (discussing limited form of joint and several liability among defendants
against whom judgment is entered in favor of an innocent plaintiff).
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responsible. The nonsettling defendants will be jointly and
severally liable for that percentage, and will continue to
have rights of contribution against one another.512
Therefore, just as in the "several only" liability context,513 the
fact of a settlement by one defendant will neither increase nor
decrease the potential liability of the nonsettling defendants.5 14
512. Franklin v. Kaypro Corp., 884 F.2d 1222, 1231 (9th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 111
S. Ct. 232 (1990). See also Stefano v. Smith, 705 F. Supp. 733, 737-38 (D. Conn. 1989)
(under Connecticut law, the trier of fact must determine the percentage of fault
attributable to a settling defendant, multiply that percentage against the judgment,
and deduct that resulting amount from the judgment; the sum remaining provides the
basis for entry of judgment against the remaining defendants according to the dictates
of joint and several liability). But see Peck, Reading Tea Leaves, supra note 175
(arguing that RCW 4.22.070 creates severe complications for negotiation of settlements,
particularly in cases of faultless plaintiffs and multiple tortfeasors).
513. Harris, Partial Tort Settlements, supra note 53, at 89 n.122 ("[bloth several
liability, and the proportionate credit rule in joint and several liability.... produce
the same result").
514. In a recent article, Professor Peck suggests that the Washington Supreme
Court's decision in Clark v. Pacificorp, 118 Wash. 2d 167, 822 P.2d 162 (1991), may be
interpreted to require a judicial hearing to determine the allocation of fault before any
settlement may be made in a case of a faultless plaintiff where the defendants would
be jointly and severally liable under Paragraph (1)(b). Peck, Reading Tea Leaves,
supra note 175, at 355-57, 359-60. To the contrary, the Clark court was addressing the
unique situation of settlement in the context of a tort suit by a worker against a third
person, where the settling parties wished to allocate fault to the worker's employer
who was immune from direct suit under the workers' compensation statute. Under an
amendment to the workers' compensation statute, allocation of fault to the employer
would eliminate or reduce the lien of the employer (usually represented by the
Department of Labor and Industries) upon the the worker's settlement for
reimbursement of workers' compensation benefits that had been paid to the worker.
See infra part IV.B. If the worker and the third person were able by their own
agreement to establish the share of fault to be assigned to the employer, they could
thereby deprive the Department of any right to reimbursement without allowing the
Department an opportunity to be heard and to contest the allocation of fault to the
employer. See Clark, 118 Wash. 2d at 180-81, 822 P.2d at 169-70. To prevent collusion
between the parties to manipulate the allocation of fault to the employer, the supreme
court ruled that a judicial hearing is necessary to determine the amount of fault that
should be allocated to the nonparty employer and thus the amount by which the
Department's lien will be reduced. Id, By contrast, when one tortfeasor reaches a
settlement with a fault-free plaintiff, the remaining nonsettling tortfeasors will not be
held responsible in damages for the share of fault ultimately allocated by the trier of
fact to the settling tortfeasor. Thus, the settlement between the plaintiff and the
settling tortfeasor does not prejudicially impact the potential liability of the
nonsettling tortfeasors who are not party to the settlement agreement. Accordingly,
there is no need for a presettlement judicial hearing to protect the rights of the
nonsettling tortfeasors in a Paragraph (1)(b) case. Similarly, if a joint settlement is
reached with all tortfeasors, the interests of each are adequately protected through
their decisions whether to consent to the terms of the settlement agreement and there
is therefore no need to obtain judicial approval of the settlement. In sum, the
settlement hearing ruling in Clark has no logical application to the very different
context of settlement in a case of multiple tortfeasors.
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Thomas V. Harris, a Washington attorney, has authored a
comprehensive analysis of partial tort settlements under the
Tort Reform Act of 1986, including proposed revisions to the
statutes to clarify the effects of the move to the comparative
fault system under RCW 4.22.070."'z For a more detailed dis-
cussion of settlement and contribution, together with helpful
examples of the statute's operation, the reader is referred to
Mr. Harris's article.
H. The Exceptions to the Statutory Modification of Joint and
Several Liability
Although RCW 4.22.070 establishes a general rule of com-
parative responsibility among tortfeasors, with certain limita-
tions in the contexts of vicarious liability and the innocent
plaintiff, there are three exceptions in the statute. 16 If a case
falls within one of these three exceptions, RCW 4.22.070 has no
application and the common law rules of joint and several lia-
bility or assessment of liability on other bases would continue
to govern. 17
In two categories of actions, those involving hazardous
wastes or substances1 8 and certain business torts, 519 Subsection
(3) preserves common law joint and several liability; each
defendant remains liable for the entire loss, less any share
attributable to the plaintiffs fault. 20 The third exception
involves the assessment of liability on a market share basis for
injuries caused by certain generic products, such as drugs,
when the manufacturer cannot be identified.521 Each of these
three exceptions, their purpose, their scope, and their applica-
tion are discussed below.
1. The Hazardous Waste or Substance Exception
RCW 4.22.070(3)(a) provides:
(a) Nothing in this section affects any cause of action relat-
ing to hazardous wastes or substances or solid waste disposal
515. Harris, Partial Tort Settlements, supra note 53.
516. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(3) (1991).
517. See infra part V (discussing future of common law doctrine of joint and
several liability).
518. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(3)(a) (1991). See infra part III.H.1.
519. I& § 4.22.070(3)(b). See infra part III.H.2.
520. Fault continues to be allocated between plaintiffs and defendants pursuant to
the comparative negligence statutes. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.22.005-.015 (1991).
521. Id, § 4.22.070(3)(c). See inf~ra part III.H.3.
1992]
122 University of Puget Sound Law Review
sites.5 22
This exception was examined by the Washington Supreme
Court in Softe v. Fibreboard Corporation.5  In Softe, a former
pipefitter afflicted with lung cancer sought damages from
asbestos manufacturers. Based upon Paragraph (3)(a), the trial
court instructed the jury to apply joint and several liability
among all manufacturers. 51 On appeal, the asbestos manufac-
turers, although conceding that asbestos is a "hazardous sub-
stance," argued that the exception applies only to problems
relating to hazardous waste and environmental pollution.5'
Based upon the plain language of the exception-which con-
tains no language explicitly limiting the provision to environ-
mental litigation-the Washington Supreme Court rejected
this interpretation.a26
The Sofie court placed considerable weight upon the
evolution of the exception during the legislative process. 527 An
early version of the exception as considered on the floor of the
state senate provided for joint and several liability "'if the
cause of action involves a violation of any state or local law
relating to solid wastes, hazardous wastes or substances, air,
water, or high or low level radioactive wastes or sub-
stances.' ",528 The final version enacted by the legislature more
broadly refers to "any cause of action relating to hazardous
wastes or substances or solid waste disposal sites."5" The court
ruled that "the simple use of the word 'or'" in the provision
indicates that the exception applies not only to cases involving"solid waste disposal sites," but also to "hazardous substance"
cases.530 Moreover, the court reasoned, the words "any cause of
action" mean "in simple and plain terms" that the provision is
not limited to causes of actions founded upon certain environ-
mental pollution statutes.53 1 Accordingly, the court held that
the exception in Paragraph (3)(a) "includes 'hazardous sub-
522. Id § 4 .2 2 .07 0(3)(a).
523. 112 Wash. 2d 636, 771 P.2d 711, amended, 780 P.2d 260 (1989).
524. I. at 667, 771 P.2d at 727.
525. Id. at 668, 771 P.2d at 728.
526. Id. at 668-69, 771 P.2d at 728.
527. Id.
528. Sofie, 112 Wash. 2d at 668, 771 P.2d at 728 (quoting S. Journal, 49th Reg. Seas.
& 1st Spec. Seas. 467 (1986)).
529. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(3)(a) (1991).
530. Softe, 112 Wash. 2d at 668, 771 P.2d at 728.
531. Id. at 669. 771 P.2d at 728.
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stances' wherever they may be found."' 2
The Sofie court's broad statement-that the exception
applies to "'hazardous substances' wherever they may be
found" 5 3-- has led plaintiffs in some cases to argue that the
exception applies whenever a hazardous substance is present at
the time of the injury, even if the substance has nothing what-
soever to do with the injury. Thus, if an automobile collides
with a truck carrying a hazardous substances, these advocates
would argue that the exception applies, even if the only inju-
ries suffered result from the physical collision of the vehicles
and not from any discharge of the materials carried by the
truck. Or they would contend that joint and several liability
applies when a worker handling hazardous substances is
injured, even if the injury occurs because the worker suffers a
fall at the worksite rather than from any injurious exposure to
the substance.
This argument can be dismissed rather easily. By saying
that the exception applies to hazardous substances "wherever
they may be found," the court was merely explaining that the
provision is not limited to cases where a hazardous substance is
found at a toxic waste site. The Sofie court was not repealing
the essential element of causation. Paragraph (3)(a) applies
only if the hazardous substance is the instrumentality that
caused the injury. Any other interpretation leads to absurd
results.
The more difficult question is whether the Sofie court
extended the exception beyond the narrow purpose the legisla-
ture had in mind and beyond the limits of a rational basis to
support an exception to an otherwise generally applicable rule
of comparative responsibility. Although the court's analysis is
in accord with the plain language of the exception, the court
failed to adhere to the rule of construction that when a general
provision is qualified by an exception, the exception should be
read narrowly "in order to preserve the primary operation of
the provision.' 53 Doubts as to the proper interpretation of an
exception are to be resolved in favor of the general provi-
532. Id. at 668, 771 P.2d at 728.
533. Id.
534. See Commissioner v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739 (1989). See also Hall v.
Corporation of Catholic Archbishop, 80 Wash. 2d 797, 801, 498 P.2d 844, 847 (1972) ("[ilt
is a well settled rule of statutory construction that exceptions to legislative enactments
must be strictly construed").
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sion.53 5 Instead, as we shall see, the Sofie court's broad reading
of Paragraph (3)(a) has created an exception without an under-
lying purpose and therefore one without clear definition and
scope.
The legislative history of the exception indicates a modest
purpose and thus a limited application. Paragraph (3)(a)
apparently originated as an amendment offered by Senator
Philip A. Talmadge on the floor of the state senate.536 Senator
Talmadge explained:
What this amendment is designed to do, is to allow the con-
tinuation of the process that Senator Kreidler has under-
taken in the area of Superfund to urge the parties to that
controversy to come to an agreement both as to the funding
of the state Superfund and as to the liability issue.
If we were not to have this amendment in place, there is
zero incentive for large business in this state to attempt to
develop a funding mechanism to deal with Superfund,
because their liability would be several only and that means
only their share of the fault. However, that could be deter-
mined in situations involving hazardous waste. 531
Senator Talmadge's reference to "Superfund" is to the
state version of the federal Superfund law.53 s The state ver-
sion, which is codified at RCW Chapter 70.105B,5 39 was devel-
oped and sponsored by Senator Kreidler. Like its federal
counterpart, the law is designed to promote the cleanup of haz-
ardous waste dumpsites by holding all property owners jointly
and severally liable for all damages resulting from the deposit-
ing of hazardous materials."0 Senator Talmadge's amendment
was intended to preserve joint and several liability in order to
further the goals of the state Superfund law.
535. State v. Wright, 84 Wash. 2d 645, 652, 529 P.2d 453, 458 (1974); State v.
Christensen, 18 Wash. 2d 7, 19, 137 P.2d 512, 518 (1943).
536. The amendment read:
The defendants shall be jointly and severally liable if the cause of action
involves a violation of any state or local law relating to solid wastes, hazardous
wastes or substances, air, water, or high or low level radioactive wastes or
substances. If legislation is enacted in 1986 creating joint and several liability
for causes of action relating to solid wastes or hazardous wastes or substances,
then this subsection shall be null and void.
S. Journal, 49th Reg. Sess. & 1st Spec. Sess. 467 (1986).
537. Ik (remarks of Sen. Talmadge).
538. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675 (West 1983 & Supp. 1992).
539. WASH. REv. CODE ch. 70.105B (1991).
540. See id § 70.105B.040(2) (providing that all persons liable for release of
"hazardous substances" shall be jointly and severally liable).
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The amendment was adopted by voice vote. The language
of the exception did evolve before enactment, and the final
version does more generally refer to "any cause of action relat-
ing to hazardous wastes or substances or solid waste disposal
sites."' "4 However, there is no indication in the legislative his-
tory that the motivating purpose behind the exception changed
along with the wording.
Based upon this legislative history, commentators writing
prior to the Sofie decision understood Paragraph (3)(a) as a
narrow exception tied to the legislature's "concern that several
liability alone would not provide sufficient incentives for large
businesses to participate in the state superfund for cleaning up
waste depositories."'  As another commentator explained:
The first exception to abolishment of joint and several liabil-
ity, causes of action relating to hazardous wastes o[r] sub-
stances or solid waste disposal sites, is the result of the
legislature's intent to maintain an incentive for large busi-
nesses to contribute to a funding mechanism similar to the
Environmental Protection Agency Superfund for hazardous
waste cleanup. The potential of joint liability for this type of
tortious conduct will presumably instill into these businesses
a willingness to create and fund a statewide system by which
hazardous waste pollution can be cleaned up. The fund also
would be used to defray the cleanup costs of a landfill in
which hazardous wastes were deposited. 1 3
When the Sofie court looked beyond the narrow legislative
purpose and extended the exception to broadly impose joint
and several liability in any case involving tortious injury by
reason of exposure to a hazardous substance, the exception lost
its underlying meaning. Although the Washington Supreme
Court may not be faulted for giving full effect to the plain
words of the exception, the consequence in this particular
instance is to create a crisis of meaning and justification for the
exception. As I suggested in my earlier article, "[b]y taking the
exception beyond the legislature's concerns with environmen-
tal pollution and the proposed 'Superfund' toxic waste cleanup
bill, the Washington Supreme Court's broader construction
may slip the exception from its mooring to a rational and nar-
541. Id. § 4.22.070(3)(a).
542. Peck, Washington's Partial Rejection, supra note 2, at 251 (footnote omitted).
543. McFadden, supra note 13, at 242-43.
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row purpose."'
Without being anchored to the legislature's stated purpose,
the exception becomes vulnerable to a constitutional equal pro-
tection challenge from defendants insisting that their liability
be adjudicated under the same principle of comparative fault
that is generally applied to other tortfeasors under RCW
4.22.070. What is the rational basis for imposing joint and sev-
eral liability upon one group of defendants simply because the
plaintiff's injury is caused by a hazardous substance while
applying a general rule of comparative fault to other defend-
ants whenever the plaintiff's injury is caused by any other
instrumentality? For example, why should the rule of tort lia-
bility change when the injury is caused by a hazardous sub-
stance rather than a hazardous product or a hazardous
activity? Because no principled answer to these questions is
apparent, the Softe court's broad application of the exception
leaves the statutory provision without rational justification.
Moreover, if we divorce Paragraph (3)(a) from its specific
legislative purpose, it is difficult to give clear content to its
terms. The legislative history indicates that the exception
applies to hazardous wastes and substances that pollute the
environment, especially when wastes or substances are leaking
into the environment from toxic waste disposal sites. The
applicability of the exception to particular conduct and to types
of wastes or substances should be determined by the relation-
ship of the proviso to the need to prevent and clean-up envi-
ronmental pollution. But if we instead apply the exception
whenever a hazardous waste or substance or disposal site
serves as the instrumentality for harm, troubling problems of
definition arise. What is a "hazardous waste or substance"?
For that matter, what is a "substance"? And what is a "solid
waste disposal site"? Does that include a county dump which
does not contain hazardous wastes? Or is the term "solid waste
disposal site" to be understood in reference to "hazardous
waste or substance" and thus apply only to a site for storage of
hazardous wastes and substances?
With respect to Paragraph (3)(a), Kristin Houser, a plain-
tiff's attorney specializing in toxic tort cases, comments:
In Sof-te, the court was not required to explore the issue of
what constitutes a hazardous substance in any depth since
544. Sisk, Constitutional Challenges, supra note 13, at 471-72 n.180.
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the defendant conceded that asbestos was one. Definitional
questions will undoubtedly spawn more litigation. For
example, to be "hazardous" does the substance have to be
something that is known to injure all who are exposed to it
at certain doses (like arsenic), or would it be enough that a
significant number of those exposed to the toxins suffer
injury (like asbestos), or would it even extend to those sub-
stances that can cause very severe injury, but only to a small
percentage of those exposed (i.e., perhaps, dioxin). Further
questions could arise over what is a "substance": e.g., is radi-
ation a "substance"; is electricity a "substance," and so
forth.M4
Indeed, the definitional problem may be more fundamen-
tal than simply comparing the relative toxic nature of danger-
ous chemicals. Is water a "hazardous substance"? The
individual scalded by boiling water or drowning in a lake might
certainly so conclude. What about ordinary concrete? The
person falling from a height onto a concrete floor will find it
hazardous. The courts undoubtedly will reject as absurd any
attempt to stretch the term "hazardous waste or substance" to
include water or concrete, and they will be correct in doing so.
But what rationale will support that conclusion? Without ref-
erence to the underlying legislative purpose of cleaning up
environmental pollution, what is to be our guiding star? How
should we define the terms of the exception?
Ms. Houser suggests looking to the definition of "hazard-
ous wastes and substances" in other federal and state laws reg-
ulating hazardous materials. 4 For example, the Washington
545. Houser, supra note 443, at 296-97. In Sofie, the Washington Supreme Court
found it significant that the final version of the exception spoke in broader terms than
the earlier draft of the exception that was adopted by amendment on the Senate floor.
Sofie, 112 Wash. 2d at 668-69, 771 P.2d at 728. Under this reasoning, it would be
significant that the earlier amendment made specific reference to "high or low level
radioactive wastes or substances," in addition to "hazardous wastes or substances." S.
Journal, 49th Reg. Sess. & 1st Spec. Sess. 467 (1986). Because the final version enacted
as RCW 4.22.070(3)(a) lists only "hazardous wastes or substances," with no mention of
radioactivity, it could be argued that radioactive materials are outside the scope of the
statutory language. However, it could just as easily be contended that the term
"hazardous wastes or substances" was later settled upon as a broader term that
encompasses all dangerous materials, whether the danger is chemical or radioactive. If
the exception is narrowed and connected to legislative concerns about environmental
pollution and the cleanup of hazardous waste sites, the legislative purpose would
plainly extend to radioactive pollution and radioactive material disposal sites.
546. Houser, supra note 443, at 297-98. Interestingly, in the state statutes cited by
Ms. Houser, the terms "hazardous substance" or "hazardous waste" appear in the
context of environmental regulation statutes. That the Washington Legislature used
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Hazardous Waste Management Act defines "hazardous sub-
stances" and "hazardous wastes" synonymously as including
"all dangerous and extremely hazardous waste,"" 7 which in
turn is described as having such characteristics as "pos[ing] a
substantial present or potential hazard to human health, wild-
life, or the environment"; s "hav[ing] ... toxic properties that
may cause death, injury or illness or hav[ing] mutagenic,
teratogenic, or carcinogenic properties";m 9 being "corrosive,
explosive, flammable, or [generating] pressure through decom-
position or other means"; 5 and being "highly toxic to man or
wildlife."55 ' The Washington Hazardous Substance Informa-
tion Act defines "hazardous substances" by reference to a long
list of other federal and state statutes and regulations. 52
These definitions are as good as any. The fact that the leg-
islature has used the same term in another statute is undoubt-
edly owed some weight in attempting to define its meaning in
this context. But until the courts identify some underlying
purpose for Paragraph (3)(a), it will be impossible to deter-
mine how the statute should apply and what its terms mean in
the context of the statutory goal. In order to restore a sense of
purpose to the exception, both to give it a rational basis and to
provide a touchstone for giving meaning to its terms, the
Washington Supreme Court may need to revisit its expansive
ruling in Sofie and revive a narrower interpretation that is
more closely tethered to the legislative history.
2. The Business Torts Exception
RCW 4.22.070(3)(b) provides:
(b) Nothing in this section shall affect a cause of action
arising from the tortious interference with contracts or busi-
ness relations.55 3
the same term elsewhere in such a context provides further indication that the use of
the same phrase in Paragraph (3)(a) was likely intended as a reference to statutes
relating to environmental pollution. In sum, the best evidence is that, in enacting the
hazardous waste exception, the legislature was concerned with the discharge of
hazardous wastes or substances into the environment.
547. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.105.010(14), (15) (1991).
548. Id. § 70.105.010(5).
549. Id. § 70.105.010(5)(a).
550. Id § 70.105.010(5)(b).
551. Id, § 70.105.010(6)(a)(ii).
552. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.102.010(5) (1991).
553. Id. § 4.22.070(3)(b).
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This exception was adopted as an amendment on the floor
of the state senate.' Senator Philip A. Talmadge, the author
of the amendment, justified the exception as necessary to pre-
vent interference with the development of unique principles of
law in the distinctive area of business torts.555 Senator R. Ted
Bottinger joined in urging adoption of the exception, stating
that the area of business torts was outside the legislative con-
cern with availability and affordability of insurance.5
The scope of Paragraph (3)(b) could be measured in three
different ways: (a) the nature of the parties theory--as apply-
ing to tort suits between business or commercial entities,
thereby setting as the benchmark the nature of the parties to
the dispute; (b) the nature of the relief theory-as applying to
tort suits which seek damages solely for economic loss, thereby
limiting the exception to suits requesting certain forms of
relief; or (c) the nature of the cause of action theory--as apply-
ing to causes of action for interference with contracts or busi-
ness relations, thereby confining the exception to cases based
on certain theories of liability. The plain language of the
exception, together with the legislative history, make clear
that the nature of the cause of action is the determining factor.
Before confirming that conclusion, I will first dismiss the other
two possibilities.
a. Nature of the Parties Theory
The first possible interpretation of RCW 4.22.070(3)(b)-as
applying only to disputes between business or commercial enti-
ties-may be readily discarded. Although Senator Talmadge in
introducing this provision twice described the exception as
involving "business torts," 7 nothing in his supporting state-
ment suggests that its application turns upon a characterization
of the affected parties as "businesses." Nor does the wording
of the exception provide any support for reading it as a provi-
sion designed to provide special treatment to business interests.
Although denomination of this statutory paragraph as the
"business torts" exception may be appropriate as a shorthand
554. S. Journal, 49th Reg. Sess. & 1st Spec. Sess. 468 (1986).
555. I& (remarks of Sen. Talmadge).
556. Id (remarks of Sen. Bottinger). See also Peck, Washington's Partial
Rejection, supra note 2, at 251 (describing legislative purpose behind exception);
McFadden, supra note 13, at 243 (same).
557. S. Journal, 49th Reg. Sess. & 1st Spec. Sess. 468 (1986) (remarks of Sen.
Talmadge).
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reference, the scope of this provision is not to be defined by an
arbitrary characterization of the tortfeasor or the victim of the
tortious conduct.
b. Nature of the Relief Theory
In his statement supporting the amendment that became
the business torts exception, Senator Talmadge contrasted
"business torts" with "personal injury actions."5" From this
one could draw the inference that the type of relief sought is
the element that distinguishes those cases falling within the
exception from those other cases that remain subject to the
comparative fault rules of RCW 4.22.070. To the contrary, Sen-
ator Talmadge's statement is better understood as simply illus-
trating the wide spectrum of fault-based torts that, in the
absence of a specific exception, would be within the coverage
of the comparative fault enactment, ranging from personal
injury torts to property damage torts, and including that spe-
cies of property damage claims that are generically known as
business torts.
Moreover, it would be a fundamental error to circumscribe
the Washington comparative negligence and comparative fault
statutes according to the type of injury or damage sustained, as
opposed to the fault-based nature of the tortious conduct. As
one Washington appellate court has stated, "the comparative
fault doctrine shall apply to all actions based on 'fault,'"
whatever the theory of liability. 9 There is no reasoned basis
for carving exceptions out of the principle of comparative fault
based on the type of recovery sought rather than the nature of
the tortious conduct.
Courts in other jurisdictions have generally refrained from
limiting the concept of comparative fault to claims involving
either personal injury or casualty damage to physical property.
For example, although the Washington appellate courts have
not yet addressed the question, there is no reason why fault
should not be compared and allocated in an action for negli-
gent misrepresentation, although the harm suffered in such
cases is ordinarily pecuniary in nature. As the Minnesota
Supreme Court observed in Florenzano v. Olson,' the "major-
558. Id
559. Lundberg v. All-Pure Chemical Co., 55 Wash. App. 181, 186, 777 P.2d 15, 19
(1989) (emphasis added).
560. 387 N.W.2d 168 (Minn. 1986).
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ity of... states considering the issue... have held principles
of comparative responsibility applicable to cases of negligent
misrepresentation."'" Dean Prosser stated that there is "no
apparent reason for distinguishing negligent misrepresentation
from any other negligence in [the application of contributory
or comparative negligence concepts]." 2 And, indeed, there is
no apparent reason why the degree of justifiable reliance-a
central element in a negligent misrepresentation case--cannot
be compared in the same manner as other forms of fault in
other fault-based actions resulting in other types of harm.
Negligence is negligence.
The language of the Washington comparative fault statutes
supports this conclusion. As explained earlier," s the concept
of fault incorporated in RCW 4.22.070 is derived from the
Washington comparative negligence statutes. RCW 4.22.005
mandates application of comparative fault between plaintiffs
and defendants in actions "seeking to recover damages for
injury or death to person or harm to property."'  This lan-
guage should be understood to reach pecuniary harm caused by
culpable conduct. Indeed, an interpretation of the phrase
"harm to property" as not including economic harm would be
difficult to understand and artificially restrictive. An injury to
a pecuniary interest manifestly constitutes damage to economic
property.
Courts in other jurisdictions have applied comparative
fault statutes, with language similar to the Washington provi-
sion, to cases involving purely economic or pecuniary harm. In
Lippes v. Atlantic Bank of New York, 5 a New York appellate
court dealt at length with the "injury to property" concept and
found that the purpose behind the comparative fault statute"was to release the concept of damage apportionment from the
parochial confines of accident cases and to broaden its applica-
561. Id. at 176. See also Robinson v. Poudre Valley Fed. Credit Union, 654 P.2d 861
(Colo. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that fault is appropriately allocated between plaintiff
and defendant by application of comparative fault principles to negligent
misrepresentation case); Cypress Oilfield Contractors., Inc. v. McGoldrich Oil Co., 525
So. 2d 1157 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (applying comparative fault to misrepresentation);
Borchardt v. Wilk, 456 N.W.2d 653, 655 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990) (discussing apportionment
of fault by trial court in negligent misrepresentation case).
562. PROSSER, supra note 100, § 107, at 706. See also Florenzano v. Olson, 387
N.W.2d 168, 176 (Minn. 1986) (citing PROSSER).
563. See supra part III.B.1.
564. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.005 (1991).
565. 419 N.Y.S.2d 505 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979).
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tion flexibly to reach any breach of legal duty or fault .... "6
Likewise, in Darnell Photographs, Inc. v. Great American Ins.
Co., 7 the Colorado Court of Appeals applied the comparative
fault statute to an action against an insurer for negligently fail-
ing to add additional insurance coverage. The court flatly
rejected the argument that the phrase "damage to property"
should be limited to casualty harm rather than economic
injury:
It is well recognized that comparative negligence statutes
have been enacted to ameliorate the harsh results which
sometimes occur under the doctrine of contributory negli-
gence. To adopt the narrow construction of the statute pro-
posed by defendant would defeat the purpose for which it
was designed; therefore, we hold that the phrase "injury to
property" in the comparative negligence statute is not neces-
sarily limited to a physical injury to tangible property, but
rather includes any damage resulting from invasion of one's
property rights by actionable negligence. 5"
Courts in Massachusetts and New Jersey have reached the
same conclusion.569
The Washington Supreme Court has assumed the applica-
bility of comparative fault principles to cases which involved
allegation of only pecuniary losses. The court has referred to
comparative fault in such commercial contexts as a claim based
upon an architect's negligence in taking measurements that
566. I& at 511. See also Murph & Fritz's Place, Inc. v. Loretta, 447 N.Y.S.2d 205,
208 (N.Y. City Ct. 1982) (negligent representation case).
567. 519 P.2d 1225 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974).
568. 1i at 1226 (citation omitted).
569. See, e.g., O'Malley v. Putnam State Deposit Vaults, Inc., 458 N.E.2d 752, 760
(Mass. Ct. App. 1983) (applying comparative fault statute with "injury to person or
property" language to company's negligent failure to prevent conversion of plaintiff's
gold coins by company officer); H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 152 (N.J.
1983) (applying comparative fault statute with "injury to person or property" language
to suit by investor seeking solely pecuniary damages for accounting malpractice). See
generally VICTOR E. ScHwARTZ, CoMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, § 2.2, at 36 (2d ed. 1986);
Jay M. Allen, Note, Damage Apportionment in Accounting Malpractice Actions: The
Role of Comparative Fault, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 949, 968-74.
The Kansas Supreme Court initially ruled that the language "property damage" in
the Kansas comparative fault statute did not apply to actions for economic damages.
Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Huff, 704 P.2d 372 (1985). The Kansas legislature
responded by specifically adding the words "economic loss" to the statute. KAN. STAT.




resulted in additional expenses in a construction project,570 and
a claim by a builder for lost rent and added costs due to a
county's negligent suspension of a building permit.571
Accordingly, distinguishing between cases based upon the
nature of the relief sought would introduce an alien element
into the interpretation and application of the comparative fault
statute. Each of the three exceptions to RCW 4.22.070 instead
direct the reader to the nature of the "cause of action" and
thus to the nature of the tortious conduct.
c. Nature of the Cause of Action Theory
Having rejected each of the alternative interpretations of
the second exception to RCW 4.22.070, we are left with the
plain language of the statute, which is where we should always
return. Paragraph (3)(b) simply and directly ties the scope of
the exception to the assertion of a "cause of action arising from
the tortious interference with contracts or business rela-
tions. 5 7 2 The legislative history likewise focuses upon the
nature of the legal theory. Senator Talmadge, the author of
the exception, expressed concern that elimination of joint and
several liability in this particular context would disturb the
development of the unique rules governing interference with
contracts and business relations.573 Moreover, Senator Bot-
tinger concurred in the addition of this exception, saying it
would have no impact on the legislative purpose of reducing
insurance rates since "you cannot buy insurance to cover
this.5s74 Like Senator Talmdage, Senator Bottinger's remarks
plainly are directed to the nature of the tortious activity and
the unavailability of insurance for indemnification of liability
for conduct that amounts to interference with contracts or
business relations.
The scope of Paragraph (3)(b), therefore, is coextensive
with the scope of the tortious interference cause of action.
Although a full survey of the law of interference with con-
570. Seattle Western Ind. v. David A. Mowat Co., 110 Wash. 2d 1, 9, 750 P.2d 245,
250 (1988).
571. J & B Dev. Co. v. King County, 100 Wash. 2d 299, 308, 669 P.2d 468, 474
(1983), overruled on other grounds by Meany v. Dodd, 111 Wash. 2d 174, 759 P.2d 455
(1988).
572. WASH. REv. CODE § 4.22.070(3)(b) (1991).
573. S. Journal, 49th Reg. Sess. & 1st Spec. Sess. 468 (1986) (remarks of Sen.
Talmadge).
574. Id. (remarks of Sen. Bottinger).
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tracts or business relations is beyond the scope of this Article,
a short summary of the legal doctrine is in order. Protection of
contractual arrangements and concrete business expectancies
provides a measure of commercial stability and reliability to
marketplace transactions.575 However, the "policy of the com-
mon law [has always been] in favor of free competition. "576
Thus, the law also recognizes the general privilege of each
actor in the economic marketplace to seek to influence others
and to take appropriate actions to "maximize economic inter-
ests. '5 77 In a free market economy, the law must accommodate
an aggressively competitive economic order and not unreasona-
bly restrict free movement and change in the marketplace.578
As a leading treatise says, "it is no tort to beat a business rival
to prospective customers." '579
Within the framework of a free market system, the tort of
wrongful interference with contract and business relations
"'draws a line beyond which no member of the community
may go in intentionally intermeddling with the business affairs
of others.' "I The difficulty lies in finding that line between
permissible vigorous competition and impermissible wrongful
interference. Commentators agree that mere interference is
not enough; the interference must be shown to be wrongful in
some manner. 5s  In order to avoid suppressing the free
market, courts appear to be gravitating toward a standard that"restricts tort liability to those cases in which the defendant's
act is independently wrongful."5" 2  As the Washington
Supreme Court held in Pleas v. City of Seattle,58 before an
575. John Danforth, Note, Tortious Interference With Contract" A Reassertion of
Society's Interest in Commercial Stability and Contractual Integrity, 81 COLUM. L.
REV. 1491, 1493 (1981).
576. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 36, § 130, at 1012
(footnote omitted).
577. See Birkenwald Distrib. Co. v. Heublein, Inc., 55 Wash. App. 1, 12, 776 P.2d
721, 727 (1989) (interference with contract case).
578. Gina M. Grothe, Note, Interference With Contract in the Competitive
Marketplace, 15 WM. MITcHELL L. REv. 453, 458 (1989).
579. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 36, § 130, at 1012.
580. Pleas v. City of Seattle, 112 Wash. 2d 794, 801, 774 P.2d 1158, 1162 (1989)
(quoting Rock Falls v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 300 N.E.2d 331, 333 (Ill. App. Ct.
1973)).
581. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORT, supra note 36, § 129, at 979
("liability turns on the purpose for which the defendant acts, with the indistinct notion
that the purpose must be considered improper in some undefined way").
582. Harvey S. Perlman, Interference With Contract and Other Economic
Expectancies, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 61, 62 (1982).
583. 112 Wash. 2d 794, 774 P.2d 1158 (1989).
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interference will be deemed actionable, the trier of fact must
detect "either the defendant's pursuit of an improper objective
of hurting the plaintiff or the use of wrongful means that in
fact cause injury to plaintiff's contractual or business
relationships."'
The tort applies both to wrongful disruption of contractual
relationships (that is, rights established by agreement) and of
business expectancies (that is, interests not yet reduced to a
contract right).,' 5 In Pleas, the Washington Supreme Court
combined the rules governing contractual and business expec-
tancy interference into a single tort of " 'wrongful interference
with . . . economic relationships.' " The elements of this
cause of action are:
(1) the existence of a valid contractual relationship or busi-
ness expectancy; (2) knowledge of the relationship or expec-
tancy by the alleged interfering party; (3) intentional
interference inducing or causing breach or termination of
the relationship or expectancy; and (4) resultant damage. 58 7
In defense, the defendant may establish that the interfer-
ence was justified or its actions were privileged.5m A defendant
"'who in good faith asserts a legally protected interest of his
own which he believes may be impaired by the performance of
a proposed transaction is not guilty of tortious interfer-
ence.' ,9 Similarly, a defendant may not be held liable for
wrongful interference when it merely has exercised its privi-
lege to compete in the free marketplace or to act in promotion
584. Id at 803-04, 774 P.2d at 1163.
585. The terms "business relations" or "business expectancies" include prospective
economic advantages that are reasonably concrete and immediate in terms of
expectation. For example, the Washington courts have extended protection to
commercial interests in the pursuit and competition of a construction project, Pleas v.
City of Seattle, 112 Wash. 2d 794, 774 P.2d 1158 (1989) (city intentionally and
improperly blocked a legitimate construction project), and the prospective sale of
property to a willing customer, Sunland Invest., Inc. v. Graham, 54 Wash. App. 361, 773
P.2d 873 (1989) (real estate contract vendee sued vendor for tortious interference with
prospective sale of land to others).
586. Pleas, 112 Wash. 2d at 803, 774 P.2d at 1163 (quoting Top Serv. Body Shop,
Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 582 P.2d 1365, 1368 (Or. 1978)).
587. Sea-Pac Co. v. United Food & Commer. Workers Local 44, 103 Wash. 2d 800,
805, 699 P.2d 217, 219-20 (1985). See also Pleas, 112 Wash. 2d at 800, 774 P.2d at 1161;
Joy v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 62 Wash. App. 909, 912, 816 P.2d 90, 92 (1991).
588. Pleas, 112 Wash. 2d at 800, 774 P.2d at 1161; Joy, 62 Wash. App. at 913, 816
P.2d at 92.
589. Brown v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 94 Wash. 2d 359, 375-76, 617 P.2d 704, 713
(1980) (quoting Singer Credit Corp. v. Mercer Island Masonry, Inc., 13 Wash. App. 877,
884, 538 P.2d 544, 549 (1975)).
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of its own economic interests,59° other than by wrongful means
such as inducing a contract breach to obtain customers or other
prospective advantage.5 91
In sum, the substantive law governing of the cause of
action for tortious interference as developed in Washington
case law defines the scope of the exception to comparative
fault stated in RCW 4.22.070(3)(b).
3. The Generic Products or "Market Share" Liability
Exception
RCW 4.22.070(3)(c) provides:
(c) Nothing in this section shall affect any cause of action
arising from the manufacture or marketing of a fungible
product in a generic form which contains no clearly identifi-
able shape, color, or marking.592
As the commentators agree,5 93 and the legislative history
confirms,5" Paragraph (3)(c) was intended to preserve the
common law authority of the Washington Supreme Court to
consider alternative approaches to liability when the manufac-
turer of a fungible or generic product cannot be identified.
The court had previously adopted such an alternative approach
in Martin v. Abbott Laboratories.595
In Martin, a woman had allegedly developed cancer as a
result of prenatal exposure to the drug diethylstilbestrol
(DES), which had been taken by her mother during preg-
nancy.5' Although the plaintiff's mother could recall the size
of the drug dosages she had taken, she could not remember the
name of the pharmaceutical company that had produced the
tablets.5 7 In cases involving a generic or fungible product (that
590. Birkenwald Distrib. Co. v. Heublein, Inc., 55 Wash. App. 1, 12, 776 P.2d 721,
727 (1989).
591. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 36, § 129, at 986.
592. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(3)(c) (1991).
593. Peck, Washington's Partial Rejection, supra note 2, at 251; Sisk, supra note
13, at 472-73; McFadden, supra note 13, at 243-44.
594. S. Journal, 49th Reg. Seass. & 1st Spec. Sess. 469 (1986) (remarks of Sen.
Talmadge) (describing the predecessor amendment to Paragraph (3)(c) as "carv[ing]
out an exception for alternate market share liability as decided by the Supreme Court
of this state").
595. 102 Wash. 2d 581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984).
596. Id. at 583, 689 P.2d at 371. See also supra part III.E.1 (discussing the Martin
court's analysis of concerted activity theory of liability).
597. Martin, 102 Wash. 2d at 584, 689 P.2d at 371.
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is, an "identical-type product" 598 ), the court recognized that it
may not always be possible to ascertain which of several manu-
facturers in the industry produced the particular dosage that
injured a particular plaintiff, especially when the injury is not
manifested until many years later. Accordingly, if the plaintiff
is to be compensated at all for the harm caused by the culpable
behavior of some member of the drug industry, the court con-
cluded that it was necessary to hold every manufacturer liable
in proportion to its share of the market during the period at
issue.5
Under a "market share" theory of manufacturer liability, a
producer of a fungible product in a generic form is held
responsible in damages based merely upon its participation in
the market for the product. The plaintiff is relieved from
proving that the harm was actually caused by the particular
actions of that precise member of the industry. In the Martin
decision, the Washington Supreme Court adopted a "market
share alternate liability" approach.' A manufacturer of DES
is subject to liability unless it can prove that could not have
been the manufacturer of the dosage ingested by the plaintiff's
mother, such as by establishing that it did not produce or mar-
ket the type of DES taken, or that it did not sell the drug in
that geographic area or at that point in time.6°1 Each manufac-
turer joined to the action by the plaintiff will be presumed ini-
tially to have had an equal percentage share of the market and
thus will be equally responsible in damages along with every
other defendant.602 However, a manufacturer may reduce its
proportional share of liability by proving that it had a lower
share of the market at the time in question. 3
The imposition of liability upon members of an entire
industry based upon market share has been criticized as an
598. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 36, § 103, at 714.
599. Martin, 102 Wash. 2d at 602-07, 689 P.2d at 381-83. See generally Sharon
Novak, Comment, Into the Quagmire: Washington Adopts Market Share Liability in
DES Cases, 21 GONZ. L. REV. 199, 241-42 (1985-86) (concluding that the court failed to
articulate a theory that provides the fairest and most efficient resolution of the
problem); Mark Reeve, Note, Washington Adopts Market Share Liability for DES
Producers, 60 WASH. L. REV. 543, 547 (1985) (characterizing Washington's adoption of
market share liability for DES manufacturers as an "appropriate innovation").
600. Martin, 102 Wash. 2d at 602-07, 689 P.2d at 381-83.
601. Id. at 605, 689 P.2d at 382.
602. Id.
603. Id at 605-06, 689 P.2d at 382. See also George v. Parke-Davis, 107 Wash. 2d
584, 591-94, 733 P.2d 507, 511-13 (1987) (discussing calculation of market share for
DES).
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"abandon[ment of] the fundamental principle of causation" in
tort law.6°4 One commentator has described this alternate
form of liability as based on the dubious "notion that it is bet-
ter to impose liability on someone who has caused no harm-
at least if he somehow 'had it coming' anyway-than to leave
uncompensated someone who clearly has been wronged." 5
One court that rejected the market share theory has ruled that
"the public policy favoring recovery on the part of an innocent
plaintiff does not justify the abrogation of the rights of a poten-
tial defendant to have a causative link proven between that
defendant's specific tortious acts and the plaintiff's injury. '
An alternate or market share theory imposes liability upon a
defendant for merely creating a risk of harm, without any
actual showing that the risk created by the defendant's particu-
lar conduct was realized in injury to this plaintiff. Moreover,
courts and commentators suggest that by ignoring the require-
ment of a nexus between the plaintiff's injury and the blame-
worthy conduct of a particular manufacturer, the market share
theory discourages product "research and development while
adding little incentive to" increase the safety of products
because "all companies face potential liability regardless of
their [safety] efforts."' 7
The theory has also been criticized as based on the unreal-
istic assumption that it is possible as a practical matter to
establish the market shares of individual manufacturers, espe-
cially many year later. Appellate courts, such as the Washing-
ton Supreme Court in Martin, that have adopted market share
liability "have done so while ruling on pretrial motions and
have not had the benefit of first having heard evidence on the
604. Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 823 P.2d 717, 730 (Haw. 1991) (Moon, J.,
dissenting) (dissenting from the adoption of market share liability in a case involving a
suit by a hemophiliac who was exposed to the AIDS virus through blood products).
605. HUBER, supra note 44, at 81 (emphasis in original). See also Martin, 102
Wash. 2d at 602, 689 P.2d at 381 ("this court is faced with a choice of either fashioning
a method of recovery for the DES case which will deviate from traditional notions of
tort law, or permitting possibly tortious defendants to escape liability to an innocent,
injured plaintiff").
606. Case v. Fibreboard Corp., 743 P.2d 1062, 1067 (Okla. 1987).
607. Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241, 247 (Mo. 1984); Keith C. Miller &
John D. Hancock, Perspectives on Market Share Liability: Time for a Reassessment?,
88 W. VA. L. REV. 81, 103-04 (1985); David M. Schultz, Market Share Liability in DES
Cases: The Unwarranted Erosion of Causation in Fact, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 771, 811-12
(1991); Jonathan B. Newcomb, Comment, Market Share Liability for Defective




availability of market share data." ' As subsequent litigation
experience has shown, there is little reliable information avail-
able to determine the manufacturers' percentages of the mar-
ket.6°9 Because of the long lapse in time from the sale of the
drug to the filing of the tort actions, the fact that many manu-
facturers are no longer in business, and given that the drug
was prescribed for a number of different uses, it is impossible
to fairly allocate the market among the hundreds of companies
that produced the drug.610 As a result, determinations of mar-
ket share percentages are likely to be arbitrary and unfair,61'
or defendants will be unable to establish their market shares
and thus be left with liability for "a wholly speculative and dis-
proportionate amount of the damages. 61 2 Even if definition of
market share is theoretically possible, there will be "a tremen-
dous cost, both monetarily and in terms of the workload, on
the court system and litigants in an attempt to establish per-
centages [of market share] based on unreliable or insufficient
data. 613
Adhering to the fundamental requirement of cause-in-
fact, most courts have dismissed actions in which a plaintiff
could not connect a product to a particular producer.614 The
highest courts in only six states have accepted a market share
exception to the requirement of proximate causation, and they
have only done so in the context of generic medical prod-
ucts. 615 Although the theory arguably would apply whenever
608. Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324, 337 (Ill. 1990). See also Martin, 102
Wash. 2d at 582-84, 689 P.2d at 371 (case arose on motions for summary judgment).
609. Smith, 560 N.E.2d at 337.
610. Id.; Novak, supra note 599, at 234-36; Newcomb, supra note 607, at 325-26.
611. Smith, 560 N.E.2d at 338.
612. Id.
613. Id. at 338. See also David A. Fischer, Products Liability-An Analysis of
Market Share Liability, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1623, 1657 (1981) ("[t]he legal fees and
administrative costs arising from litigation of this magnitude easily could rival the cost
of the plaintiff's judgment").
614. See, e.g., Tidler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 95 F.R.D. 332 (D.D.C. 1982), affld, 851 F.2d
418 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Morton v. Abbott Laboratories, 538 F. Supp. 593 (M.D. Fla. 1982);
Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004 (D.S.C. 1981); Gray v. United States, 445 F.
Supp. 337 (S.D. Tex. 1978); Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324 (Ill. 1990); Mulcahy
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d 67 (Iowa 1986); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171
(Mass. 1982); Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. 1984); Shackil v. Lederle
Laboratories, 561 A.2d 511 (N.J. 1989). See generally Teresa M. Schwartz, Product
Liability Reform by the Judiciary, 27 GONZ. L. REV. 303, 319 (1991-92) ("[flor products
other than DES, courts overwhelmingly have rejected market share and other forms
of collective liability").
615. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, (Cal.) cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912
(1980) (DES); Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1990) (DES); Smith v.
19921
University of Puget Sound Law Review
injuries are caused by a fungible product in a generic form, the
Washington courts have not extended the market share
approach beyond the single context in which it was devised-
cases involving the drug DES. Indeed, in Lockwood v. AC & S,
Inc.,6 16 although concluding it was unnecessary to resolve the
issue in that case, the Washington Supreme Court acknowl-
edged that "the use of market-share alternate liability theory
in the asbestos products context is not without difficulties. 617
Asbestos is not a completely fungible product, as asbestos prod-
ucts contain different amounts of asbestos and have varying
propensities to release asbestos fibers. 8  In sum, departing
from the traditional requirement of proximate causation to
address the conundrum of identification in generic product
cases plunges the courts into a new "quagmire" of problems. 19
In enacting the generic product exception of Paragraph
(3)(c), the legislature did not intend to comment upon the wis-
dom of market share liability nor to encourage the court to
expand the approach to new frontiers of products liability.62
Paragraph (3)(c) is a statement of permission, not of command
or commendation.
Shortly before final passage of the Tort Reform Act of
1986, Senator Talmadge suggested that the legislation had
"substantial difficulties in its definition of alternate market-
share liability" and predicted that it amounted to "an invita-
tion for great difficulty in the interpretation of that area of the
law."'6 21 Senator Talmadge missed the point; the vagueness of
the statutory language was deliberate. The statute was not
Cutter Biological, Inc., 823 P.2d 717 (Haw. 1991) (blood products); Hymowitz v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989), cerL denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989) (DES);
Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984) (DES); Collins v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 342 N.W.2d 37 (Wis.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984) (DES).
616. 109 Wash. 2d 235, 744 P.2d 605 (1987).
617. Id. at 245 n.6, 744 P.2d at 612.
618. Goldman v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 514 N.E.2d 691, 700-01 (Ohio 1987);
Craig A. Etter, Note, The Causation Problem in Asbestos Litigation: Is There an
Alternative Theory of Liability, 15 IND. L. REV. 679, 691-92 (1982).
619. See Novak, supra note 599.
620. Professor Peck suggests that the exception may be read to extend market
share liability to cases involving such goods as nails, screws, bolts, grain, and lumber.
Peck, Washington's Partial Rejection, supra note 2, at 251. Although the exception
may not preclude the Washington Supreme Court from exercising its common law
authority to extend the market share theory beyond its present narrow context of
generic drugs, neither should the statute be read as an invitation to explore the outer
limits of group-based liability.




intended to provide detailed and specific direction to appellate
courts. Rather, the legislature wished to leave the court a free
hand, allowing the court to decide whether, when, and how the
common law should be molded to devise rules of liability to
apply in the unique context of fungible products manufactured
in a generic form.622 As Senator Talmadge himself had
explained when introducing the amendment that later evolved
into Paragraph (3)(c), the provision was designed to "carve[]
out an exception for alternative market-share liability as
decided by the Supreme Court in this state" 623-- the exception
leaves room for common law decision. Paragraph (3)(c) is sim-
ply a "hands-off" provision.
However, borrowing from the Martin analysis, Paragraph
(3)(c) does circumscribe the boundaries of market share liabil-
ity by limiting the potential extension of the theory to those
cases involving products manufactured without identifying
characteristics. In Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, the Washing-
ton Supreme Court adopted the theory in the narrow context
of a fungible drug with a chemically identical formula that had
been been produced "in a 'generic' form which did not contain
any clearly identifiable shape, color, or markings." 624  Para-
graph (3)(c) similarly speaks in terms of "a fungible product in
a generic form which contains no clearly identifiable shape,
color, or marking. '6 25
Because of this limiting language, Professor Peck argues
that the exception is "not well drafted" and may fail to serve
its purpose. 26 He apparently believes that the market share
liability theory should also apply when a fungible product did
indeed possess an identifying attribute, but owing to the pas-
sage of time or for other reasons a plaintiff nonetheless is
unable to describe the product and thereby connect it with a
particular manufacturer.627 Such an extension of market share
liability is precluded by the legislature's choice of statutory
language. Under Paragraph (3)(c), if a manufacturer has
622. See Houser, supra note 443, at 296 (with Paragraph (3)(b), "[t]he legislature
... was simply making it clear that it did not intend to tamper with existing law in this
area").
623. S. Journal, 49th Reg. Sess. & 1st Spec. Sess. 469 (1986) (remarks of Sen.
Talmadge) (emphasis added).
624. Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 602, 689 P.2d 368, 381 (1984).
625. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.2 2 .070(3)(c) (1991).
626. Peck, Washington's Partial Rejection, supra note 2, at 251.
627. See id. (suggesting that market share liability should apply to use of asbestos
notwithstanding that asbestos products frequently bear a trade name or mark).
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impressed an identifying mark or other characteristic upon its
product, it may not later be held responsible merely because a
plaintiff finds it difficult to recreate that identification. Unless
the manufacturer has contributed to the identification problem
by creating an indistinguishable product, the plaintiff remains
responsible for establishing the nexus between a particular
injury and a particular wrongdoer.
I. Conclusion
At the beginning of Part III of this Article, I suggested
that the language of RCW 4.22.070 was sufficiently direct that
its application would raise few significant issues of statutory
interpretation.6 s The length of the ensuing discussion would
seem to belie that observation. For a statute that I said was
not in need of much interpretation, I have certainly devoted
substantial and extended attention to that very question.
Notwithstanding, I do not retreat from my preliminary obser-
vation. In its central aspects, RCW 4.22.070 does speak clearly
and unequivocally. The basic structure of the statute, estab-
lishing a general regime of comparative responsibility, cannot
be the subject of any genuine dispute. Rather, the necessity of
my expanded analysis of the statute is attributable to the
breadth of its application and to the ceaseless efforts of its
detractors to devise alternative constructions to limit its opera-
tion and effect.
Although it was perhaps an inevitable next stage in the
evolution toward a system grounded in comparative fault, the
statutory modification of joint and several liability in RCW
4.22.070 was nevertheless a fundamental change in Washington
law. With certain defined limitations and exceptions, RCW
4.22.070 mandates allocation of fault among all tortfeasors in
all circumstances. The statute sweeps broadly. Because it
touches so many aspects of tort law, a comprehensive study of
the statute requires an examination of a wide range of topics.
In addition, although the basic structure of the statute is
plainly apparent, and its application in the ordinary case
should be straightforward, a statutory reform of this magni-
tude is bound to generate a few areas of legitimate controversy.
Accordingly, I have addressed particular areas of uncertainty,
such as the application of comparative fault to the hybrid case
628. See supra part III.A.1.
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of the combined acts of negligent and intentional tortfeasors,629
and the delineation of the scope of the hazardous waste excep-
tion in a rational manner consistent with the legislative
purpose.630
Moreover, as something of a tribute to the creativity of
tort reform's detractors, much of the foregoing discussion was
necessary to identify and dispute the variant interpretations of
RCW 4.22.070 that have recently been invented by the oppo-
nents of comparative responsibility. I have explained that the
legislative intent to hold each tortfeasor liable according to its
share of fault, as reflected in the statutory language and the
legislative history, would be frustrated by these "dis-interpre-
tations." Accordingly, to sustain the plain meaning of the stat-
ute precludes acceptance of deconstructionist interpretations,
such as the proposal that fault not be allocated against non-
party entities,63 ' and the theory that the statute's direction for
entry of judgment against each defendant for its "proportion-
ate share" of the damages instead permits the jury to assign
damages based upon an equitable basis other than the percent-
age of fault allocated to each defendant. 32
Therefore, despite the length of the intervening discussion,
I end with the same simple theme with which I began-the
statute can speak for itself. By the adoption of RCW 4.22.070,
the legislature intended to equate liability with fault. In
nearly all applications, the statute's language leads unambigu-
ously and ineluctably to that conclusion. In cases of doubt, the
statute should be understood in light of the guiding principle of
comparative fault in liability. In that way, the statute will be
interpreted and applied in the true spirit of tort reform.
IV. FILLING IN THE GAPS: READING THE COMPARATIVE
FAULT ACT TOGETHER WITH OTHER STATUTES
A. Introduction
Whenever a new act is enacted by the legislature, the
courts inevitably will be called upon to consider its meaning,
not only in isolation, but also as it applies in relation to other
statutory schemes. In some instances, the fit will be smooth;
the new statute and the old will rest together easily, each occu-
629. See supra part III.B.2.b.
630. See supra part III.H.1.
631. See supra part III.C.1.f and g.
632. See supra part III.D.
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pying a part of that field of the law in harmony with the other
and without overlap or confusion. In other instances, however,
the new and the old statutes will lie together uneasily, with
apparent conflicts in their respective universes of coverage and
command.
In this part of the Article, I look at two situations that
demand an attempt to reconcile RCW 4.22.070 with another
statute operating in the same area-one situation in which the
Washington Supreme Court has recently given the answer and
the other in which the appellate courts have yet to speak.
First, I will discuss the intersection between comparative fault
under the Tort Reform Act of 1986 and the Industrial Insur-
ance Act, which traditionally has provided for benefits to
injured workers on a no-fault basis.6 3 The Washington
Supreme Court recently was required to weigh the "competing
interests""s of tort reform and the workers' compensation sys-
tem in determining whether the state government lost its
traditional right to reimbursement of workers' compensation
benefits paid when the worker later recovered damages in tort
from a third person and fault was allocated to the immune
employer. The court's resolution of this problem is a model for
reconciliation of other statutory provisions with the command
of comparative responsibility in RCW 4.22.070. The court
resolved the conflict by applying the underlying principle of
comparative fault to reduce the state government's right to
reimbursement in correlation with the employer's share of the
fault for the injury to the worker.
Second, I examine the relationship between the compara-
tive fault rule for tort liability established by RCW 4.22.070 in
the Tort Reform Act of 1986 and the "retailer relief" provision
adopted in the Product Liability Act of 1981.63 RCW
7.72.040(2) -commonly known as the "retailer relief" provi-
sion-reflects an earlier legislative attempt to ameliorate the
harsh effects of joint and several liability by generally exempt-
ing a non-manufacturing product seller from liability. How-
ever, the "retailer relief" statute is subject to certain
exceptions; for example, holding the product seller jointly and
severally liable if the manufacturer is insolvent and thus
633. See irfmra part IV.B.
634. Clark v. Pacificorp, 118 Wash. 2d 167, 183-84, 822 P.2d 162, 171 (1991).
635. See infra part IV.C.
636. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.040(2) (1991).
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unable to respond in damages to the plaintiff. 7 The question
then is whether the exceptions to the "retailer relief" statute
continue to apply and thereby impose joint and several liability
upon a passive distributor or retailer of a product, or whether
the subsequently enacted rule of comparative fault supple-
ments and supersedes the earlier, imperfect attempt to correct
the flaws of joint and several liability. To fully illustrate the
manner in which I believe RCW 4.22.070 should be reconciled
with other statutory enactments, I work through each of the
steps of this analysis, reaching the conclusion that both stat-
utes must be read together as a further limitation on the liabil-
ity of non-manufacturing product sellers.
B. Comparative Fault and the Industrial Insurance Act
Under the Washington Industrial Insurance Act, an
employee injured on the job is entitled to workers' compensa-
tion benefits. 8 In exchange for providing the worker with an
assured source of compensation, the employer is granted
immunity from tort liability for injuries to the employee,
whether caused by the employer or a coemployee.639 Unless an
employer so elects and is qualified to be a self-insurer,"' all
employers must pay premiums to the state workers' compensa-
tion fund managed by the Department of Labor and Indus-
tries." 1 In sum, "the industrial insurance program functions as
a statutory substitute for a tort action accusing the employer of
wrongful conduct .... "I
Although an action against the employer is barred under
the Industrial Insurance Act, the worker is still permitted to
bring a tort action against a third person, such as the manufac-
turer of machinery or equipment used by the employee at the
637. I& § 7.72.040(2)(b).
638. Clark v. Pacificorp, 118 Wash. 2d 167, 174, 822 P.2d 162, 166 (1991).
639. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.04.010 (1991). See generally Clark, 118 Wash. 2d at 184,
822 P.2d at 171 ("The act was created to provide sure and certain relief for injured
workers and their beneficiaries. It was created through compromise. Both employees
and employers gave up their common law rights and defenses in exchange for a no-
fault system of compensation. The employer received immunity from suit, and the
employee received compensation and benefits deemed by the Legislature to be
sufficient recompense."); Stertz v. Industrial Ins. Comm'n, 91 Wash. 588, 590-91, 158 P.
256, 258 (1916) (upholding the workers' compensation statute as a valid compromise
that assures the employee of benefits while immunizing the employer from tort
liability).
640. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.14.020 (1991).
641. Id. § 51.16.035..210.
642. Sisk, supra note 13, at 452.
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time of the injury. 4 s Before tort reform, the third person
defendant, if found liable, would be responsible in damages for
the full amount of the employee's injuries, notwithstanding
that the employer's fault may have contributed to the accident.
This result followed directly from the doctrine of joint and sev-
eral liability. Because of the employer's immunity from suit,
the third person was also unable to obtain any contribution
from the employer. 4 However, the employee who recovered
from a third person was required to reimburse the Washington
State Department of Labor and Industries or the self-insured
employer for at least part of the workers' compensation bene-
fits already obtained. 5 When the employee recovered from
the third person, the Department or employer would have a
lien upon that recovery for the amount of the benefits to be
reimbursed.64e
With the enactment of the Tort Reform Act of 1986, an
injured employee may no longer recover from the third person
that share of the damages that is attributable to the actions of
the employer. 7 Under RCW 4.22.070, fault must be allocated
by the trier of fact to "every entity," specifically including"entities immune from liability to the claimant."648  Thus,
rather than requiring the third person to bear the employer's
share of the responsibility, industrial insurance benefits paid to
the worker are the exclusive compensation to the worker for
the employer's share of the fault.
"[I]n keeping with the principle that industrial insurance
is a substitute for a tort action against the employer," 9 the
workers' compensation statute was amended by the Tort
Reform Act of 1986 to provide that workers who can show
their injuries were caused in part by an employer or co-
employee will be able to retain the entire judgment against
third person tortfeasors and will not have to reimburse the
Department for all of the workers' compensation benefits.'
643. WAsH. REV. CODE § 51.24.030-.110 (1991).
644. Montoya v. Greenway Aluminum Co., 10 Wash. App. 630, 639, 519 P.2d 22, 28
(1974) (the immunity of the employer under the Industrial Insurance Act "applies to
claims by a third party against the employer for contribution or indemnity").
645. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.24.060 (1985).
646. Id.
647. See supra part III.C.l.d.
648. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1) (1991).
649. Sisk, supra note 13, at 452.
650. S. Journal, 49th Reg. Sess. & 1st Spec. Sess. 464 (1986) (remarks of Sen.
Bottinger) (the amendment to the workers' compensation statute was designed to
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The amendment added a new Subsection (f) to RCW
51.24.060(1) that reads:
If the employer or co-employee are determined under RCW
4.22.070 to be at fault, (c) and (e) of this subsection do not
apply and benefits shall be paid by the department and/or
self-insurer to or on behalf of the worker or beneficiary as
though no recovery had been made from a third person.651
Based upon this language-that workers' compensation
benefits should be paid as though "no recovery" had been
made from a third person-commentators (including myself)
understood the statute to mean that "employees injured in
whole or in part by the negligence of their employer or co-
employee [have] the ability to collect both the full amount of
their workers' compensation benefits and the full amount of a
judgment against the third party." 2 In other words, the stat-
ute was interpreted to mean that, whenever some fault was
allocated to the employer, the Department's lien for reim-
bursement of benefits was eliminated in full. However, this
"all or nothing" approach is difficult to reconcile with the
underlying principle of comparative responsibility that ani-
mates RCW 4.22.070. Moreover, a complete elimination of the
Department's right to reimbursement would provide a windfall
to workers in many cases at the expense of the state compensa-
tion fund. 53
In Clark v. Paciftcorp,e- the Washington Supreme Court
addressed this anomaly in the conjunction between the com-
parative fault provision of RCW 4.22.070 and the amendment
to the workers' compensation statute codified in RCW
51.24.060(1)(f). In two cases consolidated on appeal, the survi-
prevent a "double whammy" whereby the employer's share of the fault would not be
collectible in a tort action against a third person and the employee would also be
obliged to refund the workers' compensation benefits from the tort recovery against
the third person).
651. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.24.060(1)(f) (1991).
652. Stephen D. Thompson, Comment, Development in the Law, The 1986 Tort
Reform Act: Apportionment of Damages in Workers' Compensation (RCW 51.24.060),
23 WiLLAMETTE L. REV. 211, 250 (1987) (emphasis added). See also Charles R. Bush,
The Impact of the Tort Reform Act Upon the Industrial Insurance Act 22 GONZ. L.
REV. 121, 127-28 (1986/87); Peck, Washington's Partial Rejection, supra note 2, at 254;
Sisk, supra note 13, at 452-53.
653. Clark v. Pacificorp, 118 Wash. 2d 167, 185, 822 P.2d 162, 172 (1991) (if the right
to reimbursement is wholly eliminated, "the plaintiff may be made more than whole
at the expense of the compensation fund").
654. 118 Wash. 2d 167, 822 P.2d 162 (1991).
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vors of deceased workers had collected workers' compensation
benefits as beneficiaries and then prosecuted wrongful death
actions against third persons. s In both cases, the plaintiffs
reached a settlement or proposed settlement with the third
person.65 The plaintiffs then contended that the deceased
worker's employer had also been partially at fault, and thus
that the Department's lien for reimbursement had been elimi-
nated under the statute.657 The Department appeared in both
actions to contest the elimination of the lien.6 8 When the con-
solidated appeals came before the Washington Supreme Court,
"the central issue [was]: does RCW 51.24.060(1)(f) provide for
elimination or merely a reduction of the Department's lien if
the worker's employer or co-employee is determined to be at
fault under RCW 4.22.070? "P659
The C7ark court concluded that RCW 51.24.060 "should be
interpreted to require a reduction of the right to reimburse-
ment in proportion to the employer's share of fault."' The
court read the amendment to the Industrial Insurance Act in
light of the comparative fault principles of the 1986 Tort
Reform Act. Because RCW 51.24.060(1)(f) specifically men-
tions RCW 4.22.070, the court ruled that the reference would
be "superfluous if it were not meant to require a reduction [of
the Department's lien] in proportion to fault."'661 The statutes
must be construed "[i]n accordance with the principles of com-
parative fault, tort reform, and adequate compensation for
injured workers. 6 6 2 Accordingly, the court held, RCW
51.24.060(1)(f) must be read to provide for a proportionate
reduction in reimbursement, and not an elimination of the
lien, unless the employer's fault exceeds the third person's per-
centage of fault: 6 s
A trier of fact shall apportion fault to all at-fault entities in
accordance with RCW 4.22.070. This includes the injured
worker or beneficiary, the employer, and the third party.
Each party shall then pay his proportionate share of dam-
ages. The Department pays the employer's share in the
655. Id. at 172-74, 822 P.2d at 165-66.
656. Id. at 173-74, 822 P.2d at 165-66.
657. Id.
658. Id.
659. Clark, 118 Wash. 2d at 175, 822 P.2d at 166.
660. Id. at 190, 822 P.2d at 174.
661. Id at 183, 822 P.2d at 171.
662. Id. at 172, 822 P.2d at 165.
663. Id. at 190-91, 822 P.2d at 174-75.
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form of workers' compensation benefits. Where the
employer's share of fault exceeds the benefits paid, the
Department's right to reimbursement is reduced; where it
exceeds the third party's share of fault, the right is
eliminated. 664
Applying comparative fault to proportionately reduce the
Department's lien for workers' compensation benefits ensures
that the employee will not enjoy a double recovery of damages,
that the employer will not profit from its own wrongdoing, and
that the third person will pay only its proportionate share of
the damages.6 65 In sum, the Clark v. Pacificorp decision stands
as a model for reading RCW 4.22.070 in conjunction with
another statutory regime, by seeking the result most consistent
with the central principle of comparative fault among all
responsible for an injury.
C. Comparative Fault and the "Retailer Relief' Statute
1. Introduction
In 1986, the legislature largely abandoned the common law
doctrine of joint and several liability, generally limiting it to
narrow circumstances where the claimant is without fault and
all responsible entities have been joined to the action. As I
have written elsewhere, RCW 4.22.070 of the Tort Reform Act
of 1976 articulates a "new approach-a nearly pure compara-
tive fault system among all parties and entities-[that] is char-
acterized by the touchstone principle of fairness that the law
should not place the full burden of liability upon one who is
only partly responsible for a loss."'
As an earlier step in the evolution of Washington liability
664. Clark, 118 Wash. 2d at 172, 822 P.2d at 165. In a footnote to the opinion, the
Clark court provided two illustrations of the application of its ruling. Id. at 191 n.12,
822 P.2d at 175 n.12. In the first example, the employee's damages are determined to
be $100,000, and the employer is determined to be 10 percent at fault. The employer's
proportionate share of the damages thus is $10,000. Therefore, if the Department has
paid $30,000 in workers' compensation benefits, the employee would be required to
reimburse $20,000 of those benefits. In the second example, the employee's damages
are again determined to be $100,000, but the employer's share of fault is determined to
be 40 percent. The employer's proportionate share of the damages thus is $40,000.
Therefore, if the Department again has paid $30,000 in workers' compensation benefits,
the Department is required to continue to pay benefits until the total paid equals the
employer's share of the fault. And when the employer's share of fault exceeds that of
the third person tort defendant, the right to reimbursement would be eliminated. Id
665. Id. at 190, 822 P.2d at 174-75.
666. Sisk, supra note 13, at 446.
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law to a comparative fault system, the Product Liability Act of
1981"6 created a special "safe harbor" for retailers, distribu-
tors, and other non-manufacturing product sellers who were
not responsible for the design or manufacture of an allegedly
dangerous product. 8 ' This "retailer relief" provision
exempted these entities from the then-prevailing general rule
of joint and several liability and generally directed that they
would be be liable only for their own conduct." 9 However,
because the doctrine had not yet been modified by the 1986
Act, the retailer relief statute still allowed joint and several
liability to be imposed upon non-manufacturers when the
actual manufacturer of a product was insolvent or otherwise
not amenable to suit.6 70
When the Washington State Legislature passed the 1986
Tort Reform Act, it failed to specifically coordinate the new
statute with this previous enactment. The 1986 Act, although
adopting a general rule of comparative fault for nearly all
other actors, does not expressly extend its benefit to those
product sellers who were granted special protection just five
years earlier. Nevertheless, to leave product sellers outside the
ambit of RCW 4.22.070 would have the perverse effect of plac-
ing the favored child of the 1981 reforms in the position of the
pretermitted heir of the 1986 statute. This gap in the statutory
scheme is now beginning to surface and to be the subject of
sharp contention in litigation at the trial court level.
The question, then, is whether the general rule of several
liability under the Tort Reform Act of 1986 (RCW 4.22.070),
applies to product liability claims made against retailers and
distributors, thereby supplementing or superseding the excep-
tion in the Product Liability Act of 1981, which imposed joint
and several liability upon non-manufacturing product sellers
when the manufacturer was insolvent or otherwise not amena-
ble to suit (RCW 7.72.040). The language and intent of the
1986 Act and of the exceptions to the retailer relief provision
in the 1981 Act are apparently inconsistent. I suggest that a
careful analysis of the two statutes, a diligent attempt to read
the two enactments together, an application of longstanding
principles of statutory interpretation, and a study of the legis-
667. Product Liability Act of 1981, ch. 27, 1981 Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess. 112.
668. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.040(1) (1991).
669. Id.
670. I& § 7.72.040(2).
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lative purpose lead us to a conclusion that is in harmony with
the reforming purpose of the 1986 statute. In the following
sections, I outline the type of analytical approach that I believe
a court should apply in filling the gaps in interpretation when
the comparative fault statute must be reconciled with other
legislation.
2. The Historical Evolution of Liability Law for Non-
Manufacturing Product Sellers From the Common
Law to the 1981 Product Liability Act and
the 1986 Tort Reform Act
a. The Common Law Period
A distributor, retailer, or other intermediary ordinarily
acts as a mere conduit in the chain of a product's distribution
and thus is not responsible for any defect in design or manu-
facture. In a typical transaction, the retailer or distributor
receives goods in a sealed package or as a finished product and
simply passes it on to the consumer, without doing anything
that could contribute to any defect in the product or to any
danger the product may pose to a consumer. Indeed, in some
cases, the product seller may never even take possession of the
item, but instead simply pass along an order to the manufac-
turer for shipment directly to the purchaser.
Nevertheless, during the common law period, Washington
courts followed the majority approach of imposing strict liabil-
ity upon product sellers irrespective of causal responsibility for
the nature or condition of the product. 7' Prior to 1981, a plain-
tiff who suffered an injury from an allegedly defective product
could recover from anyone in the chain of distribution.672
Although a retailer, wholesaler, or distributor may have had
no responsibility for the product's design or manufacture, and
usually had no opportunity to discover any defect, it was never-
theless subject to strict liability for a defective product.6 73
671. See generally Frank J. Cavico, Jr., The Strict Tort Liability of Retailers,
Wholesalers, and Distributors of Defective Products, 12 NOVA L. REV. 213, 218-20
(1987) (summarizing majority rule that extended strict product liability to retailers,
wholesalers, and distributors); Burt A. Leete, Caught in the Middle: The Need for
Uniformity in Products Liability Statutes Affecting NonManufacturer Sellers, 18
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 997, 998-1000 (1982) (same).
672. Celia E. Holuk and Donna L. Walker, Comment, Products Liability-Tort
Reform An Overview of Washington's New Ac4 17 GONZ. L. REV. 357, 359 (1982).
673. See, e.g., Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 11 Wash.
App. 929, 525 P.2d 286 (1974), affd, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 542 P.2d 774 (1975).
19921
152 University of Puget Sound Law Review
Strict liability was even applied to distributors of products that
were shipped directly to the purchaser and thus had never
been in the possession of the supplier. 74 In sum, under the
common law doctrine of joint and several liability, the seller's
liability was coextensive with that of the manufacturer.
However, even during the common law era, several courts
and commentators recognized the inherent inequity involved
in imposing liability upon intermediate parties not responsible
for design or manufacture of a product.675 In Sam Shainberg
Co. v. Barlow,676 the Mississippi Supreme Court refused to
extend strict product liability to a retailer and wholesaler of
shoes. The court observed that the allegedly defective shoes
had been sold by the retailer in exactly same condition as they
had left the manufacturer, that neither the retailer nor whole-
saler had participated in design or manufacture of the shoes,
and that the defect was a latent one not discoverable by the
retailer. The court recognized that an extension of strict liabil-
ity to these intermediaries "would make each retail merchant
an insurer or guarantor of every one of the thousands of items
that he might handle merely as a sales conduit. 6 77
In Atkins v. American Motors Corp.,678 the Alabama
Supreme Court adopted the concept of strict products liability
but refused to "impose[] liability equally on all 'sellers' with-
out regard to culpability causally related in fact to the defec-
tive condition of the product .... ,"679 The court explained that
to hold liable in tort a retailer of a packaged product,
purchased from a reputable manufacturer without knowl-
edge of its unsafe condition, for the mere selling of a defec-
tive product is to fully equate for liability purposes a tort
remedy with a breach of warranty remedy, the effect of
which is to destroy the distinction between the two.6 80
The Louisiana Court of Appeal reached the same conclu-
674. Zamora v. Mobil Oil Corp., 104 Wash. 2d 199, 201, 704 P.2d 584, 586 (1985).
675. See generally Cavico, supra note 671, at 226-33 (summarizing critiques of
application of strict products liability to non-manufacturing sellers); John G. Culhane,
Real and Imagined Effects of Statutes Restricting the Liability of Non-manufacturing
Sellers of Defective Products, 95 DICK. L. REV. 287, 294-95 (1991) (same).
676. 258 So. 2d 242 (Miss. 1972).
677. Id. at 246.
678. 335 So. 2d 134 (Ala. 1976).
679. Id. at 138.
680. Id. at 139.
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sion. In McCauley v. Manda Bros. Provisions Co., s a plaintiff
filed suit against a retailer and manufacturer of allegedly con-
taminated packaged food. The court acknowledged that strict
liability had been imposed upon retailers in other jurisdictions,
but declined to follow that approach.6 2 The court dismissed
the action against the retailer, holding "that, in the absence of
negligence or knowledge of the defect or unwholesomeness of
the product sold, a retailer of a pre-packaged food product,
which is not the manufacturer thereof, sold for public con-
sumption, cannot be held liable for injuries resulting from the
consumption thereof. 68 3
More than one court questioned the logic of holding non-
manufacturing product sellers liable merely because they were
links in the chain of distribution. As the Arizona Court of
Appeals observed recently:
Merely pointing to an entity which is in the "stream of com-
merce" or part of the "enterprise" is not enough [to impose
strict liability]. If it were, the trucking company which
hauled the product from the manufacturer to the retailer
would be strictly liable, as would the newspaper which
advertised the product which induced the customer to
buy. 684
In Wellman v. Supreme Farmstead Equipment, Inc.,68 5 a
plaintiff brought a strict liability action against an intermedi-
ary and the manufacturer, alleging injury by reason of a defect
in a piece of farm machinery.8 6 The intermediary firm was
engaged in the business of selling farm equipment and had
arranged the sale, for which it received a commission. 7 How-
ever, the intermediary firm had not been involved in the trans-
fer of title. The purchase order was sent to the manufacturer
that had shipped the machinery directly to the customer.8
The New York trial court held that under circumstances
where the intermediary "neither designed, manufactured,
delivered or installed the equipment which was purchased, .... it
681. 202 So. 2d 492 (La. Ct. App. 1967), affd, 211 So. 2d 637 (La. 1968).
682. Id at 497.
683. d.k
684. Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Associated Merchandising Corp., 782 P.2d 1187,
1191 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989).
685. 420 N.Y.S.2d 353 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979).
686. Id. at 353.
687. Id, at 354.
688. Id.
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would be a distortion to hold that [the intermediary] ... should
respond in damages" under strict liability. 89 The court further
held:
The predicate for holding the distributor liable solely
because he may be a chain in the link by which the product
reached the hands of the plaintiff and primarily because of
some financial gain obtained by someone situated as [the
intermediary firm], is illogical. Responsibility should walk
hand in hand with fault and should not be premised upon
either the immediate availability of an individual or corpora-
tion as a target, nor is it sensible to require such a distribu-
tor to respond merely because some financial gain was
obtained.69 °
Professor Richard A. Epstein of the University of Chicago
Law School agrees. He has emphasized that
the radical revision introduced [by court decisions and the
Restatement of Torts] in the treatment of intermediate par-
ties should not be confused with the traditional form of
strict liability. It is a dubious form of vicarious liability for
the wrongs of others that serves none of the proper purposes
of the products liability law.691
Indeed, it was the unfairness of a rule imposing strict liability
upon a non-negligent distributor or retailer that ultimately led
the Washington State Legislature to adopt a retailer relief stat-
ute as the first step away from artificial and inequitable abso-
lute liability.
b. The Product Liability Act of 1981-The "Retailer Relief'
Statute (RCW 7 72.040)
Because of the manifest inequity of holding retailers and
distributors jointly and severally liable for product defects over
which they had no control, the Washington Legislature was
moved in 1981 to establish a different rule for those product
sellers who took no part in the manufacturing, altering, or
assembling of a product. In the Product Liability Act of 1981,
the legislature created a "safe harbor" protection for non-man-
ufacturing product sellers, subject only to certain narrow
689. Id at 355.
690. Id.




exceptions. 92  Under RCW 7.72.040(1),693 "a product seller
other than a manufacturer" is liable only for claims based
upon the product seller's own (1) negligence, (2) breach of an
express warranty, or (3) intentional misrepresentation or con-
cealment of information about the product.6 "
However, consistent with the 1981 Act's retention of joint
and several liability as a general rule, RCW 7.72.040(2)695 pro-
vides that the non-manufacturing product seller acquires the
liability of a manufacturer if (1) there is no solvent manufac-
turer subject to service of process, (2) it is "highly probable"
that the claimant could not enforce a judgment against any
manufacturer, (3) the product seller is a controlled subsidiary
of a manufacturer, or vice versa, (4) the product seller pro-
vided plans or specifications for the product which proximately
caused the product's defects, or (5) the product was marketed
under the non-manufacturing product seller's trade or brand
name.6 9 6
692. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.040 (1991). On the "retailer relief" statute, see
generally Holuk and Walker, supra note 672, at 426-30; Philip A. Talmadge,
Washington's Product Liability Act, 5 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1981).
693. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.040(1) (1991).
694. RCW 7.72.040(1) provides:
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, a product seller other
than a manufacturer is liable to the claimant only if the claimant's harm was
proximately caused by:
(a) The negligence of such product seller; or
(b) Breach of an express warranty made by such product seller; or
(c) The intentional misrepresentation of facts about the product by such
product seller or the intentional concealment of information about the
product by such product seller.
695. Id. § 7.72.040(2).
696. RCW 7.72.040(2) provides:
(2) A product seller, other than a manufacturer, shall have the liability of a
manufacturer to the claimant if:
(a) No solvent manufacturer who would be liable to the claimant is subject
to service of process under the laws of the claimant's domicile or the state of
Washington; or
(b) The court determines that it is highly probable that the claimant would
be unable to enforce a judgment against any manufacturer; or
(c) The product seller is a controlled subsidiary of a manufacturer, or the
manufacturer is a controlled subsidiary of the product seller; or
(d) The product seller provided the plans or specifications for the
manufacture or preparation of the product and such plans or specifications
were a proximate cause of the defect in the product; or
(e) The product was marketed under a trade name or brand name of the
product seller.
Id. RCW 7.72.040 was amended in 1991 by the addition of Subsection (3), which
excepts pharmacists from Subsection (2) if the pharmacist dispenses the product as
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c. The Tort Reform Act of 1986-The Comparative Fault Act
(RCW 4.22.070)
At the time the 1981 Act was adopted, proponents of tort
reform argued that the legislation did "not go far enough in
reducing the liability of products sellers and [instead] pre-
fer[red] provisions eliminating joint and several liability
.... "6 That next step in the evolution of modern liability law
was not long in coming. As discussed throughout this Article,
the 1986 Tort Reform Act embraced the principle of compara-
tive fault, adopting a general rule of several only liability based
upon each tortfeasor's percentage share of the fault.
If the 1986 adoption of comparative fault governs, a
defendant to a products liability action, whether a manufac-
turer or a distributor or retailer, would not be liable for any
portion of the loss for which it was not responsible. The trier
of fact would separately allocate fault to every entity involved,
including both the manufacturer of the allegedly defective
product and the product seller. No fault would be allocated to
any entity for the presence of defects in a product over which
the entity had absolutely no control. Accordingly, if directly
and solely applicable, RCW 4.22.070 would plainly relieve mere
conduits in the chain of product distribution from the risk of
liability for unknown defects in a product.
3. Reconciling the 1981 Retailer Relief Statute and 1986
Comparative Fault Act
a. Introduction
When two apparently conflicting statutes are set side-by-
side in a particular case, a court should first attempt to inter-
pret them in such a manner as to give effect to both, so long as
the reconciliation does not distort the statutory language.698
Consistent with this principle of statutory construction, I will
conclude that the 1986 Act's partial abolition of joint and sev-
eral liability (RCW 4.22.070) should be read to supplement the
1981 Act's "retailer relief" provision (RCW 7.72.040). In this
way, the modest limitation in the 1981 "retailer relief" provi-
manufactured and pursuant to a prescription by a licensed practitioner and if the phar-
macist complies with statutory recordkeeping requirements. Id, § 7.72.040(3).
697. Staff Report, S.B. 3158, 47th Leg. Sess. Washington State Senate Judiciary
Committee (1981) (outlining testimony of witnesses on Product Liability Act of 1981).
698. Tommy P. v. Board of Cty. Comm'rs of Spokane Cty., 97 Wash. 2d 385, 391-92,
645 P.2d 697, 700-01 (1982).
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sion can be harmonized with the broader abrogation of joint
and several liability in the 1986 Act.
b. A Simple (and Wrong) Interpretation That Avoids
Conflict Between the Statutes
Under certain circumstances, such as when the manufac-
turer is not amenable to suit or is insolvent, RCW 7.72.040(2)
departs from the general rule that a non-manufacturing prod-
uct seller is liable only for its own negligence and instead pro-
vides that the product seller "shall have the liability of a
manufacturer." '  Under RCW 4.22.070, fault is separately
allocated to each entity according to the extent of its culpabil-
ity for and causation of the injury. The threshold question is
whether there is any conflict between the two statutes. The
answer turns upon the meaning of that phrase -"the liability
of a manufacturer."
The simplest way in which to read the 1981 and 1986 stat-
utes together would be to (1) view RCW 7.72.040(2) as nar-
rowly applying only a theory of liability to non-manufacturing
product sellers, while (2) RCW 4.22.070 directs separate alloca-
tion of fault between a manufacturer and a product seller,
whatever may be the underlying theory of liability. So under-
stood, RCW 7.72.040(2)'s reference to "the liability of a manu-
facturer" means only that the non-manufacturing product
seller would be subject to strict liability-a theory of liability
that otherwise would be reserved only for the product manu-
facturer itself.7°  Under this simple approach, the statute's
imposition of "the liability of a manufacturer" would not mean
that the product seller would be substituted for the actual
manufacturer; it would only allow the addition of the product
seller as another defendant potentially subject to strict
liability.
If this path were taken, our journey would come to an end
in the world of comparative fault. Under RCW 4.22.070, the
trier of fact must allocate fault in all fault-based actions
(including strict liability) °1 to all culpable entities (including
nonparty entities not joined to the lawsuit).7 '2 Although the
699. WASH. REv. CODE § 7.72.040(2) (1991).
700. Id § 7.72.030 (standards of liability of a manufacturer).
701. See supra part III.B.1 (discussing the definition of fault in RCW 4.22.015 as
incorporated into RCW 4.22.070).
702. See supra part III.C.L.f (discussing allocation of fault to nonparty entities).
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theory of strict liability would apply to the product seller
under RCW 7.72.040(2), RCW 4.22.070 would nevertheless per-
mit the trier of fact to allocate all of the fault to the manufac-
turer as the sole party with causal responsibility for any defect
in the product, even if the actual manufacturer were insolvent
or unavailable. Indeed, the conclusion that all fault should be
allocated to the manufacturer actually responsible for a defect
would almost certainly follow in the vast majority of cases.
Thus, while the exception to the retailer relief provision in
RCW 7.72.040(2) would potentially expose the product seller to
strict liability, the fault allocation process of RCW 4.22.070
would ensure that liability would never be imposed for any
share of the fault attributable to the conduct of the actual
manufacturer. In other words, what RCW 7.72.040(2) gives,
RCW 4.22.070 takes away. And this sleight of hand would be
accomplished while theoretically giving full effect to the lan-
guage of each statute.
This neat and simple approach does have the virtue of
resolving the problem while avoiding any conflict between the
statutes. At least superficially, it also is grounded in the actual
language of the exception to the statute-construing "the lia-
bility of a manufacturer" as only adopting a theory of strict lia-
bility. This approach has only one flaw-it is not a faithful
interpretation of RCW 7.72.040 in light of its context and legis-
lative purpose. Unfortunately, the simplest resolution is not
the correct one.
Looking at the plain language of RCW 7.72.040(2), there is
more than one possible way to understand the direction that a
product seller "shall have the liability of a manufacturer."
Rather than merely a reference to a theory of liability, the pro-
vision could just as easily be read as saying that, for liability
purposes, the product seller will be treated as if it were the
manufacturer of the product. When the manufacturer is not
available to provide a remedy to the plaintiff, the non-manu-
facturing product seller steps into the shoes of the manufac-
turer and assumes full responsibility (both culpably and
causally) for any defects in the product. When fault is allo-
cated by the trier of fact under RCW 4.22.070, any fault attrib-
utable to the manufacturer of the product would be diverted to
the non-manufacturing product seller.
The full context of the provision supports this interpreta-
tion. Under RCW 7.72.040(2), the non-manufacturing product
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seller "shall have the liability of a manufacturer" if, inter alia,
the manufacturer is not subject to service of process or the
plaintiff probably could not enforce a judgment against the
manufacturer. °3 The manifest purpose of this exception is to
provide an alternative source of recompense to the plaintiff
when the manufacturer becomes practically unavailable. 70  As
one commentator on retailer relief statutes says, the product
seller is "'transformed' into a manufacturer (thus subject to
strict liability) when the manufacturer is unavailable to the
plaintiff.170 5 The retailer relief statute merely allows the prod-
uct seller to "defer" liability to the manufacturer,70 6 with the
significant caveat that the manufacturer be available to accept
that liability. Otherwise, the product seller becomes the substi-
tute for the manufacturer, vicariously subject to liability as
though it were an alter ego.
In addition, this alternative reading of RCW 7.72.040(2)
better comports with the legislative purpose. The legislative
history clarifies that the phrase-"the liability of a manufac-
turer"-was simply another way of saying that the traditional
rule of joint and several liability would apply to hold the prod-
uct seller liable for the full amount of the plaintiff's dam-
ages.7" 7 The effect of joint and several liability is to hold one
tortfeasor jointly responsible for the conduct of other
tortfeasors. Indeed, the Washington Senate Select Committee
on Tort and Product Liability Reform, which designed the pro-
vision, explained that the non-manufacturing product seller
should have "primary liability" if no solvent manufacturer was
703. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.040(a)(b) (1991). The remaining provisions of
Subsection (2) further confirm that the subsection places the product seller in the
position of the manufacturer of the product at issue. A product seller will also have
"the liability of a manufacturer" if the product seller is a controlled subsidiary of the
manufacturer or the manufacturer is a controlled subsidiary of the product seller, the
product seller provided the plans or specifications for the product, or the product is
marketed under the trade or brand name of the product seller. Id § 7.72.040(2)(c)(e).
In each instance, the product seller has assumed direct responsibility for the particular
product and thus is treated as the alter ego of the manufacturer.
704. Culhane, supra note 675, at 297 (rather than leave the plaintiff without a
remedy, retailer relief statutes generally retain the product seller as a "guarantor" if
recovery may not be had from the actual manufacturer).
705. Id.
706. Cherry v. Siemans Medical Systems, Inc., 565 N.E.2d 215, 218 (Ill. App. Ct.
1990).
707. Washington State Senate Select Committee on Tort and Product Liability
Reforms, Final Report, December 1980, reprinted in S. Journal, 47th Reg. Sess. 617,
632 (1981); Section-By-Section Analysis of S.B. 3158, Washington State Senate
Judiciary Committee 6 (1981).
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available to compensate the plaintiff.7 °8 Thus, when RCW
7.72.040(2) adds the non-manufacturing product seller back
into the liability formula, it equates the product seller with the
manufacturer and holds the seller "responsible for the dam-
ages associated with a product liability claim even if the defect
in the product was the manufacturer's responsibility."7"
In sum, Subsection (2) of RCW 7.72.040 is a vicarious liabil-
ity provision.710 In certain specified circumstances, such as
when the actual manufacturer is beyond the reach of recovery,
the product seller is held directly liable for the conduct of the
manufacturer with respect to manufacturing and design
defects. So understood, there is an unavoidable conflict
between this exception to the retailer relief statute and the
general abolition of joint and several in the comparative fault
statute.
c. To the Extent of Conflict, the 1986 Comparative Fault Act
Must Prevail Over the 1981 Retailer Relief Statute
To the extent that the 1981 retailer relief exception and
the 1986 comparative fault statute conflict, the broader and
more recent reform adopted in the 1986 Tort Reform Act must
prevail. When two statutes relating to the same subject matter
are found to be incompatible, the later act irnpliedly repeals
the earlier act to the extent of the incompatibility, especially
when the later act covers the entire subject.71 1 In Great North-
ern Railway Co. v. Glover,"'2 the Washington Supreme Court
considered whether a later statute had impliedly repealed an
earlier statute, notwithstanding the specific direction in the
708. Washington State Senate Select Committee on Tort and Product Liability
Reforms, Final Report, Dec. 1980, reprinted in S. Journal, 47th Reg. Sess. 617 (1981).
709. Talmadge, supra note 692, at 11.
710. See EPSTEIN, supra note 691, at 64 (holding product sellers strictly liable
together with product manufacturers is "a dubious form of vicarious liability for the
wrongs of others that serves none of the proper purposes of the products liability law")
(emphasis in original).
711. Local 497, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Pub. Util. Dist. 2, 103 Wash. 2d 786,
788-89, 698 P.2d 1056, 1057 (1985) (implied repeal occurs when two acts are so clearly
inconsistent with or repugnant to each other that they cannot be reconciled and both
given effect by a fair and reasonable construction); State ex rel. Reed v. Spanaway
Water Dist., 38 Wash. 2d 393, 397, 229 P.2d 532, 534 (1951) (later act operates as a repeal
of earlier act when the later act covers the entire subject matter, is complete, and is
intended to supersede prior legislation on the subject). See generally 1A SINGER, supra
note 254, § 23.09, at 331-32 ("repeal may arise by necessary implication in the
enactment of a subsequent act").
712. 194 Wash. 146, 77 P.2d 598 (1938).
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earlier enactment that no subsequent act be construed as
repealing any of its provisions unless the later act expressly so
provided.71 The later statute contained no express repeal of
the prior legislation."' The Glover court nevertheless was
obliged to find an implicit repeal, in favor of the more recent
statute, because the two acts were inconsistent and irreconcila-
ble.7"' The same result follows here.
The Tort Reform Act of 1986 is expansive in its effect. By
its terms, the Act was intended to apply to "all actions filed on
or after August 1, 1986."76 Thus, to the extent of inconsis-
tency with any prior legislative action, the 1986 Act not only
impliedly but also expressly takes precedence. Moreover,
RCW 4.22.070, the comparative fault provision, makes a broad
sweep. The provision begins by commanding that the trier of
fact determine the percentage of fault attributable to "every
entity" in "all actions" involving the fault of more than one
entity.71 7 Accordingly, the breadth of this provision and its
application to all tort cases could not be more vigorously
expressed.
RCW 4.22.070 contains several defined limitations and
exceptions to the general rule of several liability. A limited
form of joint and several liability is preserved if the claimant is
not at fault.718 A defendant also remains responsible for the
actions of another person if the defendant acted "in concert"
with that person or if the person was an agent or servant of
the defendant.719 In addition, there are three exceptions to
RCW 4.22.070: (1) hazardous substance and waste torts,
(2) certain business torts, and (3) cases involving assessment of
713. Id at 155-56, 77 P.2d at 603.
714. Id. at 157, 77 P.2d at 603.
715. Id. at 156-57, 77 P.2d at 603.
716. Tort Reform Act of 1986, ch. 305, § 910, 1986 Wash. Laws 1367 (emphasis
added). See also supra note 55 (discussing effective date of Tort Reform Act of 1986).
717. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1) (1991) (emphasis added). See United States v.
Smith, 111 S. Ct. 1180, 1188 (1991) (because the Liability Reform Act, by its plain
language, provides for immunity from tort liability for "any employee of the
Government" acting within the scope of employment, 28 U.S.C.S. 2679(b)(1) (1990)
(emphasis added), the statute could not be construed such that federal government
employees "who were already protected by other statutes ... cannot now benefit from
the more generous immunity available under the Liability Reform Act").
718. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1)(b) (1991). See also supra part III.F (discussing
the limited form of joint and several liability among defendant against whom
judgment is entered in favor of an innocent plaintiff).
719. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1)(a) (1991). See also supra part III.E (discussing
liability of defendants who have engaged in concerted action or who have an agency
relationship with another person).
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liability on a market share basis for injuries caused by generic
products.720 Each of these defined limitations and exceptions
was adopted for deliberate legislative reasons.72' When a stat-
ute specifically mentions exceptions, other exceptions may not
be added by the courts.722 The legislature did not see fit to
include any provision in RCW 4.22.070 to exempt product lia-
bility claims or claims against non-manufacturing product sell-
ers from the general rule of several liability. Such an
exception may not now be engrafted upon the otherwise
unqualified language of RCW 4.22.070.
d. The Legislature Intended to Extend the Rule of
Comparative Fault to Non-Manufacturing Product
Sellers
In construing a statute, we may glean further evidence of
legislative intent from a consideration of the legislative his-
tory.723 Statements by a prime sponsor of a bill at the time of
its consideration by the legislature are particularly strong indi-
cia of legislative intent. 24 The bill's sponsors may be expected
to be particularly well-informed about its purpose, meaning,
and intended effect.725 Senator Talmadge, although ultimately
opposed to many of the reforms in the Tort Reform Act of
1986, nonetheless was a primary sponsor of the bill and was
active in the legislative debate. His remarks on the proposal to
modify joint and several liability leave no doubt about the
breadth of its application, including its extension to product
liability claims: "I would urge the members of the Senate to
remember that this particular legislation touches upon envi-
ronmental matters, product matters, defamation, work place
safety and a variety of very difficult issues. 7 26
720. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(3) (1991). See also supra part III.H (discussing
exceptions to statute).
721. See supra parts III.E, III.F, and III.H (discussing the statutory limitations and
exceptions and their legislative purposes). See also Sisk, supra note 13, at 467-73
(same).
722. Jepson v. Department of Labor & Ind., 89 Wash. 2d 394, 404, 573 P.2d 10, 16
(1977) ("[w]here a statute provides for a stated exception, no other exceptions will be
assumed by implication").
723. Washington Pub. Utility Districts' Utilities Sys. v. Public Utility Dist. No. 1,
112 Wash. 2d 1, 7, 771 P.2d 701, 705 (1989).
724. Marine Power v. Human Rights Comm'n, 39 Wash. App. 609, 619-20, 694 P.2d
697, 703 (1985).
725. 2A SINGER, supra note 254, § 48.15, at 377.




The house debates are even more pertinent to the present
inquiry. In discussing the need to "correct that joint and sev-
eral liability problem," Representative Barnes used the partic-
ular example of a wholesaler in a product distribution chain.727
He explained that, under then current law, a wholesaler would
be exposed to joint and several liability merely because it was a
conduit, and despite the fact that such an intermediary would
have little or no independent fault.728 In sum, the intent of the
legislature to apply the provisions of RCW 4.22.070 to product
liability claims against non-manufacturing sellers of products-
notwithstanding any inconsistent provisions in RCW 7.72.040-
is plain.
e. Because the Exceptions to RCW 7.72.040 Were Grounded
in the Doctrine of Joint and Several Liability, the
New Rule of RCW 4.22.070 Takes
Precedence
RCW 4.22.070 establishes a general rule of several liability.
By providing that non-manufacturing product sellers are gen-
erally liable only for their own culpable conduct, the 1981
retailer relief provision is largely in harmony with this
approach. However, to the extent that the exceptions to RCW
7.72.040 would permit recourse to joint and several liability
when RCW 4.22.070 would not, the latter statute must prevail.
The law of tort liability underwent a sea change in the 1986
Tort Reform Act, placing parties to a tort action on a new
course. Because the exceptions to the 1981 retailer relief provi-
sion reflect a now outmoded approach to liability law, those
exceptions are largely superseded by the 1986 Act.
RCW 7.72.040 was an evolutionary step on the road toward
a system of comparative fault. It provided a limited "safe har-
bor" from the doctrine of joint and several liability to distribu-
tors and retailers. However, because joint and several liability
was still the rule of the day, the legislature restricted the pro-
tections granted under RCW 7.72.040 through the insertion of
various exceptions, so that a plaintiff would not be left without
some defendant able to satisfy a judgment. The legislature
expressly described these exceptions-such as the insolvent
manufacturer exception-as applying "traditional rules of joint
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and several liability. 7 29 Indeed, the legislature emphasized the
retention of joint and several liability in the 1981 Act by enact-
ing an express provision adopting the doctrine as the prevailing
rule.730
In sum, the 1981 Act in general, and the exceptions to
RCW 7.72.040 in particular, were grounded in the concept of
joint and several liability. For example, under RCW
7.72.040(2)(b), non-manufacturing product sellers remained
subject to joint and several liability when there was no solvent
manufacturer against which the plaintiff could enforce a judg-
ment. 31 Thus, the distributor or retailer, who had acted
merely as a link of the chain of distribution, became responsi-
ble to pay the plaintiff's damages not based on its actual contri-
bution to the product defect, but solely because of its ability to
pay.
By contrast, RCW 4.22.070 enacted in the 1986 Act reflects
a strong sentiment against holding a defendant liable based
merely upon ability to pay. An underlying premise of a com-
parative fault system is that party A should not be held liable
in damages simply because party B cannot be. The legislature
appreciated that the general abolition of joint and several lia-
bility means that plaintiffs must take defendants as they find
them and thus may be left without recovery if a defendant
becomes insolvent. As has always been true when there is a
single defendant, if a defendant is not able to satisfy the judg-
ment, the plaintiff assumes the risk of noncollection. By enact-
ing RCW 4.22.070, the legislature understood that a plaintiff
could no longer shift liability from one defendant to another"when there are multiple defendants and one goes broke."73
To hold a non-manufacturing product seller liable as a
729. Washington State Senate Select Committee on Tort and Product Liability
Reforms, Final Report, Dec. 1980, reprinted in S. Journal, 47th Reg. Sess. 617, 632
(1981); Section-By-Section Analysis of S.B. 3158, Washington State Senate Judiciary
Committee 6 (1981).
730. Product Liability Act of 1981, ch. 27, § 11, 1981 Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess. 112
(codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.030 (1991)). See also Senate Select
Committee on Tort and Product Liability Reforms, Final Report, Dec. 1980, reprinted
in S. Journal, 47th Reg. Sess. 628, 635 (1981) (legislature believed the rule on joint and
several liability should continue to be recognized and thus codified it in the 1981 Act).
RCW 4.22.030 was amended by the 1986 Act to provide that joint and several liability
would apply "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in RCW 4.22.070." Tort Reform Act of
1986, ch. 305, § 402, 1986 Wash. Laws 1358. Accordingly, RCW 4.22.070 takes
precedence.
731. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.040(2)(b) (1991).
732. See H. Journal, 49th Reg. Sess. & Spec. Sess. 1063 (1986) (remarks of Rep.
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manufacturer under RCW 7.72.040(2)(b), when the responsible
manufacturer, is insolvent contradicts this basic tenet of a com-
parative fault system. The exception in RCW 7.72.040(2)(b) is
precisely the type of access to a "deep pocket"-imposition of
liability based on ability to pay rather than on extent of
responsibility-that RCW 4.22.070 was passed to prevent.
Legislative tort reform in Washington has been a step-by-
step evolutionary process. Accordingly, when there is a con-
flict between tort reform statutes, the legislature's broader and
more recent reform (comparative fault under RCW 4.22.070)
must prevail over earlier piecemeal efforts (the limited retailer
relief provision of RCW 7.72.040). 733 To the extent of the con-
flict between the statutes, the 1986 Act's general repudiation of
joint and several liability must be understood as a repeal of the
joint and several liability exceptions to the retailer relief provi-
sion of the 1981 Act.7 4
Armstrong) (opposing tort reform legislation because an injured plaintiff would not
receive the whole award if there are "multiple defendants and one goes broke").
733. See Dietz v. General Electric Co., 821 P.2d 166, 171 (Ariz. 1991) (statute
"abrogating joint and several liability and establishing a system of several liability
making each tortfeasor responsible for paying for his or her percentage of fault and no
more" as part of Arizona tort reform "must prevail over" earlier statutory provision
prohibiting assessment of fault against employer immune from liability to employees
under the workers' compensation program).
734. In a real sense, the 1986 Act does not truly repeal the 1981 Act, even in part,
but rather builds and expands upon what the legislature had created in the "retailer
relief" statute, namely protection of non-manufacturing product sellers from liability.
See United States v. Smith, 111 S. Ct. 1180, 1188 (1991) ("[Tihe rule disfavoring implied
repeals simply is not implicated by the facts of this case, because the Liability Reform
Act [extending immunity from tort liability to all federal government employees
acting within the scope of their employment] does not repeal anything enacted by the
Gonzalez Act (which had earlier created limited immunity from tort liability for
military doctors]. The Liability Reform Act adds to what Congress created in the
Gonzalez Act, namely protection from liability for military doctors.") (emphasis in
original). The 1981 "retailer relief" statute did not create liability for product sellers-
that exposure to liability had been accomplished by judicial extension of strict liability
to the conduits in the chain of product distribution. The 1981 Act instead created a
"safe harbor" for non-manufacturing product sellers by essentially eliminating joint
and several liability with the manufacturing in most circumstances. The 1986 Act
widened the harbor further by expanding the circumstances under which joint and
several liability would not apply.
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f Given the Special Solicitude of the Legislature for
Retailers and Distributors, Depriving Those
Intermediaries of the Benefits of
Comparative Fault Would Be
Absurd
In 1981, despite the general retention of a rule of joint and
several liability, the legislature carved out a special "safe har-
bor" for non-manufacturing product sellers. The legislature
recognized the unfairness of the then prevailing approach that
essentially "ma[d]e each retail merchant an insurer or guaran-
tor of every one of the thousands of items [it] handles merely
as a sales conduit."7 Indeed, as one jurist protested, holding
intermediate sellers of products liable coextensively with the
manufacturer, even though these passive conduits had done
nothing that directly contributed to any injury, was "heavy-
handed to point of injustice." 7 Accordingly, from among all
possible defendants to tort liability claims, the legislature sin-
gled out retailers and distributors for a special dispensation
from the rule of joint and several liability (RCW 7.72.040(1)).
However, in keeping with the mood of the times, there
remained a few exceptions to this protection (RCW
7.72.040(2)).
The legislature has now moved a step further and adopted
a general rule of several liability for all defendants. It would
be absurd to deny the benefit of that comparative fault rule to
the one class of defendants-non-manufacturing product sell-
ers-that had earlier been the beneficiary of special solicitude
from the legislature. Statutes "should be construed to effect
their purpose and unlikely, absurd, or strained consequences
should be avoided. '737 The 1981 Act revealed a strong legisla-
tive intent to restrict the liability of non-manufacturing parties
in products liability cases. It would be perverse to convert
RCW 7.72.040 into a basis for imposing a stricter standard of
liability upon non-manufacturers than the comparative fault
standard which is now applied to nearly all other defendants.
Accordingly, in furtherance of the legislative policy, RCW
4.22.070 should be understood to both take precedence over and
to supplement RCW 7.72.040, thereby permitting imposition of
735. See Sam Shainberg Co. v. Barlow, 258 So. 2d 242, 246 (Miss. 1972).
736. Bailey v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 6 P.2d 108, 117 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967)
(Molloy, J., dissenting).
737. State v. Fermestad, 114 Wash. 2d 828, 835, 791 P.2d 897, 901 (1990).
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joint and several liability against non-manufacturing product
sellers only if permitted by the exceptions or limitations to
both statutes.7"
4. Conclusion
In conclusion, the 1981 and 1986 Act should be harmonized
to the extent possible with primary effect being given to the
more recent 1986 Act when conflict is unavoidable. When
RCW 7.72.040(2) would impose joint and several liability, and
RCW 4.22.070 would not, RCW 4.22.070 prevails. However,
RCW 4.22.070 takes priority only to the extent of conflict with
RCW 7.72.040(2). Thus, when RCW 4.22.070 would permit
application of joint and several liability, RCW 7.72.040(2)
would be given effect as a continuing part of the statutory
code.739
Accordingly, a non-manufacturing product seller may be
held liable as manufacturer for a defect in a product only if
both of the following prerequisites are met:
(1) the plaintiff was entirely blameless in the accident
which led to his or her injury, thereby bringing the case
738. Moreover, statutes should be read so as to avoid constitutional problems. If
RCW 7.72.040 and RCW 4.22.070 are construed in a manner that leaves non-
manufacturing product sellers in a worse position than other tort defendants,
substantial equal protection problems arise. Given that non-manufacturing product
sellers typically are not in a position to contribute to any defect in a product, there are
compelling reasons to give preferential treatment to such sellers. (Indeed, to hold that
a product seller will be held liable only when it is causally responsible for the product
defect is not really preferential treatment at all but merely an application of the basic
element of proximate causation.) There is no principled basis for placing non-
manufacturing product sellers in a disfavored category. Especially given the earlier
solicitude shown by the legislature for passive intermediaries in the distribution chain,
no rational basis would exist for depriving distributors of the full benefits of several
liability under the 1986 Act.
739. Therefore, in some instances, a non-manufacturing product seller may still be
held vicariously liable for the conduct of a manufacturer. If, for example, the plaintiff
is without fault so that joint and several liability may be applied to defendants under
RCW 4.22.070(1)(b), and the manufacturing is joined as a defendant to the judgment
but is insolvent, the product seller would remain responsible under RCW 7.72.040(2)(b)
for the full amount of the plaintiff's damages. This is indeed an anomalous--and I
believe unjustifiable-result. It is also inconsistent with the spirit of tort reform; that
is, the principle that an individual should be held liable only to the extent of its own
responsibility. But when RCW 4.22.070 lifts its general injunction against joint and
several liability, the application of RCW 7.72.040(2) ceases to be in direct conflict.
Thus, as long as RCW 7.72.040(2) remains on the statute books (and assuming no
constitutional infirmities in disparate treatment of product sellers from other
defendants, see supra note 738), it must be given effect when its operation is not
contrary to the provisions of the later enactment.
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within the limited joint and several liability rule of RCW
4.22.070(1)(b), or the case falls within one of the specific
exceptions to comparative fault in RCW 4.22.070(3); and
(2) the case falls within an exception to the retailer
relief statute, thereby allowing application of joint and sev-
eral liability to non-manufacturing product sellers under
RCW 7.72.040(2).
In all other cases, a non-manufacturing product seller may
be held liable only for its own independently culpable conduct.
Fault must be allocated under RCW 4.22.070 among all entities
allegedly responsible for the product, including the manufac-
turer, whether or not the manufacturer is available or is joined
to the lawsuit. As stated in RCW 7.72.040(1), a product seller
will be liable only for its own negligence, the breach of an
express warranty made by the seller, or intentional misrepre-
sentation of facts or concealment of information about the
product, if the product seller's conduct is the proximate cause
of the plaintiff's harm.7 41
A retailer or distributor typically is not responsible for a
defect in a product.741 Having not manufactured or designed
the product, the seller is no more responsible for a manufac-
turing or design defect than the truck company which trans-
ported the product. Moreover, as a general rule, "a seller does
not have a duty to inspect or test a product for possible defects
unless he has reason to know that the product is likely to be
dangerously defective."7 Although a retailer who sells an
article "which is in a condition dangerous to human life" is
required "to exercise reasonable care to ascertain patent
defects," the seller is not liable for injuries resulting from
latent defects and "is not required to dismantle the article or
make a factory type inspection." 743 Even the limited inspection
duty imposed upon sellers of inherently dangerous products
does not apply to a distributor that does not have actual posses-
sion or control of the product.7 " In addition, unless the prod-
740. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.040(1) (1991).
741. Culhane, supra note 675, at 294.
742. Martin v. Schoonover, 13 Wash. App. 48, 55, 533 P.2d 438, 442 (1975). See also
Koker v. Armstrong Cork, Inc., 60 Wash. App. 466, 477, 804 P.2d 659, 666 (1991) (the
duty to inspect a product or test for defects rests on the manufacturer, not the
retailer).
743. Burnett v. Hunt, 5 Wash. App. 385, 391-92, 486 P.2d 1129, 1133 (1971).
744. In Zamora v. Mobil Oil Corporation, 104 Wash. 2d 199, 704 P.2d 584 (1985), the
Washington Supreme Court refused to impose a duty of inspection upon a distributor
of propane who never had possession or control of the gas. Even though propane may
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uct seller is aware of problems with the product, the seller has
no duty to warn of possible defects.745
In sum, a non-manufacturing product seller is unlikely to
be held liable in negligence in the run-of-the-mill case. 46
When RCW 4.22.070 supersedes the exceptions in RCW
7.72.040(2), the unique duties of a product manufacturer with
respect to design, fabrication, inspection, and the duty to warn
may not be transported to a passive product seller, whether or
not the manufacturer is amenable in damages. This conclusion
is hardly surprising or unfair to the consumer. As Professor
Epstein has said, "there is no consumer expectation that [dis-
tributors and retailers] will do more than pass their products
down the chain of distribution. 747
V. The Future of Joint and Several Liability: Statutory Tort
Reform and the Common Law
[A] statute is not an alien intruder in the house of the com-
mon law, but a guest to be welcomed and made at home
there as a new and powerful aid in the accomplishment of its
appointed task of accommodating the law to social needs.
Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone748
A. The Spirit of Statutory Tort Reform as the Inspiration to
Common Law Tort Reform
The courts, of course, are obliged to faithfully and fully
apply RCW 4.22.070, as well as the other provisions of the 1986
be an inherently dangerous product, the court held that the seller had no "duty to
obtain control or possession of the product in order to inspect it." I& at 203, 704 P.2d
at 587 (emphasis in original). As one commentator on product liability has stated, a"consumer generally will be in a better position than an intermediate seller to prevent
injury from occurring, because the middleman may never even touch or see the
defective product." David P. Griffith, Note, Products Liability--Negligence Presumed.
An Evolution, 67 TEx. L. REV. 851, 874-75 (1989).
745. See Zamora, 104 Wash. 2d at 205, 704 P.2d at 588 (seller that was unaware of
any defect had only a duty to warn about general dangers of a product).
746. The more the retailer [seller] is only a conduit for the product, the less
likely he can be held in negligence. Conversely, the more the [seller] takes an
active part in preparing the product for final use and takes the role of a
manufacturer or assembler, the more likely he can be found liable in
negligence.
Martin v. Schoonover, 13 Wash. App. 48, 54-55, 533 P.2d 438, 442 (1975); see also
Zamora v. Mobil Oil Corp., 104 Wash. 2d 199, 204, 704 P.2d 584, 587-88 (1985).
747. EPSTEIN, supra note 691, at 61.
748. Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States 50
HAnv. L. REv. 4, 15 (1936).
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Tort Reform Act, in all circumstances encompassed within the
language of the statute. Likewise, the spirit of tort reform as
enacted by the legislative branch should inspire and inform the
judicial development of the common law in those areas not
subject to the direct command of the statute. In 1986, the
Washington State Legislature spoke to vital questions of public
policy concerning the future of modern tort law and in so
doing purposefully embraced the "primal concept that . . . the
extent of fault should govern the extent of liability-[a princi-
ple that] remains irresistible to reason and all intelligent
notions of fairness. '749  The central concept of comparative
fault adopted by the legislature is "a new generative impulse
transmitted to the legal system."7" Washington courts should
give heed not only to the express charge of the Tort Reform
Act in its specific provisions but also to "the social policy and
judgments expressed in legislation by the lawmaking agency
which is supreme."75'
As Chief Justice Roger J. Traynor said more than twenty
years ago, "we no longer can afford to have judges retreat into
formulism, as they have recurringly done in the past to shield
wooden precedents from any radiations of forward-looking
statutes while they ignored dry rot in the precedents them-
selves. ' 752 From the most ancient of times, common law courts
have appropriately turned to statutorily-declared principles of
law to guide the development of the common law in areas
lying near, but just outside the realm of the statute. 53 For
example, the adoption of statutes in the late nineteenth cen-
tury granting legal powers to married women gave "impetus to
new judge-made rules" further recognizing that women were
749. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1231 (Cal. 1975).
750. See Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., 300 U.S. 342, 351 (1937) ("a legislative
policy ... is itself a source of law, a new generative impulse transmitted to the legal
system").
751. Chief Justice Stone, supra note 748, at 14 ("Apart from its command, the
social policy and judgments expressed in legislation by the lawmaking agency which is
supreme, would seem to merit that judicial recognition which is freely accorded to the
like expression in judicial precedent.").
752. Traynor, supra note 7, at 402.
753. Landis, supra note 67 (describing early common law doctrine of the "equity
of the statute," which extended the effect of statutes beyond their terms to analogous
situations); Page, supra note 65 (discussing historical practice of juristic common law
system in borrowing statutory rules, standards, and principles); Robert F. Williams,
Statutes as Sources of Law Beyond Their Terms in Common-Law Cases, 50 GEO. WASH.




entitled to "participation in the legal benefits of living.""7
Common law judges "amplified the range"7 5 of emancipation
statutes by extending the rights, as well as the responsibilities,
of women into other areas of the law. As the United States
Supreme Court reminds us, "[i]t has always been the duty of
the common law court to perceive the impact of major legisla-
tive innovations and to interweave the new legislative policies
with the inherited body of common law principles-many of
them deriving from earlier legislative exertions."7'
The Washington Tort Reform Act of 1986 builds upon ear-
lier "legislative exertions" in the adoption of comparative neg-
ligence in 1973... and in the 1981 "retailer relief" provision to
ease the harsh impact of joint and several liability upon con-
duits in the chain of product distribution.15  RCW 4.22.070 is
the product of "responsible findings of fact and expressions of
the felt needs of society"7 59 concerning the social effects of
expanding tort liability law, and the attraction of comparative
fault as a foundation for imposing liability. The statutory prin-
ciples adopted by the people's representatives assembled in the
legislature-principles that reflect "the more direct and accu-
rate expression of the popular will"-warrant the deliberate
attention of common law courts.7 ° In sum, the Tort Reform
Act of 1986 should not be regarded by the judiciary as a statute
which is "to be obeyed grudgingly, by construing it narrowly
and treating it as though it did not exist for any purpose other
than that embraced within the strict construction of its
words."761
754. Traynor, supra note 7, at 413. See also Williams, supra note 753, at 583-84;
Landis, supra note 67, at 223-24; McCluskey v. Bechtel Power Corp., 363 So. 2d 256,
262-64 (Miss. 1978) (describing how Mississippi courts in the Nineteenth Century
"receive[d] [the woman's law] into the body of law" as a principle from which to reason
in common law cases).
755. Traynor, supra note 7, at 415.
756. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 392 (1970).
757. Act of April 24, 1973, ch. 138, § 1, 1973 Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess. 949 (codified
as amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.005-.015 (1991)).
758. Product Liability Act, ch. 27, § 5, 1981 Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess. 112 (codified
as amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.040 (1991)). See generally supra part IV.C
(discussing the retailer relief provision).
759. See Willard Hurst, The Content of Courses in Legislation, 8 U. CHI. L. REV.
280, 291 (1941) (encouraging "the study of statutes not as rules but as responsible
findings of fact and expressions of felt needs of society").
760. See Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARv. L. REV. 383, 406
(1908).
761. Stone, supra note 748, at 14 (decrying the mistaken "habit of narrow
construction of statutes" and failure to treat enactments "as recognitions of social
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B. The Message of Statutory Tort Reform for the Common
Law Court
What does it mean to say that the Tort Reform Act of 1986
and the modification of joint and several liability in RCW
4.22.070 should be "receive[d] ... fully into the body of the law
as affording not only a rule to be applied but a principle from
which to reason"?762 It does not mean that the general princi-
ple of comparative fault articulated in the statute must prevail
throughout the law of tort fault-based liability. Indeed, RCW
4.22.070 expressly contemplates a continuing role for joint and
several liability in a number of contexts, including when the
plaintiff is innocent of any contributory fault or when a case
falls within certain general exceptions for cases involving haz-
ardous substances, generic products, or certain business torts.
Indeed, RCW 4.22.030 directs that, "[e]xcept as otherwise pro-
vided in RCW 4.22.070," liability of tortfeasors on an indivisible
claim shall be joint and several.763 Accordingly, statutory tort
reform sends a more subtle, yet nevertheless significant,
message for the common law courts.
To begin with, as discussed earlier,7' RCW 4.22.070 should
be liberally applied with a presumption that the compelling
concept of comparative fault is the general rule of tort liability,
subject only to clearly defined and limited exceptions. The
courts "should not focus the microscope of judicial analysis on
a few words in the entire Act, and in the process erode the
overriding purpose of the Act." '65 The statute's purpose of cor-
relating individual responsibility in damages with the extent of
individual fault should inform all questions of interpretation of
the statute.
In addition, the enactment of the 1986 Tort Reform Act,
and the adoption of new principles of equitable treatment
among parties to liability actions, should be the occasion for a
reexamination by the courts of recent departures from long-
standing rules of the common law. In particular, the courts
should explore anew the extension of joint and several liability
policy"); see also Williams, supra note 753 (criticizing failure of courts to recognize the
persuasive force of policies underlying statutes).
762. See 3 POUND, supra note 68, at 656.
763. WASH. REv. CODE § 4.22.030 (1991).
764. See supra part III.A.2 (discussing the duty of the courts to give full effect to
the intent and spirit of RCW 4.22.070).
765. McCluskey v. Bechtel Power Corp., 363 So. 2d 256, 264 (Miss. 1978)
(interpreting Mississippi workers' compensation statute).
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to contexts where the causal link between a minor actor's con-
duct and the tortious harm is attenuated.
The doctrine of joint and several liability as applied in the
decades leading up to the 1986 Reform Act had come to be
inequitable and unduly expansive in two primary ways. First,
the adoption of comparative negligence had abrogated the arti-
ficial view that a tort claim resulting in indivisible harm was a
unitary wrong incapable of apportionment.7 Once the con-
cept of comparative fault had been applied between plaintiffs
and defendants, it became impossible to justify holding one of
several tortfeasors liable for the entire harm when that
tortfeasor had been at fault only in part. The concept of com-
parative fault-apportioning liability on the basis of percentage
of fault-became irresistible, particularly in those situations
where the plaintiff had also contributed to the injurious
incident.
This first flaw in the doctrine of joint and several liability
has been comprehensively addressed by the Tort Reform Act.
RCW 4.22.070 establishes the general principle of liability in
accordance with comparative fault. This matter is now the
subject of statutory codification. RCW 4.22.070 also marks the
boundaries of comparative fault, by setting forth certain princi-
pled departures from the general rule of several only liability.
In those narrow contexts in which the statute provides for a
continuation of joint and several liability, the courts have no
authority to second-guess that legislative judgment and expand
several liability through common law adjudication. In sum, the
nature and the scope of comparative fault has not been left
open for judicial refinement.
Second, in the years leading up to the Tort Reform Act of
1986, the combination of joint and several liability and the
gradual relaxation of the requirement of proximate causation
had greatly magnified the liability of remote actors whose fault
and contribution to the risk of harm was minimal.7 6 7 By weak-
766. See supra part II.A (discussing the developments in tort law leading to tort
reform).
767. For examples of cases tracing the causal link for an injury beyond the
immediate tortfeasor to more remote actors, see, e.g., Dickinson v. Edwards, 105 Wash.
2d 457, 716 P.2d 814 (1986) (motorcyclist was injured in an accident with an intoxicated
motorist; potential liability extended to restaurant owner and motorist's employer who
furnished and served alcoholic beverages to the motorist); Petersen v. State, 100 Wash.
2d 421, 671 P.2d 230 (1983) (plaintiff was injured when her car was struck by another
vehicle driven by a recently released state hospital psychiatric patient; liability
extended to state psychiatrists who treated and released the patient). See also Martin
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ening the requirement of a direct causal nexus between a
defendant's conduct and an injury to a plaintiff, the courts
multiplied the number of possible targets in a tort lawsuit.
This in turn dramatically increased the likelihood that remote
actors found to have made only a negligible contribution to the
circumstances resulting in injury would nevertheless be
exposed to liability for the entire loss under the doctrine of
joint and several liability.
Peter W. Huber perceptively sketches how the relaxation
of proximate causation permitted plaintiffs' lawyers and a pha-
lanx of experts to
trace out for the jurist all the antecedent causes of a calam-
ity, from the crushed sports car at the intersection, to the
accommodating bartender who had poured drinks for the
driver, to the great-aunt who had lent the car, to General
Motors which had designed it, to the municipality that had
planted the hedge near the traffic light, to the psychiatrist
who had counseled the driver on alcoholism .... The old,
formalist rules would have cut through a crowd like this in
short order, shunning speculation about remote causes on
the assumption that such speculation would more likely
cause accidents in court than prevent them elsewhere. But
with the new rules, the law could range far afield and pur-
sue the most distant suspected malefactors.7 68
The adoption of RCW 4.22.070 resolved one part of the
problem of joint and several liability by endorsing the general
principle of comparative fault and establishing its appropriate
parameters. The other part of the problem-the dilution of
the element of proximate causation-remains to be addressed
through a case-by-case reevaluation by the common law courts.
The spirit of tort reform animating the statutory modification
of joint and several liability modification points the way for a
judicial reconsideration of the extension of liability to remote
and attenuated causes of an injury. Hopefully, the future will
see a revitalization of the requirement of "some direct relation
between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct
v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984) (eliminating the
requirement of proximate causation in the case of injuries resulting from manufacture
of the drug DES, instead imposing a rule of industry-wide apportionment of liability)
(discussed supra part III.H.3).





C. A Trilogy of Cases on Legal Causation: A Model for
Common Law Reform
Even before the enactment of the Tort Reform Act of
1986, a judicial revival of proximate causation was underway in
Washington at the intermediate appellate court level. In a
series of motor vehicle accident cases beginning about the time
that tort reform was adopted legislatively, Division One of the
Washington Court of Appeals reaffirmed the court's common
law authority to declare how far to extend liability for a
defendant's remote actions when an injury occurs as a more
direct result of an immediate cause.
The trilogy of cases began in 1985-less than a year before
the legislature adopted the 1986 tort reform legislation-with
the appellate court's decision in Klein v. City of Seattle.770 A
motorist had been killed when another driver, who was speed-
ing and had been drinking, crossed the center line on a public
bridge and collided with the decedent's automobile.77 Rather
than pursuing the immediate and most obvious wrongdoer-
the other driver-the decedent's estate brought an action
against the City of Seattle, alleging negligent design and main-
tenance of the public roads.772 The jury found that the city had
been negligent but that the city's negligence was not a proxi-
mate cause of the decedent's death.773 On appeal, the Washing-
ton Court of Appeals, Division One, affirmed, holding that the
city's negligence "as a matter of law" was not a proximate
cause of the accident. 774 Given the "extreme carelessness" of
the at-fault driver who had been speeding and crossed the
center line, the court as "a matter of public policy" refused to
hold the city responsible for "guard[ing] against this degree of
negligent driving."775
In the 1989 case of Braegelmann v. Snohomish County,7 76
the same court encountered a very similar situation. A motor-
769. See Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1311, 1318 (1992)
(stating standard for proximate causation under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act).
770. 41 Wash. App. 636, 705 P.2d 806 (1985).
771. Id. at 637, 705 P.2d at 807.
772. Id. at 637, 705 P.2d at 806.
773. Id.
774. Id. at 639, 705 P.2d at 807.
775. Id, at 639, 705 P.2d at 807-08.
776. 53 Wash. App. 381, 766 P.2d 1137 (1989).
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ist was killed and his passenger-daughter was injured when
another "highly intoxicated" and speeding driver crested the
top of a hill on the wrong side of the road and struck the vehi-
cle head on.777 The motorist's wife and the mother of the pas-
senger filed suit both against the at-fault driver, alleging
negligent driving, and against the county, alleging negligent
construction, design, and maintenance of the road.778 The trial
court dismissed the county on summary judgment.779 On
appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals, Division One,
explained that proximate causation consists of two elements-
cause-in-fact and legal causation.7s° Although cause-in-fact is
ordinarily an issue for the trier of fact and thus not susceptible
to summary judgment, the question of legal causation is one
for the courts:
Legal causation... requires a determination of whether lia-
bility should attach as a matter of law, given the existence of
cause in fact. Determining factors in resolving an issue of
legal causation have been described as mixed considerations
of logic, common sense, justice, policy, and precedent. One
of the policy considerations is how far the consequences of
defendant's acts should extend.78'
The court of appeals acknowledged that the plaintiff had
offered expert affidavit testimony that the highway design was
improper and did not afford the at-fault driver sufficient sight
distance, and that the posted speed limit exceeded the maxi-
mum safe speed for the highway.78 2 Nevertheless, on the
authority of Klein, the court ruled that "policy considerations
dictate" that the county had no duty to protect against"extreme conduct. '- 7 83 The court noted that, as in Klein, there
had been a head-on collision in which the at-fault driver was
speeding and crossed the center line.7 4 Moreover, in this case,
there was the "additional factor" of the at-fault driver being
"highly intoxicated" at the time of the collision.7 8 5
The third decision came two years later in the 1991 single
777. I. at 382, 766 P.2d at 1138.
778. Id, at 383, 766 P.2d at 1138-39.
779. Id. at 383, 766 P.2d at 1139.
780. I& at 384, 766 P.2d at 1139.
781. Braegelmann, 53 Wash. App. at 384-85, 766 P.2d at 1139 (citations omitted).
782. Id, at 385, 766 P.2d at 1140.





motorist case of Cunningham v. State.7 Early one morning, a
legally intoxicated motorist drove into a concrete barrier at the
gate to a military base.78 7 Investigators for the motorist con-
cluded that the road to the gate was not properly signed,
lighted, and striped, and that the barrier should have been con-
structed with an impact attenuation device. 78" The motorist's
attorney, however, failed to file a claim against the federal gov-
ernment before expiration of the statute of limitations. 7 9 The
motorist then filed an action for legal malpractice against his
attorneys.790 The trial court granted summary judgment for
the attorneys.7 9 ' Although the attorneys may have been negli-
gent in failing to file a timely action, the Washington Court of
Appeals, Division One, concluded that the motorist would not
have recovered against the federal government.7 9 2
Once again, the court's decision was grounded upon the
legal element of proximate causation. After examining the
factual record, the Cunningham court stated "that neither
logic, common sense, justice, nor policy favors finding legal
causation here. '793  The court cited the following factors:
(1) the motorist had a blood alcohol level twice the legal level
for automobile drivers; (2) the motorist admitted the gate was
sufficiently well lit that he was aware of its presence;
(3) despite his awareness of the gate, the motorist did not sig-
nificantly lessen his speed; and (4) the motorist did not drive
786. 61 Wash. App. 562, 811 P.2d 225 (1991).
787. Id. at 564, 811 P.2d at 226. The motorist's passenger was also seriously
injured. Id. The passenger filed suit in federal court against the motorist, the United
States, and several other entities. IM Several of the claims against the United States
were dismissed on the grounds that the federal government's decisions in designing
and placing the road and barrier involved policy factors and thus were shielded from
liability under the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28
U.S.C.S. § 2680(a) (1990). Id. The passenger's remaining claims were ultimately
settled. Id. at 565.
788. Cunningham, 61 Wash. App. at 564, 811 P.2d at 226.
789. Id. at 565, 811 P.2d at 227.
790. Id. Notwithstanding that the statute of limitations had expired, the motorist
also named various entities that allegedly were responsible for the negligent
construction and design of the road and gate to the military base.
791. Id.
792. The court also concluded that the motorist's claims against the federal
government based upon road and gate design and placement would have been barred
by collateral estoppel. Id at 565-70, 811 P.2d at 227-29. The motorist had been a
defendant to the passenger's earlier action against the United States and, in that
capacity, had vigorously litigated the federal government's liability for those claims
under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Id at 569, 811 P.2d at 229.
793. Cunningham, 61 Wash. App. at 571, 811 P.2d at 230.
University of Puget Sound Law Review
attentively."9 Under these circumstances, and in light of the
precedents of Klein and Braegelmann, the court concluded
that the federal government's negligent failure to provide ade-
quate lighting and striping on the road to the gate was not a
proximate cause of the accident.795
Because these three cases arose before the effective date of
the Tort Reform Act of 1986, RCW 4.22.070 was not applied.
Still, these decisions have continuing importance even under
the new regime of comparative fault.7 In two of the deci-
sions, it is true that the posture of the cases was such that the
exposure of the governmental entity as a remote actor would
be minimal under tort reform, even in the absence of a com-
plete dismissal on proximate causation grounds. However, in
the remaining case of the trilogy, application of RCW 4.22.070
would not protect the governmental entity from being held
fully responsible in damages despite the minimal and attenu-
ated degree of causation. A reasonable result in this third case
depends upon the court's revitalization of legal causation as a
meaningful limitation on the bounds of tort liability.
I will illustrate this point by examining the facts of each
case with an application of RCW 4.22.070. In Klein, the motor-
ist's estate brought suit only against the city and neglected to
name the at-fault driver.7" Under RCW 4.22.070, fault never-
theless would be allocated against an unjoined at-fault
driver.v98 Even if the city's negligence were regarded as one
proximate cause of the accident, the great share of the fault
certainly would be allocated to the unjoined at-fault driver
based upon his "extreme carelessness. ' ' 799 And because the at-
fault driver was not joined as a defendant to the action, the
city would not be responsible for that proportionate share of
the damages attributable to the percentage share of fault allo-
794. Id.
795. Id.
796. This trilogy of cases on legal causation has had influence beyond Division
One of the Washington Court of Appeals. In Re v. Tenney, 56 Wash. App. 394, 783
P.2d 632 (1989), Division Two of the Court of Appeals applied Braegelmann in the
context of a motorcyclist's collision with a truck. The Re court held that a grain
elevator operator's negligence in permitting obstruction of a highway was not a
proximate cause of the accident. The truck driver had made a change of lane and the
motorcyclist was inattentive and driving at excessive speed when he attempted to pass
the truck on the left and then collided with the truck. Id at 398-99, 783 P.2d at 634.
797. K/ein, 41 Wash. App. at 637, 705 P.2d at 807.
798. See supra part III.C.l.f (discussing allocation of fault to nonparty entities).
799. See Klein, 41 Wash. App. at 639, 705 P.2d at 807.
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cated to the nonparty driver.80° Accordingly, even if the
deceased motorist was free from contributory fault, the estate
would not be able to charge the city with liability for more
than its presumably small share of the damages attributable to
its small share of the fault.
In Cunningham, the application of RCW 4.22.070 would
have had even less effect. That case involved a one car acci-
dent.801 Before the Tort Reform Act of 1986, the comparative
negligence statute already provided for an allocation of fault
between plaintiffs and defendants. Even if the Cunningham
court had determined that the federal government bore some
legal responsibility for the accident, a comparative negligence
analysis should expose the government to little liability. The
trier of fact undoubtedly would have allocated a minimal share
of the fault to the government in comparison with the plaintiff
himself, as a highly intoxicated driver who drove at full speed
into an obstruction of which he admitted he was at least some-
what aware. 0 2 Of course, in both Klein and Cunningham,
even a proportionate allocation of responsibility would have
left the governmental entities involved liable in at least some
small measure, notwithstanding the remoteness of their pur-
portedly negligent conduct from the injury to the motorists.
More importantly, the remaining Braegelmann case illus-
trates the vital and continuing importance of the legal causa-
tion trilogy even in the world of comparative fault. In
Braegelmann, the deceased motorist's estate brought suit both
against the at-fault driver for negligent driving and against the
county for negligent road construction and design.0 3 Given
the extreme conduct of the at-fault driver in speeding, crossing
the center line, and being highly intoxicated,0 4 the trier of fact
would presumably allocate most of the fault to that driver and
assign a minimal share of fault to the county.
However, the facts of the Braegelmann case indicate that
the deceased motorist was likely without contributory fault, as
he apparently was proceeding safely in his own lane of traffic
when the at-fault driver crested a hill at high speed and on the
800. See supra part III.C.l.f (discussing allocation of fault to nonparty entities) and
part III.F (discussing the limited form of joint and several liability among defendants
liable to an innocent plaintiff).
801. Cunningham, 61 Wash. App. at 564, 811 P.2d at 226.
802. See id, at 572, 811 P.2d at 230.
803. Braegelmann, 53 Wash. App. at 383, 766 P.2d at 1138-39.
804. Id at 386, 766 P.2d at 1140.
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wrong side of the road."°5 Under Paragraph (1)(b) of RCW
4.22.070, when the person suffering injury is without fault, "the
defendants against whom judgment is entered shall be jointly
and severally liable for the sum of their proportionate shares"
of the damages."° Although the county's share of fault might
be markedly small-perhaps as low as one percent-the county
would remain jointly and severally liable with the at-fault
driver who had been joined to the lawsuit.0 7 In the not
uncommon event that the at-fault driver would be unable to
satisfy his or her share of the damages, the county as the "deep
pocket" would be left with the public treasury doors wide
open.
The Braegelmann legal causation ruling intervenes to pre-
vent that absurd result. Accordingly, even after tort reform,
the Klein-Braegelmann-Cunningham trilogy remains as an
important judicial limitation upon the liability of remote and
often minor actors, at least when a more immediate actor has
engaged in particularly egregious conduct.
In its most recent foray into the question of legal causation
in the context of motor vehicle accidents, the Washington
Court of Appeals, Division One, refused to extend the legal
causation holding in Braegelmann to a case that arguably
involved less egregious conduct on the part of the motorist. In
Stephens v. City of Seattle,808 a motorcyclist, who apparently
had been drinking and was speeding, was injured when he
struck a negligently designed curb.8 0 9 The motorcyclist
brought suit against the city for negligent design of the inter-
section.81 0 The trial court granted summary judgment on prox-
imate causation grounds, but the court of appeals reversed.1 1
Because this was an appeal from a summary judgment and the
evidence on the motorcyclist's speed and alcohol level was con-
flicting, the court was obliged to look at the evidence in the
light most favorable to the motorcyclist .8  Although there
was evidence that the motorcyclist had been drinking, but was
not legally intoxicated, the results of the blood alcohol test
805. Id. at 382, 386, 766 P.2d at 1137, 1138.
806. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1)(b) (1991).
807. See supra part III.F (discussing the limited form of joint and several liability
among defendants liable to an innocent plaintiff).
808. 62 Wash. App. 140, 813 P.2d 608 (1991).
809. i& at 141, 813 P.2d at 609.
810. Id.
811. Id.
812. Id. at 142-43, 813 P.2d at 609.
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were disputed."' 3 Moreover, the motorcyclist may have
exceeded by only five miles per hour that speed which an
expert witness postulated as the basis for his opinion that the
hazardous roadway, rather than the rate of speed, was the
cause of the acccident 14 Under these circumstances, the court
said it could not hold "as a matter of law that the sole proxi-
mate cause" of the accident was the motorcyclist's own
negligence.815
Because the speed limit was 30 miles per hour8 16 and the
court assumed the motorcyclist had been traveling about 20
miles in excess of that posted limit,8 1 7 and because the hospi-
tal's blood test indicated he had been drinking alcohol,818 the
Stephens decision may be questioned. In accord with the court
in Klein,; I would ask whether a city designing a road must
guard against the possibility that the road will be used by
someone who displays the combined negligence of operating a
motor vehicle after drinking and substantially exceeding the
speed limit. Nevertheless, while I might quibble with the par-
ticular result, the Stephens decision reflects no retreat from
the court's revival of a meaningful limit on legal causation.
The result in Stephens turns primarily upon the substantially
unsettled state of the factual record on summary judgment,
with significant disputes about the results of the blood alcohol
test and the various estimates of the motorcyclist's speed. 20
Viewing the disputed facts of the case in the light most
favorable to the motorcyclist, a reasonable court could con-
clude that the city's purportedly negligent design of the inter-
section was not a remote but rather a directly contributing
cause of the accident. Moreover, although the question of legal
causation arises in a single vehicle accident as well as a multi-
ple vehicle accident,8 2 ' a finding of a superseding cause that
813. Stephens, 62 Wash. App. at 142, 813 P.2d at 609.
814. Id. at 144, 813 P.2d at 610. The speed limit at the intersection was 30 miles
per hour. Id. at 142, 813 P.2d at 609. For purposes of the summary judgment motion,
the Court accepted the lower estimate of the motorcyclist's speed as 50 miles per hour.
Id. at 144, 813 P.2d 610. An expert witness stated that the hazardous condition of the
roadway was the cause of the crash, assuming a motorcycle speed of 45 miles per hour.
Id. at 143-44, 813 P.2d at 609.
815. Stephens, 62 Wash. App. at 144, 813 P.2d at 610.
816. Id at 142, 813 P.2d at 609.
817. Id at 144, 813 P.2d at 610.
818. Id. at 142, 813 P.2d at 609.
819. Klein, 41 Wash. App. at 639, 705 P.2d at 807.
820. Stephens, 62 Wash. App. at 142-44, 813 P.2d at 609-10.
821. In Cunningham, 61 Wash. App. at 572, 811 P.2d at 230, the court held that,
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breaks the chain of causation is more likely to occur in a con-
text where the egregious conduct of yet another tortfeasor
intervenes to directly cause harm to the plaintiff. More impor-
tantly, whatever the merits of the particular decision in Ste-
phens, the case is one more example that the Washington
appellate courts are continuing to exercise the supervisory
common law role of determining in each case whether, as a
matter of public policy, "the connection between defendant's
act and its ultimate result is 'too remote or insubstantial to
impose liability.' ",822 The enduring exercise of this judicial
authority is more important than the result it produces in a
particular case.
D. Conclusion
The legislature's enactment of the Tort Reform Act of
1986 was "but one stage in an ongoing process of development
of the law. '8 2' The torch has now been passed back to the
courts. The spirit of the Tort Reform Act in general, and of
RCW 4.22.070 in particular, should continue to inspire the
evolution of common law joint and several liability. In the
future, in those few areas where joint and several liability still
applies, the courts should demand a closer nexus between the
culpable conduct alleged and the injury or damage asserted
before a defendant may be held responsible as a joint
tortfeasor. In the role of a common law court, the judiciary
should exercise its authority to limit the scope of liability
within proper bounds by asking "whether the conduct has
been so significant and important a cause that the defendant
should be legally responsible. 8 24 The common law revitaliza-
tion of a meaningful limit of legal causation, together with the
statutory adoption of comparative fault, will serve the ends of
justice and of true reform.
although the case involved a one car accident, Klein and Braegelmann could not be
distinguished on the ground they involved two car accidents. The court held that
"[flor purposes of a legal causation analysis, this is a distinction without a difference."
Id As the court stated, the question remains whether as a matter of policy, "the
connection between defendant's act and its ultimate result is 'too remote or
insubstantial to impose liability.'" Id. (citation omitted).
822. Id. (quoting Hartley v. State, 103 Wash. 2d 768, 781, 698 P.2d 77, 86 (1985)).
823. See Williams, supra note 753, at 558 (citing JAMES WILLARD HURST, DEALING
WITH STATUTES 40 (1982)).




Although it has been six years since the enactment of
RCW 4.22.070, the statute remains in its infancy. Litigating
attorneys are still learning the ramifications of the changes
and studying how to respond to them in terms of litigation and
settlement strategy. The Washington appellate courts have yet
to address most of the issues that have or will arise in the
application of the comparative responsibility principle. In the
life of the law, six years is a very short time. There are always"growing pains" as a new statute is implemented in practice.8 25
It is not surprising that there remains some degree of uncer-
tainty about the full meaning and effect of this dramatic
change in the ground rules for modern tort liability.
Nevertheless, as I have attempted to show through this
Article's comprehensive examination of the statute's provi-
sions, the basic contours of the enactment stand out sharply
and clearly. The plain language of RCW 4.22.070 and each of
its subsections and paragraphs, together with an appreciation
of the legislative intent reflected both in the structure and
wording of the statute and in the legislative history, enshrine
the central principle of comparative fault. Indeed, RCW
4.22.070 may properly be denominated as the Washington Com-
parative Fault Act.
The State of Washington, through enactment of RCW
4.22.070, has set its feet firmly on the path of comparative fault
as a measure of responsibility, subject only to the limited quali-
fications and narrow exceptions delineated in the statute.
Under this Washington Comparative Fault Act, the extent of
liability ordinarily will be commensurate with the degree of
fault. If the courts adhere to that basic understanding, the
promise of tort reform will be fulfilled.
825. Eilbacher, supra note 170, at 923 (discussing implementation of the new
Indiana comparative fault statute).
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